character claim in Washington

2006A claim is unliquidated “ ‘where the exact amount of the sum to be allowed cannot be definitely fixed from the facts proved, disputed or undisputed, but must in the last analysis depend upon the opinion or discretion of the judge or jury as to whether a larger or a smaller amount should be allowed.’ ” Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wn.2d 468, 473 , 730 P.2d 662 (1986) (quoting Prier, 74 Wn.2d at 33 ). “ ‘[T]he existence of a dispute over the whole or part of the claim should not change the character of the claim from one for a liquidated, to one for an unliquidated, sum ....’” Prier, 74 Wn.2d at 33 (e

2006A claim is unliquidated “ ‘where the exact amount of the sum to be allowed cannot be definitely fixed from the facts proved, disputed or undisputed, but must in the last analysis depend upon the opinion or discretion of the judge or jury as to whether a larger or a smaller amount should be allowed.’ ” Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wn.2d 468, 473 , 730 P.2d 662 (1986) (quoting Prier, 74 Wn.2d at 33 ). “ ‘[T]he existence of a dispute over the whole or part of the claim should not change the character of the claim from one for a liquidated, to one for an unliquidated, sum ....’” Prier, 74 Wn.2d at 33 (e

2004MCCORMICK, Handbook on the Law of Damages, § 54, at 216 (1935) (quoted in Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 686 , 15 P.3d 115 ; Prier, 74 Wash.2d at 33 , 442 P.2d 621 ).

2004McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, § 54, at 216 (1935) (quoted in Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wn.2d at 686 ; Prier, 74 Wn.2d at 33 ).

2020It is the character of the claim and not of the defense that determines the question.”58 There, the court determined there was data available to compute the exact costs of repairs, so the plaintiff’s claims were for a liquidated sum on which interest would be allowed. 59 Here, the trial court determined, “Scarsella’s request for an award of prejudgment interest cannot be granted because Scarsella is not a prevailing party against Flatiron, and because the principal judgment amount is not based upon a liquidated sum.” The trial court compared this case to Wright v. City of Tacoma where the cour

2017IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS§ 5.06[1], at 221 (9th ed. 2015) ("The majority view ... is that opinion evidence is also admissible."); People v. Barber, 74 N.Y.2d 653, 655-58 , 541 N.E.2d 394 , 394-97, 543 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1989) (Titone, J. dissenting) (collecting rule 2 No. 34334-1-111 State v. Chavez (dissent) and case citations reflecting the modem, majority approach). 1 A reputation witness in Washington cannot support her knowledge of another witness's reputation as untruthful with examples; all she can provide in direct examination is what the United States Supreme Court described in

2004MCCORMICK, Handbook on the Law of Damages, § 54, at 216 (1935) (quoted in Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 686 , 15 P.3d 115 ; Prier, 74 Wash.2d at 33 , 442 P.2d 621 ).

1990This is pointed out in a perceptive opinion by Hamley, J., in State v. Goebel, 40 Wash. 2d 18 , 240 P.2d 251 (1952), quoted in §357 n. 1, infra. Without the limitation, the theory may be the vehicle for a violation of the character rule.

1990This is pointed out in a perceptive opinion by Hamley, J., in State v. Goebel, 40 Wash. 2d 18 , 240 P.2d 251 (1952), quoted in §357 n. 1, infra. Without the limitation, the theory may be the vehicle for a violation of the character rule.

1978Insurance Co. of North America v. Insurance Co., 17 Wn.

1968(Italics ours.) To the same effect is the opinion in Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161 , 79 N.W. 327 (1899), quoted extensively in 5 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1046 n.69 (1964): “It may be safely said that the tendency has been in favor of allowing interest rather than against it, and that the degree of certainty or ease with which the approximate amount can be ascertained has grown less and less stringent. . . .

1968(Italics ours.) To the same effect is the opinion in Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161 , 79 N.W. 327 (1899), quoted extensively in 5 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1046 n.69 (1964): “It may be safely said that the tendency has been in favor of allowing interest rather than against it, and that the degree of certainty or ease with which the approximate amount can be ascertained has grown less and less stringent. . . .

1967Nor does this assignment of error fall within the rationale of State v. Case, 49 Wn.2d 66 , 298 P.2d 500 (1956), which involved misconduct of a deputy prosecuting attorney of so flagrant a character that no instruction could cure it and therefore objection was not essential to review of such misconduct.

1967Nor does this assignment of error fall within the rationale of State v. Case, 49 Wn.2d 66 , 298 P.2d 500 (1956), which involved misconduct of a deputy prosecuting attorney of so flagrant a character that no instruction could cure it and therefore objection was not essential to review of such misconduct.

1956In re Alvino (1940), 111 F. (2d) 642; In re Adler (1907), 152 Fed. 422 .

1945Nor will relief be denied where, in the circumstances, the negligence of the party seeking relief is excusable.” We said, a number of years ago, in Rosenbaum v. Evans, 63 Wash. 506 , 115 Pac. 1054 , an action to reform a deed: “We cannot think that the mere failure of either party to a deed to read it operates as a bar to an action for its reformation, based upon error in the description.” Here, the error in description was, as the trial court found, the very means used to perpetrate a fraud, and we cannot think that the respondents’ failure to detect it by the use of the plat on the fifth pag

1945Nor will relief be denied where, in the circumstances, the negligence of the party seeking relief is excusable.” We said, a number of years ago, in Rosenbaum v. Evans, 63 Wash. 506 , 115 Pac. 1054 , an action to reform a deed: “We cannot think that the mere failure of either party to a deed to read it operates as a bar to an action for its reformation, based upon error in the description.” Here, the error in description was, as the trial court found, the very means used to perpetrate a fraud, and we cannot think that the respondents’ failure to detect it by the use of the plat on the fifth pag

1943The character of the cause of action is determined by the character of the claim filed. 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, p. 1536, §§ 896, 897; Zuhn v. Horst, 100 Wash. 359 , 170 Pac. 1033 ; Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588 , 60 Pac. 45 ; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448 , 138 Pac. 772 .

1943The character of the cause of action is determined by the character of the claim filed. 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, p. 1536, §§ 896, 897; Zuhn v. Horst, 100 Wash. 359 , 170 Pac. 1033 ; Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588 , 60 Pac. 45 ; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448 , 138 Pac. 772 .

1943The character of the cause of action is determined by the character of the claim filed. 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, p. 1536, §§ 896, 897; Zuhn v. Horst, 100 Wash. 359 , 170 Pac. 1033 ; Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588 , 60 Pac. 45 ; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448 , 138 Pac. 772 .

1943The character of the cause of action is determined by the character of the claim filed. 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, p. 1536, §§ 896, 897; Zuhn v. Horst, 100 Wash. 359 , 170 Pac. 1033 ; Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588 , 60 Pac. 45 ; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448 , 138 Pac. 772 .

1943The character of the cause of action is determined by the character of the claim filed. 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, p. 1536, §§ 896, 897; Zuhn v. Horst, 100 Wash. 359 , 170 Pac. 1033 ; Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588 , 60 Pac. 45 ; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448 , 138 Pac. 772 .

1943The character of the cause of action is determined by the character of the claim filed. 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, p. 1536, §§ 896, 897; Zuhn v. Horst, 100 Wash. 359 , 170 Pac. 1033 ; Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588 , 60 Pac. 45 ; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448 , 138 Pac. 772 .

1908Co., 191 N. Y. 416 .) “ When it is intended to except to a specific proposition or to particular remarks of a judge in his charge to the jury, the counsel making the exception should put his finger on the proposition clearly and distinctly, beyond any question, and employ language entirely plain, so that there can be no doubt as to the real character of the exception, or as to what was actually intended.

1903The rules which govern amendments are now to be regarded without reference to the character of the defense.” The same rule was announced in Roche v. Spokane County, 22 Wash. 121 , 60 Pac. 59 , where the trial court permitted the defendant to file a special demurrer raising the defense of the statute of limitations, after a general demurrer had been overruled and after the same defense had been, on motion, stricken from defendant’s answer.

1903The rules which govern amendments are now to be regarded without reference to the character of the defense.” The same rule was announced in Roche v. Spokane County, 22 Wash. 121 , 60 Pac. 59 , where the trial court permitted the defendant to file a special demurrer raising the defense of the statute of limitations, after a general demurrer had been overruled and after the same defense had been, on motion, stricken from defendant’s answer.

1903Also McClaine v. Fairchild, 23 Wash. 758 , 63 Pac. 517 , where the court, after stating the contention of the appel lant that it was particularly insisted that the plea of the statute of limitations was not viewed favorably, said: “But such view of the statute of limitations is not now, we think, usual or supported by the weight of authority;” citing with approval Morgan v. Morgan, supra, and the cases cited therein; and also 13 Enc.

1903Also McClaine v. Fairchild, 23 Wash. 758 , 63 Pac. 517 , where the court, after stating the contention of the appel lant that it was particularly insisted that the plea of the statute of limitations was not viewed favorably, said: “But such view of the statute of limitations is not now, we think, usual or supported by the weight of authority;” citing with approval Morgan v. Morgan, supra, and the cases cited therein; and also 13 Enc.