character defense in Wyoming

2025See Pennant, ¶ 40, 249 P.3d at 712 (citing Laramie Rivers, 565 P.2d at 1245 ); KM Upstream, ¶ 46, 278 P.3d at 727 (citing Wells Fargo, ¶ 61, 144 P.3d at 421 ). “‘[T]he existence of a dispute over the whole or part of the claim should not change the character of the claim from one for a liquidated, to one for an unliquidated sum. . . .’” Universal Drilling, ¶ 47, 271 P.3d at 1001 (quoting Rissler & McMurry, 559 P.2d at 33 ). [¶25] The Ropkens argue that the amount could not be considered liquidated because the jury did not award the full $276,169.

2012We stated that it is the character of the claim rather than the defense that determines whether the amount in dispute is liquidated. " '[TJhe existence of a dispute over the whole or part of the claim should not change the character of the claim from one for a liquidated, to one for an unliquidated sum. ...'" Rissler, 559 P.2d at 83 , quoting MeCormick on Damages, § 54, 215-16.

2025See Pennant, ¶ 40, 249 P.3d at 712 (citing Laramie Rivers, 565 P.2d at 1245 ); KM Upstream, ¶ 46, 278 P.3d at 727 (citing Wells Fargo, ¶ 61, 144 P.3d at 421 ). “‘[T]he existence of a dispute over the whole or part of the claim should not change the character of the claim from one for a liquidated, to one for an unliquidated sum. . . .’” Universal Drilling, ¶ 47, 271 P.3d at 1001 (quoting Rissler & McMurry, 559 P.2d at 33 ). [¶25] The Ropkens argue that the amount could not be considered liquidated because the jury did not award the full $276,169.

2025See Pennant, ¶ 40, 249 P.3d at 712 (citing Laramie Rivers, 565 P.2d at 1245 ); KM Upstream, ¶ 46, 278 P.3d at 727 (citing Wells Fargo, ¶ 61, 144 P.3d at 421 ). “‘[T]he existence of a dispute over the whole or part of the claim should not change the character of the claim from one for a liquidated, to one for an unliquidated sum. . . .’” Universal Drilling, ¶ 47, 271 P.3d at 1001 (quoting Rissler & McMurry, 559 P.2d at 33 ). [¶25] The Ropkens argue that the amount could not be considered liquidated because the jury did not award the full $276,169.

1993Addressing the duty to defend, the plurality opinion held that “the significant involvement of a negligence complaint in the litigation created a duty to defend unless the particular character of the claim for damage resulting from negligence establishes, as a matter of law, that coverage under any construction of the pleadings could not be invoked.” First Wyoming Bank, 860 P.2d at 1082 .

1993The opinion concluded: “Issues of the duty to defend and scope and extent of that duty raised by the negligence complaint were improperly determined by the summary judgment granted to the insurer to deny duty to defend.” First Wyoming Bank, 860 P.2d at 1083 .

1990Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752 , 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) and found that the charged defendant had no right to choose treatment as an alternative to prosecution in State v. Graves, 58 Or.

1990Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752 , 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) and found that the charged defendant had no right to choose treatment as an alternative to prosecution in State v. Graves, 58 Or.App. 286 , 648 P.2d 866 (1982).

1990Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752 , 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) and found that the charged defendant had no right to choose treatment as an alternative to prosecution in State v. Graves, 58 Or.

1990Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752 , 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) and found that the charged defendant had no right to choose treatment as an alternative to prosecution in State v. Graves, 58 Or.

1990App. 169 , 602 P.2d 346 (1979) and the character of a hearing, if any, to terminate upon decision of the prosecutor in State ex rel.

1990Anderson v. Haas, 43 Or.App. 169 , 602 P.2d 346 (1979) and the character of a hearing, if any, to terminate upon decision of the prosecutor in State ex rel.

1987Keefer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49 , 73 P. 556, 559 (1903): “ ‘ * * * It must be made clearly to appear that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed impartial.’ * * * The accused was under no obligation to disclose the character of his defense at this stage of the proceedings; but, if he chose to hold it in reserve, he cannot complain that the examination did not direct the attention of the jurors to it, or disclose whether any of them had formed any opinion in regard to it.” Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407 , 329 P.2d 25

1987Keefer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49 , 73 P. 556, 559 (1903): "`* * * It must be made clearly to appear that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed impartial.' * * * The accused was under no obligation to disclose the character of his defense at this stage of the proceedings; but, if he chose to hold it in reserve, he cannot complain that the examination did not direct the attention of the jurors to it, or disclose whether any of them had formed any opinion in regard to it." *560 Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407 , 329 P.2d

1987Keefer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49 , 73 P. 556, 559 (1903): "`* * * It must be made clearly to appear that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed impartial.' * * * The accused was under no obligation to disclose the character of his defense at this stage of the proceedings; but, if he chose to hold it in reserve, he cannot complain that the examination did not direct the attention of the jurors to it, or disclose whether any of them had formed any opinion in regard to it." *560 Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407 , 329 P.2d

1987Keefer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49 , 73 P. 556, 559 (1903): "`* * * It must be made clearly to appear that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed impartial.' * * * The accused was under no obligation to disclose the character of his defense at this stage of the proceedings; but, if he chose to hold it in reserve, he cannot complain that the examination did not direct the attention of the jurors to it, or disclose whether any of them had formed any opinion in regard to it." *560 Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407 , 329 P.2d

1976This Court also said, quoting from Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224 , at 12 Wyo. 64 , 73 P. 559 : “ * * * ‘Where the answer of the juror is fairly susceptible of a construction consistent with his impartiality, the challenging party, if he claims that a different construction should be put upon it, should follow up his inquiries so as to elicit the real facts; and he cannot reasonably require that the juror shall be excluded on the ground that the examination, which he has chosen to leave imperfect, does not exclude all inference of bias.’ * * * ” When read in conjunction with the requirements of

1976This Court also said, quoting from Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224 , at 12 Wyo. 64 , 73 P. 559 : "* * * `Where the answer of the juror is fairly susceptible of a construction consistent with his impartiality, the challenging party, if he claims that a different construction should be put upon it, should follow up his inquiries so as to elicit the real facts; and he cannot reasonably require that the juror shall be excluded on the ground that the examination, which he has chosen to leave imperfect, does not exclude all inference of bias.' * * *" When read in conjunction with the requirements of §

1939Courts of undoubted authority have held that under circumstances of this character the doctrine of laches should be applied to a claim for reimbursement. *362 In Crocker v. Dougherty, 139 Calif. 521, 73 P. 429 , a suit to quiet title to certain real property, the evidence was, as stated by the court: “(1) A stipulation to the effect ‘that the plaintiff was, at the commencement of the suit, the owner of the lands and premises described in the complaint, except in so far as the said lands and premises might be affected and incumbered by the liens asserted by the defendant, based on the tax certi

1907The issue was clear and the case does not come within the rule announced in Kenezleber v. Wahl, 28 Pac., 225 , where the answer and the cross-complaint did not disclose the nature of the defendant’s case, and for that reason it was held that the plaintiff could not anticipate the character of the defense.

1903Unless he shows the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside, and it will not be error in the court to refuse to do so.” (Reynolds v. The United States, 98 U. S., 145 ; Carter v. Territory, 3 Wyo., 193 .) The accused was itnder no obligation to disclose the character of his defense at this stage of the proceedings, but, if he chose to hold it in reserve, he' cannot complain that the examination did not direct the attention of the jurors to it or disclose whether any of them had formed a

1903Unless he shows the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside, and it will not be error in the court to refuse to do so.” (Reynolds v. The United States, 98 U. S., 145 ; Carter v. Territory, 3 Wyo., 193 .) The accused was itnder no obligation to disclose the character of his defense at this stage of the proceedings, but, if he chose to hold it in reserve, he' cannot complain that the examination did not direct the attention of the jurors to it or disclose whether any of them had formed a