character defense in Illinois

1982The reviewing court held that the purchase agreement was unenforceable for lack of a full, prior appropriation for that purpose, stating: “In the case of Commissioners of Highways v. Newell, 80 Ill. 587 , the court said: ‘With quasi corporations of this character the rule obtains that their power to impose taxes or incur indebtedness will be strictly construed.’ In this case it was further held: ‘It, then, follows that they have no power to legally incur an indebtedness for road and bridge purposes beyond the amount of the taxes already levied for that year.

1930In the case of Commissioners of Highways v. Newell, 80 Ill. 587 , the court said: “With quasi corporations of this character the rule obtains that their power to impose taxes or incur indebtedness will be strictly construed.” In this case it was further held: “It, then, follows that they have no power to legally incur an indebtedness for road and bridge purposes beyond the amount of the taxes already levied for that year.

2019See Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 549 ; Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 443 . ¶ 59 Here, when Mudge initially told jurors that the defense threw “a bunch of crap up on the wall” for them to consider, she followed the comment with a discussion focusing on the 18 inconsistent explanations offered by the defense for Jasean’s injuries, including the statements the defendant himself gave to police.

2019See Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 549 ; Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 443 . ¶ 59 Here, when Mudge initially told jurors that the defense threw “a bunch of crap up on the wall” for them to consider, she followed the comment with a discussion focusing on the 18 inconsistent explanations offered by the defense for Jasean’s injuries, including the statements the defendant himself gave to police.

2024App. 3d 686, 692-93 , 826 N.E.2d 391, 398-99 (2005), which states the following: “In order to determine whether a claim filed pursuant to a state statute or common law tort is preempted, we examine the character of the claim. [Citation.] Where a matter is purely a question of state law and is entirely independent of any understanding of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, it may proceed as a state-law claim. [Citation.] By contrast, where the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim will be preempted. [Citation.]

2024App. 3d 686, 692-93 , 826 N.E.2d 391, 398-99 (2005), which states the following: “In order to determine whether a claim filed pursuant to a state statute or common law tort is preempted, we examine the character of the claim. [Citation.] Where a matter is purely a question of state law and is entirely independent of any understanding of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, it may proceed as a state-law claim. [Citation.] By contrast, where the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim will be preempted. [Citation.]

2021Co., 253 F.3d 283 , 285 (7th Cir. 2001)). ¶ 35 In determining “whether a claim filed pursuant to a state statute or common law tort is preempted, we examine the character of the claim.” Gelb, 356 Ill.

2005Baker, 387 F.3d at 657 .

1988As stated above, the comments we have described were not objected to, but considering the evidence here, the serious character of the error, and that the jurors voted to impose the death penalty, we will recognize them as plain error." ( Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 128 .) Arguments that this case involves plain error are even more compelling than those in People v. Adams .

1988As stated above, the comments we have described were not objected to, but considering the evidence here, the serious character of the error, and that the jurors voted to impose the death penalty, we will recognize them as plain error.” (Adams, 109 Ill. 2d at 128 .) Arguments that this case involves plain error are even more compelling than those in People v. Adams.

1986The majority holds that the defendant had the burden of either showing that he was prejudiced by Mrs. Trigleth's jury service ( 111 Ill.2d at 404 ), or "that the relationship between the juror and the victim's mother was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice would arise therefrom." 111 Ill.2d at 404 .

1986The majority holds that the defendant had the burden of either showing that he was prejudiced by Mrs. Trigleth's jury service ( 111 Ill.2d at 404 ), or "that the relationship between the juror and the victim's mother was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice would arise therefrom." 111 Ill.2d at 404 .

1985People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 463, 488 ; People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 533 .

1985The Illinois Supreme Court in Beebe v. Kirkpatrick (1926), 321 Ill. 612 , 152 N.E. 539 , examined the character of a claim based on a guaranty of payment.

1985The Illinois Supreme Court in Beebe v. Kirkpatrick (1926), 321 Ill. 612 , 152 N.E. 539 , examined the character of a claim based on a guaranty of payment.

1985People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 463, 488 ; People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 533 .

1984While the use of this phrase has been held to be improper (People v. Wilson (1983), 120 Ill.

1982In other words, they can in no one year expend, lawfully, more than the amount levied for that year.’ So by analogy the commissioner of highways in the case at bar could not lawfully contract an indebtedness for machinery beyond the amount which had been levied therefor.” ( 256 Ill.

1982Simonson v. Simonson (1970), 128 Ill.

1981In People v. Rivera (1978), 62 Ill.

1980Although a cheater bar may not be as inherently dangerous a weapon as those employed in Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co. (5th Cir. 1963), 325 F.2d 397 , and Smith v. American Mail Line Ltd., when proper consideration is given to both the character of the bar and the manner in which Epps used it, we must find, as did the courts in Clevenger and Smith, that the attack was sufficiently aggravated in nature to support a finding of unseaworthiness.

1978App. 3d 500, 503 , 375 N.E.2d 557 ), stands for the proposition that cases involving mental commitment orders are a general exception to the mootness doctrine and Boyd assumes the character of an exception to that exception, and one that is not applicable to the facts of this case.

1975Ed. 319 , 40 S. Ct. 182 .) The character of this inquiry was described by the Supreme Court as “ *** ‘whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is [being] made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 488 .

1975Ed. 319 , 40 S. Ct. 182 .) The character of this inquiry was described by the Supreme Court as “ *** ‘whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is [being] made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 488 .

1964Alschuler v. Schiff, 164 Ill 298, 45 NE 424 , a case frequently cited, best illustrates the character of the defense of surrender and acceptance.

1963As we said in People v. Marino, 414 Ill. 445 at 450: “While the court has a wide discretion in the conduct of a trial, it must not invade the province of the jury by making comments, insinuations or suggestions indicative of belief or disbelief in the integrity or credibility of a witness. [Citing cases].

1946(People v. Lukoszus, 242 Ill. 101 .) That was not the character of defense defendant interposed.

1943(Brownlie v. Brownlie, 351 Ill. 72 ; Wetzel v. Firebaugh, 251 Ill. 190 .) The disqualifying interest must be an actual one and not a belief or theory which the witness may have regarding such interest.

1943(Brownlie v. Brownlie, 351 Ill. 72 ; Wetzel v. Firebaugh, 251 Ill. 190 .) The disqualifying interest must be an actual one and not a belief or theory which the witness may have regarding such interest.

1941(Proffitt v. County of Christian, 370 Ill. 530 .) The obligation of the county to pay such accrued amounts took the form of a debt founded on a contract implied in law or quasi contract.

1941(People v. Rukavina, 338 Ill. 128 ; People v. Rongetti, 331 id. 581; People v. Birger, 329 id. 352; People v. Johnson, 317 id. 430; People v. Cramer, 298 id. 509.) In People v. Johnson, supra, an instruction concluded “The reasonable doubt the jury is permitted to entertain must be as to the guilt of the accused on the whole of the evidence and not as to any particular fact in the case.” Pointing out that the challenged instruction was of the same character as the instruction condemned in earlier decisions, the court observed: “It is not correct to say that a reasonable doubt as to any particu