character rule in Nebraska

1999In the context of a character inquiry, "it is difficult, indeed, to imagine a view of the constitutional protections of speech and association which would automatically ... exclude all reference to prior speech or association on such issues as character, purpose, credibility, or intent." 366 U.S. at 51 , 81 S.Ct. 997 .

1999In the context of a character inquiry, “it is difficult, indeed, to imagine a view of the constitutional protections of speech and association which would automatically . . . exclude all reference to prior speech or association on such issues as character, purpose, credibility, or intent.” 366 U.S. at 51 .

1931In Morrison v. Lincoln Savings Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 57 Neb. 225 , it was held: “The owner of trust property is not, merely by reason of the character of his claim, entitled to a preference over the general creditors of an insolvent trustee.

1927Again, in Morrison v. Lincoln Savings Bank & Safe Deposit Co., 57 Neb. 225 , this court held: “The owner of trust property is not, merely by reason of the character of his claim, entitled to a preference over the general creditors of an insolvent trustee.” And further held: “A person asserting a claim for preference against an insolvent estate has the burden of showing that such estate has been increased, to some extent, by the misappropriation of trust funds or property belonging to the claimant.” In that case a bank, while a going institution, had received trust funds and, prior to insolvenc

1982Defendants cite Van Ornum v. Moran, 186 Neb. 418 , 183 N.W.2d 759 (1971), where we said: “One who attempts to cross a street between intersections without keeping a constant lookout for his own safety in all directions of anticipated danger is ordinarily guilty of negligence of such a character as will bar a recovery as a matter of law.

1982Defendants cite Van Ornum v. Moran, 186 Neb. 418 , 183 N.W.2d 759 (1971), where we said: “One who attempts to cross a street between intersections without keeping a constant lookout for his own safety in all directions of anticipated danger is ordinarily guilty of negligence of such a character as will bar a recovery as a matter of law.

1972Not only is he permitted to call witnesses to testify from hearsay, but indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his testimony on anything but hearsay.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469 , 69 S. Ct. 213 , 93 L.

1972Not only is he permitted to call witnesses to testify from hearsay, but indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his testimony on anything but hearsay.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469 , 69 S. Ct. 213 , 93 L.

1972In considering this question, this court has said in Ivins v. Ivins, 171 Neb. 838 , 108 N. W. 2d 99 : “The rule as to the character of the hearing to be had here is that on appeal to this court in a divorce action the cause is tried de novo.” Sally and Duane were married December 2, 1962, and have two children, Pamela Jean, born August 20, 1964, and Julie- Ann, born June 8, 1967.

1972In considering this question, this court has said in Ivins v. Ivins, 171 Neb. 838 , 108 N. W. 2d 99 : “The rule as to the character of the hearing to be had here is that on appeal to this court in a divorce action the cause is tried de novo.” Sally and Duane were married December 2, 1962, and have two children, Pamela Jean, born August 20, 1964, and Julie- Ann, born June 8, 1967.

1961See, Pestel v. Pestel, 158 Neb. 611 , 64 N. W. 2d 299 ; Birth v. Birth, 165 Neb. 11 , 84 N. W. 2d 204 .

1961See, Pestel v. Pestel, 158 Neb. 611 , 64 N. W. 2d 299 ; Birth v. Birth, 165 Neb. 11 , 84 N. W. 2d 204 .

1933Counsel for the receiver cite and rely upon State v. First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Neb. 502 , wherein it was held: “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.” It must be borne in mind that the language was used with reference to the character of the claim then before the court, and with reference to that 'Claim the language was pertinent.

1914Upon this-point the supreme court of Kansas, which has perhaps required as strict proof to raise this presumption as has any court in this country, said: “It is conceived, however, that the character of the inquiry, the persons of whom it must be made, and the place or places where it must be made are all to be determined by the circumstances of the case.” Modern Woodmen of America v. Gerdom, 72 Kan. 391 .

1914In that case and in Renard v. Bennett, 76 Kan. 848 , the court appears to adopt the rule that, when a young, unmarried man leaves the home of his parents and goes from place to place for some time, corresponding regularly with his parents, and suddenly ceases corresponding, and nothing is heard from him for more than seven years, inquiry must be made at all places and of all people where there was any probability that information might be obtained.

1904The assumption by appellants’ counsel that these decisions, or any of them, are overruled, or in any Avise shaken, by the opinion of this court in Hart v. Beardsley, 67 Neb. 145 , is Avholly unwarranted.

1895(Compiled Statutes, ch. 14, sec. 80; Nance v. Falls City, 16 Neb., 85 .) In all ether- respects we think there is ample evidence to sustain the verdict, but a review of the evidence would be useless.

1895For instance, in Pattison v. Vaughan, 40 Ind., 253 , it is said : “We think that as to matters contained in the original complaint, if not in all eases, the defendants to the original complaint, when served with process thereon, as well as the plaintiff therein, must be regarded as in court for all the purposes of the action, whether the matter in controversy arise upon the original complaint or upon the answer or cross-complaint.” This language is quoted with approval by Judge Elliott in Bevier v. Kahn, 111 Ind., 200 , in which it is held that notice is unnecessary when the original bill disc

1895For instance, in Pattison v. Vaughan, 40 Ind., 253 , it is said : “We think that as to matters contained in the original complaint, if not in all eases, the defendants to the original complaint, when served with process thereon, as well as the plaintiff therein, must be regarded as in court for all the purposes of the action, whether the matter in controversy arise upon the original complaint or upon the answer or cross-complaint.” This language is quoted with approval by Judge Elliott in Bevier v. Kahn, 111 Ind., 200 , in which it is held that notice is unnecessary when the original bill disc

1891In Donnelly v. O’Connor et al., 22 Minn., 309 , it was held, that “in garnishee proceedings, although the garnishee deny any indebtedness, if the facts which he discloses clearly show that he owes the defendant a debit which is subject to be garnished, judgment should go against him.” This rule, in Minnesota, was certainly applicable in this instance.

1891In Williams v. Pomeroy, 27 Minn., 85 , it was held that “where, in garnishee proceedings, a claimant appears, and is treated by the court and parties as a party, to the end of the proceedings, it is then too late to object that no formal order making him a party was entered.” The further objection urged, that the exact nature and purpose of the assignment could not be impeached or inquired of, for the reason that it was not alleged to be fraudulent by the plaintiff in his action below, is sufficiently answered in the character of the defense, and in the fact that the burden of proof necessaril

1887The legal proposition given to the jury was, that the plaintiff in the action could not recover upon that branch of the case. “ The character of the instruction will not be held erroneous because an improper reason for it is given.” Marion v. State, 20 Neb., 233 .