condition claim in Oregon

2025Considering the need for fair notice, the state’s proffered reading of “weapons” in ORS 137.540—partic- ularly when considered within the context of constructive Cite as 374 Or 461 (2025) 491 possession—invites potential state and federal constitu- tional problems, independently under Article I, section 34, of the Oregon Constitution, and the state constitutional princi- ples articulated in Graves, 299 Or 189 , and separately under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.

2025Considering the need for fair notice, the state’s proffered reading of “weapons” in ORS 137.540—partic- ularly when considered within the context of constructive Cite as 374 Or 461 (2025) 491 possession—invites potential state and federal constitu- tional problems, independently under Article I, section 34, of the Oregon Constitution, and the state constitutional princi- ples articulated in Graves, 299 Or 189 , and separately under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.

2025Considering the need for fair notice, the state’s proffered reading of “weapons” in ORS 137.540—partic- ularly when considered within the context of constructive Cite as 374 Or 461 (2025) 491 possession—invites potential state and federal constitu- tional problems, independently under Article I, section 34, of the Oregon Constitution, and the state constitutional princi- ples articulated in Graves, 299 Or 189 , and separately under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.

2025Considering the need for fair notice, the state’s proffered reading of “weapons” in ORS 137.540—partic- ularly when considered within the context of constructive Cite as 374 Or 461 (2025) 491 possession—invites potential state and federal constitu- tional problems, independently under Article I, section 34, of the Oregon Constitution, and the state constitutional princi- ples articulated in Graves, 299 Or 189 , and separately under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.

2012The evidence was not relevant, the court explained, because it “does not tend to prove or disprove credibility.” Id. at 75 . 2 The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in greater depth in State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38 , 913 P2d 308 (1996).

2012The evidence was not relevant, the court explained, because it “does not tend to prove or disprove credibility.” Id. at 75 . 2 The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in greater depth in State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38 , 913 P2d 308 (1996).

2012The objection to this condition was that ‘it doesn’t have any probative value and it’s prejudicial.’ The defendant is correct that this condition to the immunity agreement is not relevant; however, its admission was not prejudicial.” Id. at 72-73 .

2012The evidence was not relevant, the court explained, because it “does not tend to prove or disprove credibility.” Id. at 75 . 2 The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in greater depth in State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38 , 913 P2d 308 (1996).

2002In light of our decision in Sound Elevator v. Zwingraf, 181 Or App 150 , 45 P3d *538 958 (2002) (claimant may contest denial of new or omitted condition even if no new or omitted condition claim was filed), employer has correctly abandoned that argument. 3 We note that, under ORS 656.262(7)(a) (1999), a claimant “may initiate a new medical condition claim at any time.” Claimant has done so in this case.

1999The final condition for claim preclusion requires us to determine whether the claims in this case “could have been *641 joined in the first action.” Rennie, 294 Or at 323 .

1995Even if a condition of probation imposed by a federal court could be construed as being broader in scope than one imposed by an Oregon court, the state cannot rely on evidence in an Oregon criminal proceeding unless the evidence was “obtained in a manner that comports with the protections given to the individual by Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.” State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 254 , 834 P2d 1008 (1992).

1995Even if a condition of probation imposed by a federal court could be construed as being broader in scope than one imposed by an Oregon court, the state cannot rely on evidence in an Oregon criminal proceeding unless the evidence was “obtained in a manner that comports with the protections given to the individual by Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.” State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 254 , 834 P2d 1008 (1992).

1995Okay.” (Emphasis supplied.) 6 Defendant does not argue that he objected to the search, nor does he challenge the trial court’s finding that he acquiesced in the search. 7 Compare State v. Hindman, supra, in which a condition of the defendant’s probation required that he submit to searches “upon request.” In that case, we held unlawful a search purportedly authorized by the condition, because the police, viewing the condition as a waiver of the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, neither asked for nor received the defendant’s consent before conducting the searc

1994The issue in Johnson was whether an insurer's notice or knowledge of a condition, coupled with the passage of 60 days, ORS 656.262(6), could serve as an acceptance of the condition under the rule in Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or. 788, 790 , 670 P.2d 1027 (1983).

1994The issue in Johnson was whether an insurer's notice or knowledge of a condition, coupled with the passage of 60 days, ORS 656.262(6), could serve as an acceptance of the condition under the rule in Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or. 788, 790 , 670 P.2d 1027 (1983).

1992(Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Under ORS 742.013(1) and Knight , a misrepresentation can be material, even if it is not related to the condition for which a claim is made. 259 Or at 51 .

1984If the evidence as a whole shows a worsening of the claimant's condition the claim shall be allowed." The Court of Appeals in Oakley was incorrect when it stated: "An aggravation claim based solely on a claimant's statement that his condition has deteriorated is statutorily insufficient." [2] 63 Or.

1984If the evidence as a whole shows a worsening of the claimant’s condition the claim shall be allowed.” The Court of Appeals in Oakley was incorrect when it stated: “An aggravation claim based solely on a claimant’s statement that his condition has deteriorated is statutorily insufficient.” 2 63 Or App at 436 .

1983Co., 260 Or 564, 568 , 491 P2d 997 (1971), the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding upon us, and our review is limited to errors of law.

1983Co., 260 Or 564, 568 , 491 P2d 997 (1971), the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding upon us, and our review is limited to errors of law.

1983Subsection (2) states: “(2) To obtain additional medical services or disability compensation, the injured worker must file a claim for aggravation with the insurer or self-insured employer. * * *” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (3) states: “A physician’s report indicating a need for further medical services or additional compensation is a claim for aggravation." (Emphasis added.) Subsection (4) also refers to such a claim as a “claim for aggravation” and subsection (7) provides: “(7) A request for hearing on any issue involving a claim for aggravation must be made to the department in accordance

1983Subsection (2) states: “(2) To obtain additional medical services or disability compensation, the injured worker must file a claim for aggravation with the insurer or self-insured employer. * * *” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (3) states: “A physician’s report indicating a need for further medical services or additional compensation is a claim for aggravation." (Emphasis added.) Subsection (4) also refers to such a claim as a “claim for aggravation” and subsection (7) provides: “(7) A request for hearing on any issue involving a claim for aggravation must be made to the department in accordance

1982If the evidence as a whole shows a worsening of the claimant’s condition the claim shall be allowed.” In interpreting ORS 656.273, we have said: “As we interpret this statute, a claimant may make a ‘claim for aggravation’ under subsection (2) or alternatively, a physician may submit a report, which is a ‘claim for aggravation’ under subsection (3) * * *.” Stevens v. Champion International, 44 Or App 587, 589 , 606 P2d 674 (1980).

1982If the evidence as a whole shows a worsening of the claimant’s condition the claim shall be allowed.” In interpreting ORS 656.273, we have said: “As we interpret this statute, a claimant may make a ‘claim for aggravation’ under subsection (2) or alternatively, a physician may submit a report, which is a ‘claim for aggravation’ under subsection (3) * * *.” Stevens v. Champion International, 44 Or App 587, 589 , 606 P2d 674 (1980).

1978Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 176 , 269 P.2d 491 (1954). [9] ORS 132.330 provides: "The district attorney may submit an indictment to the grand jury in any case when he has good reason to believe that a crime has been committed which is triable within the county." [10] Since Steve testified during the preliminary hearing that he had agreed to rob someone, Steve violated a condition of his immunity that "he did not participate in a plan, * * * robbery or any other felony which indirectly resulted in the death * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) [11] It is questionable whether the state's decision

1978Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 176 , 269 P.2d 491 (1954). [9] ORS 132.330 provides: "The district attorney may submit an indictment to the grand jury in any case when he has good reason to believe that a crime has been committed which is triable within the county." [10] Since Steve testified during the preliminary hearing that he had agreed to rob someone, Steve violated a condition of his immunity that "he did not participate in a plan, * * * robbery or any other felony which indirectly resulted in the death * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) [11] It is questionable whether the state's decision

1972In some cases it has been held that no notice of forfeiture is necessary when it has been shown to do so would have been “a mere idle ceremony.” Title & Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Co., 155 Or 427, 442 , 63 P2d 909 , 64 P2d 834 (1937).

1972In some cases it has been held that no notice of forfeiture is necessary when it has been shown to do so would have been “a mere idle ceremony.” Title & Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Co., 155 Or 427, 442 , 63 P2d 909 , 64 P2d 834 (1937).

1905The statement of facts, preceding the averment of the modification, in relation to the condition of the bar at the entrance of the Siuslaw Bay, constitutes a history of the transaction which naturally precedes and logically leads up to the gravamen of the defense, forming mere matters of inducement that should be pleaded to enable the court to determine whether or not a prima facie ease was presented; but the facts thus stated are not deemed material and need not be denied: Gardner v. McWilliams, 42 Or. 14 ( 69 Pac. 915 ). 5.

1905The statement of facts, preceding the averment of the modification, in relation to the condition of the bar at the entrance of the Siuslaw Bay, constitutes a history of the transaction which naturally precedes and logically leads up to the gravamen of the defense, forming mere matters of inducement that should be pleaded to enable the court to determine whether or not a prima facie ease was presented; but the facts thus stated are not deemed material and need not be denied: Gardner v. McWilliams, 42 Or. 14 ( 69 Pac. 915 ). 5.