condition privilege in Iowa

2017“They provided that cooperation with [blood-alcohol content] testing was a condition of the privilege of driving on state roads and that the privilege would be rescinded if a suspected drunk driver refused to honor that condition.” Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2169 ; see also State v. Knous, 313 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa 1981) (“[T]he implied consent statute is based on the premise ‘that a driver impliedly agrees to submit to a test in return for the privilege of using the public highways.’ ” (quoting State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980))).

2017“They provided that cooperation with [blood-alcohol content] testing was a condition of the privilege of driving on state roads and that the privilege would be rescinded if a suspected drunk driver refused to honor that condition.” Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2169 ; see also State v. Knous, 313 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa 1981) (“[T]he implied consent statute is based on the premise ‘that a driver impliedly agrees to submit to a test in return for the privilege of using the public highways.’ ” (quoting State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980))).

2018Ct. 1980) (holding the issue of whether the AIP was visibly intoxicated when the bar served him his last drink should have been submitted to the jury because the AIP had consumed substantial amounts of alcohol, caused a vehicular accident forty-five minutes after leaving the bar, and displayed signs of intoxication to the investigating police officer, although the record lacked evidence of the AIP’s condition when the bar served him his last drink). 2 Fairbanks illustrates that direct evidence of intoxication at the time of service is not required to survive summary judgment. 929 P.2d at 436 .

2015Our supreme court held in Alberts, “Even though the district court stated the evidence may become admissible . . . , this does not change the fact that the court’s ruling was controlling so long as [the condition that would bar admissibility did not occur].” Id. at 407 .

1944The Vermont exception reads “* * * ‘purely casual or not for the purpose *555 of the employer’s trade or business.’” The court-said that since the employment was purely casual, “the alternative condition in the exception is immaterial and is not considered. ’ ’ The case of Packett v. Moretown Creamery Co., 91 Vt. 97 , 99 A. 638 , L.

1944The Vermont exception reads “* * * ‘purely casual or not for the purpose *555 of the employer’s trade or business.’” The court-said that since the employment was purely casual, “the alternative condition in the exception is immaterial and is not considered. ’ ’ The case of Packett v. Moretown Creamery Co., 91 Vt. 97 , 99 A. 638 , L.

1918Any agreement, declaration, or course of action on the part of an insurance company which leads a party insured honestly to believe that, by conforming thereto, a forfeiture of his policy will not be incurred, * * * will and ought to estop the company from insisting upon the forfeiture, though it might be claimed under the express letter of the contract.” Insurance Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572 .

1891“Acts and -declarations whereby the other party was induced to believe that the condition was dispensed with or forfeiture waived, will be sufficient to preclude the setting up of the breach of the condition as a defense to the contract of the party bound thereby.” Viele v. Insurance Co., 26 Iowa, 9, 55 ; Hollis v. Insurance Co., 65 Iowa, 454, 458 .

1891“Acts and -declarations whereby the other party was induced to believe that the condition was dispensed with or forfeiture waived, will be sufficient to preclude the setting up of the breach of the condition as a defense to the contract of the party bound thereby.” Viele v. Insurance Co., 26 Iowa, 9, 55 ; Hollis v. Insurance Co., 65 Iowa, 454, 458 .