condition requirement in Florida

2024Co., 546 So. 2d 1099 , 2 HLP first raised the insufficiency of the affidavit in its motion for rehearing. 3 1101 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (finding the owner was required to “plead nonperformance of the condition precedent” and its failure to do so constituted a waiver of the defense).

2023“Violation of a condition which is imposed by a probation officer, rather than an express condition of the trial court, cannot serve as a basis for revocation of probation.” Hostetter v. State, 82 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citation omitted); see also Waldon v. State, 670 So. 2d 1155 , 1157 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“We have several times held that probation or community control may not be revoked for violation of a condition or requirement imposed unilaterally by the probation officer but not by the sentencing order.”).

2021Id. at 921 .

2004In context, the word "when" in this case means " only when." The words "if" and "when," when used to introduce a condition, are commonly understood to mean "if and only if" or "when and only when." For example, in Kinder v. State, 779 So.2d 512 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), approved, 830 So.2d 832 (Fla.2002), the Second District considered the meaning of a limiting clause in a statute providing that "[t]he trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced

2004In context, the word "when" in this case means " only when." The words "if" and "when," when used to introduce a condition, are commonly understood to mean "if and only if" or "when and only when." For example, in Kinder v. State, 779 So.2d 512 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), approved, 830 So.2d 832 (Fla.2002), the Second District considered the meaning of a limiting clause in a statute providing that "[t]he trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced

2003Perez v. State, 805 So.2d 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Eddie v. State, 740 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Kiess v. State, 642 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).

2003Perez v. State, 805 So.2d 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Eddie v. State, 740 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Kiess v. State, 642 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).

1996See, *1158 e.g., Kiess v. State, 642 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Voudry v. State, 641 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); and Ashrafi v. State, 534 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see also Morales v. State, 518 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Hutchinson v. State, 428 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and Holterhaus v. State, 417 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).

1996See, *1158 e.g., Kiess v. State, 642 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Voudry v. State, 641 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); and Ashrafi v. State, 534 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see also Morales v. State, 518 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Hutchinson v. State, 428 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and Holterhaus v. State, 417 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).

1996See, *1158 e.g., Kiess v. State, 642 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Voudry v. State, 641 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); and Ashrafi v. State, 534 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see also Morales v. State, 518 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Hutchinson v. State, 428 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and Holterhaus v. State, 417 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).

1996See, *1158 e.g., Kiess v. State, 642 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Voudry v. State, 641 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); and Ashrafi v. State, 534 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see also Morales v. State, 518 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Hutchinson v. State, 428 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and Holterhaus v. State, 417 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).

1994Nibert and other cases, however, add the condition that the factors must be "reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence." Id. at 1061 (quoting Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1990)).

1994Nibert and other cases, however, add the condition that the factors must be "reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence." Id. at 1061 (quoting Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1990)).

1994"Greater weight" is the equivalent of "preponderance," because both simply mean "that which is more probable." See Boyd v. Gosser, 78 Fla. 64 , 82 So. 758 (1918).

1994"Greater weight" is the equivalent of "preponderance," because both simply mean "that which is more probable." See Boyd v. Gosser, 78 Fla. 64 , 82 So. 758 (1918).

1988An unmarked condition on a standard probation form is not a condition of probation, Croteau v. State, 334 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1976), and cannot, therefore, support revocation of probation.

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1960While six doctors testified in the hearings before the deputy commissioner, such deputy commissioner relied primarily to support his findings upon the testimony of only three, [2] failing in any way to give the testimony *210 of the other three doctors the benefit of his judicial opinion in accordance with the requirements of Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, Fla. 1955, 81 So.2d 503, 505 . [3] Moreover, the deputy commissioner failed to consider, in the weighing of the evidence and making reasonable deductions therefrom, the relative merits of the individual accidents, i.e. the first accident o

1891X, Constitution of 1885; Ballard v. Eckman & Vetsburg, 20 Fla., 661 ;) but before a party can avail himself of the -exemption provided in the constitution, he must show that he is in a condition to claim the exemption.