condition requirement in Washington

2025RCW 9.94A.631(1) states that a CCO has authority to conduct warrantless searches of offenders under community custody supervision “[i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an 14 No.58621-5-II offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence.” Under this statute, it is constitutional for “a CCO to search an individual based only on a ‘well-founded or reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.’ ” State v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 302 , 412 P.3d 1265 (2018) (quoting State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 628 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009)).

2024State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 628 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). 3 3 The legislature codified this exception to the warrant requirement at RCW 9.94A.631, which reads in relevant part, “[i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a [CCO] 3 No. 85149-7-I/4 Even with probationer’s diminished privacy rights, however, article I section 7 of the Washington Constitution “permits a warrantless search of the property of an individual on probation only where there is a nexus between the property searched and the alleged probation vi

2025RCW 9.94A.631(1) states that a CCO has authority to conduct warrantless searches of offenders under community custody supervision “[i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an 14 No.58621-5-II offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence.” Under this statute, it is constitutional for “a CCO to search an individual based only on a ‘well-founded or reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.’ ” State v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 302 , 412 P.3d 1265 (2018) (quoting State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 628 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009)).

2024State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 628 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). 3 3 The legislature codified this exception to the warrant requirement at RCW 9.94A.631, which reads in relevant part, “[i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a [CCO] 3 No. 85149-7-I/4 Even with probationer’s diminished privacy rights, however, article I section 7 of the Washington Constitution “permits a warrantless search of the property of an individual on probation only where there is a nexus between the property searched and the alleged probation vi

2025Further, the offender’s “privacy interest is diminished only to the extent necessary for the State to monitor compliance with the particular probation condition that gave rise to the search.” Id. “[F]ailure to include the language does not affect the order’s constitutionality.” State v. Massey, 81 Wn.

2019The statute’s “reasonable cause” requirement means that an officer must have a “well-founded suspicion that a violation has occurred.” State v. Massey, 81 Wn.

2025Lian II, 115 Wn.

2015Lian II, 115 Wn.

2025App. 811, 821-22 , 25 P.3d 467 (2001) (Lian I).

2013App. 811 , 25 P.3d 467 (2001) (Lian I), which would allow him to assert a cause of action against Post for breaching the implied warranty of habitability and various provisions of the RLTA. 5 ¶37 Under the Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord and Tenant § 17.6, a landlord is subject to liability for physical harm to tenants and their guests caused by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of: (1) an implied warranty of ha

2021RCW 9.94A.631(1) permits a warrantless search of a probationer’s property where the officer has “reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence.” We have described “reasonable cause” as a “well-founded suspicion” and explained that it “requires specific and articulable facts and rational inferences.” State v. Parris, 163 Wn.

2018While the parties agree that we should determine the scope of a CCO's search consistent with RCW 9.94A.631, their positions on the nexus requirement reflect an ongoing split in the Court of Appeals. ¶ 18 The State asks us to endorse the line of reasoning in State v. Parris, where a Division Two panel concluded that "probationers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their residences, vehicles, or personal belongings." 163 Wash. App. 110 , 123, 259 P.3d 331 (2011).

2021App. 110, 119 , 259 P.3d 331 (2011), abrogated on other grounds by Cornwell, 190 9 No. 52809-6-II Wn.2d 296.

2018While the parties agree that we should determine the scope of a CCO's search consistent with RCW 9.94A.631, their positions on the nexus requirement reflect an ongoing split in the Court of Appeals. ¶ 18 The State asks us to endorse the line of reasoning in State v. Parris, where a Division Two panel concluded that "probationers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their residences, vehicles, or personal belongings." 163 Wash. App. 110 , 123, 259 P.3d 331 (2011).

2018To have reasonable cause of a violation, the CCO must have a “‘well-founded suspicion that a violation has occurred.’” State v. Jardinez, 184 Wn.

2016Jardinez, 184 Wn.

2008However, if an offender is detained pursuant to RCW 9.94A.740 or 9.94A.631 and is later found not to have violated a condition or requirement of community custody, community placement, or community supervision, time spent in confinement due to such detention shall not toll the period of community custody.” (Emphasis added.) The statute’s focus on completion of the term of confinement rather than release from confinement distinguishes it from the federal sentencing provision at issue in United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57 , 120 S. Ct. 1114 , 146 L.

2008However, if an offender is detained pursuant to RCW 9.94A.740 or 9.94A.631 and is later found not to have violated a condition or requirement of community custody, community placement, or community supervision, time spent in confinement due to such detention shall not toll the period of community custody.” (Emphasis added.) The statute’s focus on completion of the term of confinement rather than release from confinement distinguishes it from the federal sentencing provision at issue in United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57 , 120 S. Ct. 1114 , 146 L.

2008State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450 , 69 P.3d 318 (2003).

2008State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450 , 69 P.3d 318 (2003).

2008State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450 , 69 P.3d 318 (2003).

2008State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450 , 69 P.3d 318 (2003).

2008Isla Verde, 99 Wash. App. at 132-33 , 990 P.2d 429 . ¶ 21 The City neither specifically alleges nor demonstrates what additional administrative steps Isla Verde should have taken in order to exhaust further administrative options before filing its LUPA petition in superior court.

2008Isla Verde I, 99 Wn.

2001Co. v. King County, 57 Wash. App. 170, 174-76 , 787 P.2d 58 (1990) (quantum meruit doctrine only applies when changed condition was unforeseeable to contractor); Modern Builders, Inc. v. Manke, 27 Wash.App. 86, 94 , 615 P.2d 1332 (1980) (same). "[A] finding that the contractor should have anticipated the condition will bar recovery." Bignold, 65 Wash.2d at 822 , 399 P.2d 611 .

2001App. 86, 94 , 615 P.2d 1332 (1980) (same). “[A] finding that the contractor should have anticipated the condition will bar recovery.” Bignold, 65 Wn.2d at 822 .

2001Co. v. King County, 57 Wash. App. 170, 174-76 , 787 P.2d 58 (1990) (quantum meruit doctrine only applies when changed condition was unforeseeable to contractor); Modern Builders, Inc. v. Manke, 27 Wash.App. 86, 94 , 615 P.2d 1332 (1980) (same). "[A] finding that the contractor should have anticipated the condition will bar recovery." Bignold, 65 Wash.2d at 822 , 399 P.2d 611 .

2001App. 86, 94 , 615 P.2d 1332 (1980) (same). “[A] finding that the contractor should have anticipated the condition will bar recovery.” Bignold, 65 Wn.2d at 822 .

1997The statute also provides that "[t]he requirement that the offender pay a monthly sum towards a legal financial obligation constitutes a condition or requirement of a sentence and the offender is subject to the penalties as provided in RCW 9.94A.200 for noncompliance." RCW 9.94A.145(10). [7] Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 , 94 S.Ct. 2116 , 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) did not address the constitutionality of imposition of costs against an acquitted defendant, holding only that the Oregon statute at issue which allowed imposition of costs only upon a convicted defendant did not violate equal protection

1997The statute also provides that "[t]he requirement that the offender pay a monthly sum towards a legal financial obligation constitutes a condition or requirement of a sentence and the offender is subject to the penalties as provided in RCW 9.94A.200 for noncompliance." RCW 9.94A.145(10). [7] Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 , 94 S.Ct. 2116 , 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) did not address the constitutionality of imposition of costs against an acquitted defendant, holding only that the Oregon statute at issue which allowed imposition of costs only upon a convicted defendant did not violate equal protection

2026App. 2d at 36 (quoting Whitaker, 133 Wn.

2025No. 59648-2-II Truong’s UPCS conviction was vacated under State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021).

2025No. 59648-2-II Truong’s UPCS conviction was vacated under State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021).

2025Inst. 1977), which states: A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of: (1) an implied warranty of habitability; or (2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation.[2] Lian v. Stalick, 106 Wn.

2024The State claims that Posey’s challenge to this condition is not ripe for review, citing State v. Cates, 183 Wn.2d 531 , 354 P.3d 832 (2015).

2024The State claims that Posey’s challenge to this condition is not ripe for review, citing State v. Cates, 183 Wn.2d 531 , 354 P.3d 832 (2015).

2021Under RCW 9.94A.631(1),11 “If there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a community corrections officer may require an offender to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal property.” Community custody conditions are ripe for review on direct appeal “‘if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’” State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (quoting First United Methodist Church v. H

2021“The court must also consider ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’” Id (quoting First United Methodist Church, 129 Wn.2d at 255 ).

2021Under RCW 9.94A.631(1),11 “If there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a community corrections officer may require an offender to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal property.” Community custody conditions are ripe for review on direct appeal “‘if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’” State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (quoting First United Methodist Church v. H

2021Under RCW 9.94A.631(1),11 “If there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a community corrections officer may require an offender to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal property.” Community custody conditions are ripe for review on direct appeal “‘if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’” State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (quoting First United Methodist Church v. H

2021Under RCW 9.94A.631(1),11 “If there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a community corrections officer may require an offender to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal property.” Community custody conditions are ripe for review on direct appeal “‘if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’” State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (quoting First United Methodist Church v. H

2020In Lian I, Division Three of the Court of Appeals “recognized a cause of action for the implied warranty of habitability under the [RLTA] according to subpart (1) of the Restatement.” Tucker, 118 Wn.

2018“We review conclusions of law from an order pertaining to the suppression of evidence de novo.” State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 249 , 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). 7 No. 49306-3-II A CCO may search an offender’s residence or other personal property “[i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence.” RCW 9.94A.631(1).

2018“We review conclusions of law from an order pertaining to the suppression of evidence de novo.” State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 249 , 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). 7 No. 49306-3-II A CCO may search an offender’s residence or other personal property “[i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence.” RCW 9.94A.631(1).

2015Review denied at 185 Wn.2d 1032 (2016). 1 White reviewed and signed the form detailing the requirements of her community custody terms and conditions, which included the requirement to notify her community corrections officer of any change in her address. 2 RCW 9.94A.631( 1) provides in relevant part that “[i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of [community custody], a [CCO] may require an offender to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal property.” 3 A CCO must also have pr