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7 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences1987Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 1987Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp.green1 sentence2012It is well established that “[a] violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation, although not conclusive, is evidence of negligence on the part of a violator as to all consequences that the statute, ordinance or regulation was intended to prevent.” Follansbee v. Ohse, 293 Mass. 48, 52 (1935), quoting from Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 516 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
Follansbee v. Ohsegreen1 sentence2012It is well established that “[a] violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation, although not conclusive, is evidence of negligence on the part of a violator as to all consequences that the statute, ordinance or regulation was intended to prevent.” Follansbee v. Ohse, 293 Mass. 48, 52 (1935), quoting from Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 516 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
Dana Blackie v. State of Mainegreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76-77 (1984) (regular expectation that an associate attorney will be considered for partner can be constmed as a condition or privilege of employment under Title VII); Blackie, 75 F.3d at 726 (“under certain circumstances an employer’s inaction can operate to deprive an employee of a privilege of employment that an employee had reason to anticipate he would receive; in those situations, the deprivation constitutes an adverse employment action”); Randlett, 118 F.3d at 862 (consistently awarding permanent transfers due to hardship “a common enou | 1 | 1 |
cluster 743580green1 sentence2008See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76-77 (1984) (regular expectation that an associate attorney will be considered for partner can be constmed as a condition or privilege of employment under Title VII); Blackie, 75 F.3d at 726 (“under certain circumstances an employer’s inaction can operate to deprive an employee of a privilege of employment that an employee had reason to anticipate he would receive; in those situations, the deprivation constitutes an adverse employment action”); Randlett, 118 F.3d at 862 (consistently awarding permanent transfers due to hardship “a common enou | 1 | 1 |
Hishon v. King & Spaldinggreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76-77 (1984) (regular expectation that an associate attorney will be considered for partner can be constmed as a condition or privilege of employment under Title VII); Blackie, 75 F.3d at 726 (“under certain circumstances an employer’s inaction can operate to deprive an employee of a privilege of employment that an employee had reason to anticipate he would receive; in those situations, the deprivation constitutes an adverse employment action”); Randlett, 118 F.3d at 862 (consistently awarding permanent transfers due to hardship “a common enou 2008“A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discrim inatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.” Hishon, supra at 75 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fullergreen1 sentence2007In addressing this issue as raised in the defendant’s posttrial motion, the judge stated in his memorandum of decision and order that the “jury were never informed that [Darcy’s] immunity for past crimes was contingent on her truthful testimony.” Accordingly, he also stated that “[s]pecial instructions concerning the credibility of an immunized witness are not required where the details of the immunity agreement are not entered in[] evidence and the requirement of truthful testimony as a condition of immunity is not highlighted.” “Where it is unlikely that the jury were misled into accepting t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zoning Board of Appeals of Amesbury v. Housing Appeals Committee
green
1 sentence2023The Conservation Restriction required by this paragraph shall be deemed an independent condition and requirement from that or those required by the Commonwealth's Natural Heritage and Endangered Species Act." 2 agreement and mutual release (2012 settlement agreement) whereby Delphic and WPV agreed not to request modifications of certain conditions. 3 Further proceedings required by the 2012 settlement agreement, see note 3, supra, were held before the ZBA, which issued a modified comprehensive permit (2015 modified comprehensive permit) to WPV in August 2015 in light of the number of modificat | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Old Colony Railroad v. Assessors of Boston
green
1 sentence1947Old Colony Railroad v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 439 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.