condition waiver in Colorado

2024See People v. Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871-72 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that district court was not required to appoint conflict-free counsel in connection with motion to withdraw plea absent a “colorable claim of ineffective assistance”); cf. People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15, ¶ 30 (“[T]he court is not required to substitute counsel unless it verifies that the defendant has a well-founded reason for believing that the appointed attorney cannot or will not competently represent him.”). ¶ 30 And notwithstanding defense counsel’s reservations about addressing the substance of Jayne’s allegations, he as

2024See People v. Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871-72 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that district court was not required to appoint conflict-free counsel in connection with motion to withdraw plea absent a “colorable claim of ineffective assistance”); cf. People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15, ¶ 30 (“[T]he court is not required to substitute counsel unless it verifies that the defendant has a well-founded reason for believing that the appointed attorney cannot or will not competently represent him.”). ¶ 30 And notwithstanding defense counsel’s reservations about addressing the substance of Jayne’s allegations, he as

2024See People v. Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871-72 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that district court was not required to appoint conflict-free counsel in connection with motion to withdraw plea absent a “colorable claim of ineffective assistance”); cf. People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15, ¶ 30 (“[T]he court is not required to substitute counsel unless it verifies that the defendant has a well-founded reason for believing that the appointed attorney cannot or will not competently represent him.”). ¶ 30 And notwithstanding defense counsel’s reservations about addressing the substance of Jayne’s allegations, he as

2024See People v. Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871-72 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that district court was not required to appoint conflict-free counsel in connection with motion to withdraw plea absent a “colorable claim of ineffective assistance”); cf. People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15, ¶ 30 (“[T]he court is not required to substitute counsel unless it verifies that the defendant has a well-founded reason for believing that the appointed attorney cannot or will not competently represent him.”). ¶ 30 And notwithstanding defense counsel’s reservations about addressing the substance of Jayne’s allegations, he as

1992See, e.g., Davis, 794 P.2d at 211 (upholding a prosecution consent requirement where the common law provided the defendant's right to waive trial by jury in a class 1 felony case); Iuppa, 731 P.2d at 722 (upholding the provision of section 16-8-105(2) requiring the consent of the prosecutor to waive a jury trial in cases where a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity); Brisbin, 175 Colo. at 432 , 488 P.2d at 65 (upholding statute requiring prosecutorial consent as a condition of waiver of jury trial on question of sanity). [2] The rationale that underlies the broad judicia

1992See, e.g., Davis, 794 P.2d at 211 (upholding a prosecution consent requirement where the common law provided the defendant's right to waive trial by jury in a class 1 felony case); Iuppa, 731 P.2d at 722 (upholding the provision of section 16-8-105(2) requiring the consent of the prosecutor to waive a jury trial in cases where a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity); Brisbin, 175 Colo. at 432 , 488 P.2d at 65 (upholding statute requiring prosecutorial consent as a condition of waiver of jury trial on question of sanity). [2] The rationale that underlies the broad judicia

1992People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159 (Colo.1990); see also People v. Brisbin, 175 Colo. 428 , 488 P.2d 63 (1971) (in first degree murder prosecution, statute requiring prosecutorial consent as a condition of waiver of jury trial on question of sanity was constitutional).

1992See, e.g., Davis, 794 P.2d at 211 (upholding a prosecution consent requirement where the common law provided the defendant's right to waive trial by jury in a class 1 felony case); Iuppa, 731 P.2d at 722 (upholding the provision of section 16-8-105(2) requiring the consent of the prosecutor to waive a jury trial in cases where a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity); Brisbin, 175 Colo. at 432 , 488 P.2d at 65 (upholding statute requiring prosecutorial consent as a condition of waiver of jury trial on question of sanity). [2] The rationale that underlies the broad judicia

2020See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (holding that retreat “is not a condition of immunity”). ¶21 Still, the prosecution contends that we have already recognized the distinction between improper arguments that impose a duty to retreat and proper arguments regarding a defendant’s failure to retreat that undermine the reasonableness of a defendant’s use of force.

1992See, e.g., Davis, 794 P.2d at 211 (upholding a prosecution consent requirement where the common law provided the defendant's right to waive trial by jury in a class 1 felony case); Iuppa, 731 P.2d at 722 (upholding the provision of section 16-8-105(2) requiring the consent of the prosecutor to waive a jury trial in cases where a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity); Brisbin, 175 Colo. at 432 , 488 P.2d at 65 (upholding statute requiring prosecutorial consent as a condition of waiver of jury trial on question of sanity). [2] The rationale that underlies the broad judicia

1992Iuppa v. District Court, 731 P.2d 720, 722 (Colo.1987) (holding that the General Assembly had the power to impose a condition on the waiver of a jury trial and to require the consent of the prosecution, the court, or both). [7] As the majority notes, "[t]he record before this court does not reveal what specific due process arguments, if any, were raised by the defendants in the trial court." Maj. op. at 11 n. 10.