17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vieth v. Jubelirergreen2 sentences2018Accord Vieth, 641 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. at 1789 (discussing the drawbacks of “insertion of the judiciary into districting,” including “the delay and uncertainty [it] brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it brings upon the courts”); id. at 291 ; 124 S.Ct. at 1784 (alluding to the interests in “meaningfully constrain[ing] the discretion of the courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking”). 2018Accord Vieth, 641 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. at 1789 (discussing the drawbacks of “insertion of the judiciary into districting,” including “the delay and uncertainty [it] brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it brings upon the courts”); id. at 291 ; 124 S.Ct. at 1784 (alluding to the interests in “meaningfully constrain[ing] the discretion of the courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking”). | 2 | 2 |
Irven Green and Robert Benjamin Smith v. United States of America, Arnold Jack Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008NOTES [1] Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328 , 275 A.2d 299 (1971). [2] This sort of instruction has also been referred to as a "dynamite charge." "The Allen or `dynamite' charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury." Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.1962) (footnote omitted) (construing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)) see also 6 WAYNE R. 2008This sort of instruction has also been referred to as a “dynamite charge.” “The Allen or 'dynamite' charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury.” Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.1962) (footnote omitted) (construing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)) see also 6 Wayne R. | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. CHIKONYERAgreen2 sentences2006Accord Commonwealth v. Carter, 861 A.2d 957, 962 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal granted, 583 Pa. 678 , 877 A.2d 459 (2005)(per curiam). 2006Accord Commonwealth v. Carter, 861 A.2d 957, 962 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal granted, 583 Pa. 678 , 877 A.2d 459 (2005)(per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cartergreen2 sentences2006Accord Commonwealth v. Carter, 861 A.2d 957, 962 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal granted, 583 Pa. 678 , 877 A.2d 459 (2005)(per curiam). 2006Accord Commonwealth v. Carter, 861 A.2d 957, 962 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal granted, 583 Pa. 678 , 877 A.2d 459 (2005)( per curiam ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471 , 14 P.3d 713 , 736 (2000) (stating that knowledge by the accomplice that the principal intends to commit ‘a crime’ does not impose strict liability for any and all offenses that follow); State v. DeGruy, No. 43336-9-1, 116 Wash.App. 1023 , 2003 WL 1743098 , at *2 (Wash.Ct.App. 2004See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471 , 14 P.3d 713 , 736 (2000) (stating that knowledge by the accomplice that the principal intends to commit `a crime' does not impose strict liability for any and all offenses that follow); State v. DeGruy, No. 43336-9-I, 116 Wash.App. 1023 , 2003 WL 1743098 , at *2 (Wash.Ct.App. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Goodinggreen1 sentence2004Gooding, 818 A.2d at 550 (emphasis added). [11] The Washington courts have dealt extensively with this sort of error in the context of defective jury instructions. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471 , 14 P.3d 713 , 736 (2000) (stating that knowledge by the accomplice that the principal intends to commit ‘a crime’ does not impose strict liability for any and all offenses that follow); State v. DeGruy, No. 43336-9-1, 116 Wash.App. 1023 , 2003 WL 1743098 , at *2 (Wash.Ct.App. 2004See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471 , 14 P.3d 713 , 736 (2000) (stating that knowledge by the accomplice that the principal intends to commit `a crime' does not impose strict liability for any and all offenses that follow); State v. DeGruy, No. 43336-9-I, 116 Wash.App. 1023 , 2003 WL 1743098 , at *2 (Wash.Ct.App. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Monarchgreen2 sentences1996See Commonwealth v. Monarch, 510 Pa. 138, 148 , 507 A.2d 74, 79 (1986)(“[W]here the suppression ruling is not supported by the record of the suppression proceeding, it is perfectly appropriate for the court, on post-verdict motions, to reverse its earlier suppression ruling.”). 1996See Commonwealth v. Monarch, 510 Pa. 138, 148 , 507 A.2d 74, 79 (1986)(“[W]here the suppression ruling is not supported by the record of the suppression proceeding, it is perfectly appropriate for the court, on post-verdict motions, to reverse its earlier suppression ruling.”). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of LaRuegreen2 sentences1976There we said, 244 Pa.Super. at 230 , 366 A.2d at 1277 (1976): Many factors must be taken into account. 1976There we said, 244 Pa.Super. at 230 , 366 A.2d at 1277 (1976): Many factors must be taken into account. | 1 | 1 |
SPIRES Et Ux. v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co.green2 sentences1955It was said in Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Company, 364 Pa. 52, 56, 57 , 70 A. 2d 828, 830 , 831: "To be a third party beneficiary entitled to recover on a contract . . . both parties to the contract must so intend and must indicate that intention in the contract; in other words, a promisor cannot be held liable to an alleged beneficiary *6 of a contract unless the latter was within his contemplation at the time the contract was entered into and such liability was intentionally assumed by him in his undertaking; the obligation to the third party must be created, and must affirmatively app 1955It was said in Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Company, 364 Pa. 52, 56, 57 , 70 A. 2d 828, 830 , 831: "To be a third party beneficiary entitled to recover on a contract . . . both parties to the contract must so intend and must indicate that intention in the contract; in other words, a promisor cannot be held liable to an alleged beneficiary *6 of a contract unless the latter was within his contemplation at the time the contract was entered into and such liability was intentionally assumed by him in his undertaking; the obligation to the third party must be created, and must affirmatively app | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Slawek v. BD. OF MED. ED. & LICENSURE
green
2 sentences2025The Board places particular emphasis upon one line of the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, in which the court stated that the governing statutory provisions are “clear and free from ambiguity, and, therefore, the Board’s interpretation of them is entitled to no deference.” 66 The Board understands this statement as an indication that the Commonwealth Court failed to apply the correct standard of review over an agency adjudication—that the court “gave no deference to the Board’s decision and re-weighed the evidence in the manner it saw fit.” 67 The Board additionally faults the Commonwealth Court 2025The Board places particular emphasis upon one line of the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, in which the court stated that the governing statutory provisions are “clear and free from ambiguity, and, therefore, the Board’s interpretation of them is entitled to no deference.” 66 The Board understands this statement as an indication that the Commonwealth Court failed to apply the correct standard of review over an agency adjudication—that the court “gave no deference to the Board’s decision and re-weighed the evidence in the manner it saw fit.” 67 The Board additionally faults the Commonwealth Court | 5 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Lassiter
green
2 sentences2014However, the governing federal constitutional overlay and rules of construction clearly delineated by the Legislature, as discussed above, forbid such extensions. (continuedL) [J-13A&B & 14A&B-2013] [M.O. – Castille, C.J.] - 5 With regard to Part V(C) of the Majority Opinion, I support the majority’s holding that there is no issue under Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586 , 722 A.2d 657 (1998) (plurality), in the first instance. 2014However, the governing federal constitutional overlay and rules of construction clearly delineated by the Legislature, as discussed above, forbid such extensions. (continuedL) [J-13A&B & 14A&B-2013] [M.O. – Castille, C.J.] - 5 With regard to Part V(C) of the Majority Opinion, I support the majority’s holding that there is no issue under Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586 , 722 A.2d 657 (1998) (plurality), in the first instance. | 4 | 2014–2014 |
Allen v. United States
green
2 sentences2008This sort of instruction has also been referred to as a “dynamite charge.” “The Allen or 'dynamite' charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury.” Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.1962) (footnote omitted) (construing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)) see also 6 Wayne R. 2008This sort of instruction has also been referred to as a “dynamite charge.” “The Allen or 'dynamite' charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury.” Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.1962) (footnote omitted) (construing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)) see also 6 Wayne R. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Commonwealth v. Spencer
green
2 sentences2008NOTES [1] Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328 , 275 A.2d 299 (1971). [2] This sort of instruction has also been referred to as a "dynamite charge." "The Allen or `dynamite' charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury." Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.1962) (footnote omitted) (construing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)) see also 6 WAYNE R. 2008NOTES [1] Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328 , 275 A.2d 299 (1971). [2] This sort of instruction has also been referred to as a "dynamite charge." "The Allen or `dynamite' charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury." Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir.1962) (footnote omitted) (construing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)) see also 6 WAYNE R. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Commonwealth v. Greer
green
1 sentence2008LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.9(d), at 519-20 (3d ed.2007). [3] The majority nevertheless deemed Brasfield to be "instructive as to the potential dangers of jury polling." 895 A.2d at 557 (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 240 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lowenfield v. Phelps
green
2 sentences2008LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.9(d), at 519-20 (3d ed.2007). [3] The majority nevertheless deemed Brasfield to be "instructive as to the potential dangers of jury polling." 895 A.2d at 557 (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 240 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)). 2008LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.9(d), at 519-20 (3d ed.2007). [3] The majority nevertheless deemed Brasfield to be "instructive as to the potential dangers of jury polling." 895 A.2d at 557 (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 240 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Eckman
neutral
2 sentences2004See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471 , 14 P.3d 713 , 736 (2000) (stating that knowledge by the accomplice that the principal intends to commit ‘a crime’ does not impose strict liability for any and all offenses that follow); State v. DeGruy, No. 43336-9-1, 116 Wash.App. 1023 , 2003 WL 1743098 , at *2 (Wash.Ct.App. 2004See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471 , 14 P.3d 713 , 736 (2000) (stating that knowledge by the accomplice that the principal intends to commit `a crime' does not impose strict liability for any and all offenses that follow); State v. DeGruy, No. 43336-9-I, 116 Wash.App. 1023 , 2003 WL 1743098 , at *2 (Wash.Ct.App. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.