sort presumption in Indiana

1996Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 122 , 109 S.Ct. at 2342 .

1996Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 122 , 109 S.Ct. at 2342 .

1932In the case of Teter v. Teter (1884), 101 Ind. 129 , 51 Am.

1901Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 , 51 Am.

2018This is the sort of claim that our supreme court has warned “most implicates concerns of finality, judicial economy, and repose while least affecting assurance of a valid conviction.” Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 195 . [36] In short, we can confidently say that even if Booker’s appellate counsel had cited the cases he now claims should have been cited in support of his appellate claim of insufficient evidence, the result would have been the same, i.e., we would have affirmed his convictions.

2016Id. [17] Shelby made an offer of proof, demonstrating that Dr. Leo would have testified that several of the techniques used by the police while interrogating Shelby were consistent with the sort of factors that increase the risk of eliciting a false confession, including: suggesting that the crime was either self-defense or a horrible murder, thus suggesting that if Shelby admitted to killing Lexi, he might not be subject to criminal liability; the lengthy and repetitive nature of the interrogations; and lying about the amount of evidence implicating Shelby.

2016Id. [18] The Shelby Court reviewed the Callis and Miller decisions, then wrote: We understand the Miller court’s general approval of Callis to mean that experts may testify on the general subjects of coercive police interrogation and false or coerced .confessions.

2010Rather, "Fair Hearing" in this opinion is to be understood as referring to a specific type of hearing characterized by the due process considerations to which W.S.K. was entitled. [7] We reiterate, "`the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff'" Filter Specialists, Inc. v. Brooks, 906 N.E.2d. at 840 (quoting in Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). [8] Relevant to the issues we consider in the instant case, the HCQI

2010Rather, "Fair Hearing" in this opinion is to be understood as referring to a specific type of hearing characterized by the due process considerations to which W.S.K. was entitled. [7] We reiterate, "`the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff'" Filter Specialists, Inc. v. Brooks, 906 N.E.2d. at 840 (quoting in Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). [8] Relevant to the issues we consider in the instant case, the HCQI

2007Id. at 4 .

2007Id. at 4 .

2006The Court held that the water storage district, by reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, was the sort of exception to the rule in Reynolds contemplated by Hadley. 7 Sal-yer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 730-31, 93 S.Ct. 1224 .

2006In concluding that the water storage district was not subject to the one-man, one-vote requirements, the Court specifically stated that the district, "pro'vide[d] no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body." Id. at 728-29 , 98 S.Ct. 1224 (emphasis supplied).

2005The Court in Booker described the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to a jury trial, as articulated in Blakely, and suggested that the right is only violated "whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on 'facts reflected in the jury. verdict or admitted by the defendant."' Booker, 543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. at 749 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (emphasis added) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ).

2005The Court in Booker described the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to a jury trial, as articulated in Blakely, and suggested that the right is only violated "whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on 'facts reflected in the jury. verdict or admitted by the defendant."' Booker, 543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. at 749 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (emphasis added) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ).

2005The Court in Booker described the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to a jury trial, as articulated in Blakely, and suggested that the right is only violated "whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on 'facts reflected in the jury. verdict or admitted by the defendant."' Booker, 543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. at 749 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (emphasis added) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ).

2005The Court in Booker described the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to a jury trial, as articulated in Blakely, and suggested that the right is only violated "whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on 'facts reflected in the jury. verdict or admitted by the defendant."' Booker, 543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. at 749 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (emphasis added) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ).

1995While we, like the Utah Supreme Court, "do not mean to imply that [syndrome] testimony is unreliable as a matter of law," Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 , the reliability of such evidence for the purpose of proving abuse is at present extremely doubtful and the subject of substantial and widespread repudiation by courts and scientists, Accord Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 .

1995While we, like the Utah Supreme Court, "do not mean to imply that [syndrome] testimony is unreliable as a matter of law," Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 , the reliability of such evidence for the purpose of proving abuse is at present extremely doubtful and the subject of substantial and widespread repudiation by courts and scientists, Accord Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 .

1993Mrs. Baughman testified that, although she does not remember asking the question, she may have asked something like "does the wife have to testify against her husband?" In response to this sort of inquiry, the Respondent discussed relevant case law with the Baughmans and provided them with copies of two cases, Watkins v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 949 and Laswell v. State (1986), Ind., 494 N.E.2d 981 .

1993Mrs. Baughman testified that, although she does not remember asking the question, she may have asked something like "does the wife have to testify against her husband?" In response to this sort of inquiry, the Respondent discussed relevant case law with the Baughmans and provided them with copies of two cases, Watkins v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 949 and Laswell v. State (1986), Ind., 494 N.E.2d 981 .

1990Choice of organization, dress and equipment for law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State's police power. 425 U.S. at 246-47 , 96 S.Ct. at 1445-46 , 47 L.Ed.2d at 715-16 .

1990Choice of organization, dress and equipment for law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State's police power. 425 U.S. at 246-47 , 96 S.Ct. at 1445-46 , 47 L.Ed.2d at 715-16 .

1990Contrary to Hunt's contention, the supreme court did not in White embrace the sort of instruction he offered; rather, that court noted the confusion and ambiguity associated with the term "subsidiary evidence." White, supra, 234 Ind. at 213-214 , 125 N.E.2d at 706 .

1990Contrary to Hunt's contention, the supreme court did not in White embrace the sort of instruction he offered; rather, that court noted the confusion and ambiguity associated with the term "subsidiary evidence." White, supra, 234 Ind. at 213-214 , 125 N.E.2d at 706 .

1990In addition, the Indiana Court of Appeals has recognized "[fJrom the very nature of a policeman's duties, his conduct in the community on and off duty must be above reproach." Pope v. Marion County Sheriff's Merit Bd. (1973), 157 Ind.App. 636, 646-47 , 301 N.E.2d 386, 391 .

1990In addition, the Indiana Court of Appeals has recognized "[fJrom the very nature of a policeman's duties, his conduct in the community on and off duty must be above reproach." Pope v. Marion County Sheriff's Merit Bd. (1973), 157 Ind.App. 636, 646-47 , 301 N.E.2d 386, 391 .

1981Fortson v. State, (1979) Ind., 385 N.E.2d 429 .

1889So in the case of Klein v. Landman, 29 Mo. 259 , and Hull v. Rawls, 27 Miss. 471 , where the parties had entered into a second marriage, it was held that the law would presume in favor of the legality of the second marriage, that the first marriage had been dissolved by a divorce, in the absence of some evidence to the contrary.

1889So in the case of Klein v. Landman, 29 Mo. 259 , and Hull v. Rawls, 27 Miss. 471 , where the parties had entered into a second marriage, it was held that the law would presume in favor of the legality of the second marriage, that the first marriage had been dissolved by a divorce, in the absence of some evidence to the contrary.

1889So that it can not be tried like ordinary questions of fact, which are independent of this sort of presumption.” Following the rule here enunciated, it was held in the cases, Greensborough v. Underhill, 12 Vt. 604 , Harris v. Harris, 8 Bradwell (Ill.) 57, Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84, and Yates v. Houston, 3 Texas, 433 , that where the parties had entered into a second marriage the law would presume in favor of the validity of the second marriage, in absence of proof to the contrary, that the former consort was de*ad at the time of such second marriage.

1889So that it can not be tried like ordinary questions of fact, which are independent of this sort of presumption.” Following the rule here enunciated, it was held in the cases, Greensborough v. Underhill, 12 Vt. 604 , Harris v. Harris, 8 Bradwell (Ill.) 57, Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84, and Yates v. Houston, 3 Texas, 433 , that where the parties had entered into a second marriage the law would presume in favor of the validity of the second marriage, in absence of proof to the contrary, that the former consort was de*ad at the time of such second marriage.

1889So that it can not be tried like ordinary questions of fact, which are independent of this sort of presumption.” Following the rule here enunciated, it was held in the cases, Greensborough v. Underhill, 12 Vt. 604 , Harris v. Harris, 8 Bradwell (Ill.) 57, Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84, and Yates v. Houston, 3 Texas, 433 , that where the parties had entered into a second marriage the law would presume in favor of the validity of the second marriage, in absence of proof to the contrary, that the former consort was de*ad at the time of such second marriage.

1862In cases of this sort the rule in equity is, that he may, by bill, have an injunction “ against the collection of the debt until the mortgagee shall reduce the incumbrance to a sum not exceeding that of the purchase-money due.” Buel v. Tate, 7 Blackf. 55 ; Addleman v. Merman, id. 31; Fitch v. Polk, 5 Ind. 564 .