sort claim in Alabama

2026Thus, because the Court concluded that Valta's claims were not "the sort of claim[s] which could have been properly dealt with under Rule 55(b)(1)," id. at 859 , i.e., claims for a sum certain or a sum that was capable of being made certain by computation, the Court reversed the default judgment -- but not the entry of the default -- and remanded the case "for a hearing to determine the amount of damages." Id. at 860 . 18 SC-2025-0660 This Court reached the same conclusion in Martin v. Robbins, 628 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 1993).

2026There, the defendant, who had been sued for allegedly committing fraud, conspiracy, and collusion, argued "that the default judgment was invalid because the trial court entered an award of $2,000,000 in damages without a hearing on the actual harm or loss suffered." Id. at 618 .

2026Thus, because the Court concluded that Valta's claims were not "the sort of claim[s] which could have been properly dealt with under Rule 55(b)(1)," id. at 859 , i.e., claims for a sum certain or a sum that was capable of being made certain by computation, the Court reversed the default judgment -- but not the entry of the default -- and remanded the case "for a hearing to determine the amount of damages." Id. at 860 . 18 SC-2025-0660 This Court reached the same conclusion in Martin v. Robbins, 628 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 1993).

2026Thus, because the Court concluded that Valta's claims were not "the sort of claim[s] which could have been properly dealt with under Rule 55(b)(1)," id. at 859 , i.e., claims for a sum certain or a sum that was capable of being made certain by computation, the Court reversed the default judgment -- but not the entry of the default -- and remanded the case "for a hearing to determine the amount of damages." Id. at 860 . 18 SC-2025-0660 This Court reached the same conclusion in Martin v. Robbins, 628 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 1993).

2008Perhaps the best reason for summarily denying the sort of claim presented in Ferguson’s petition, is found in Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 , 1316-1317 n. 20 (11th Cir.2000). “ ‘For example, “[i]t is common practice for petitioners attacking their death sentences to submit affidavits from witnesses who say they could have supplied additional mitigating [ ] evidence, had they been called or ... had they been asked the right questions.” Waters [v. Thomas ], 46 F.3d [1506] at 1514 [(11th Cir.1995)] (en banc).

2008Perhaps the best reason for summarily denying the sort of claim presented in Ferguson's petition, is found in Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 , 1316-1317 n. 20 (11th Cir.2000). "`For example, "[i]t is common practice for petitioners attacking their death sentences to submit affidavits from witnesses who say they could have supplied additional mitigating [] *442 evidence, had they been called or ... had they been asked the right questions." Waters [v. Thomas ], 46 F.3d [1506] at 1514 [(11th Cir.1995)] (en banc).

1992We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by State laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. . . . 'The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.' Lisenba v. California , 314 U.S. 219 , 236 [ 62 S.Ct. 280 , 290 , 86 L.Ed. 166 ] (1941)." Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. at 166 -67 , 107 S.Ct. at 521 .

1992We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by State laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. . . . 'The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.' Lisenba v. California , 314 U.S. 219 , 236 [ 62 S.Ct. 280 , 290 , 86 L.Ed. 166 ] (1941)." Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. at 166 -67 , 107 S.Ct. at 521 .

1992Given the rules of evidence, we do not believe that the evidence concerning the appellee's intoxication at the time of his consent was sufficient to prove that his consent was involuntary. " ' "[U]nless intoxication, in and of itself, so impairs the defendant's mind that he is 'unconscious of the meaning of his words,' the fact that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he confessed is simply one factor to be considered when reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession." Carr v. State , 545 So.2d 820 , 824 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989).

1992We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by State laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. . . . 'The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.' Lisenba v. California , 314 U.S. 219 , 236 [ 62 S.Ct. 280 , 290 , 86 L.Ed. 166 ] (1941)." Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. at 166 -67 , 107 S.Ct. at 521 .

1992We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by State laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. . . . 'The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.' Lisenba v. California , 314 U.S. 219 , 236 [ 62 S.Ct. 280 , 290 , 86 L.Ed. 166 ] (1941)." Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. at 166 -67 , 107 S.Ct. at 521 .

1977See Wambles v. Coppage , Ala.Civ.App., 333 So.2d 829 (1976); Snellings v. Snellings , 272 Ala. 254 , 130 So.2d 363 (1961).

1977See Wambles v. Coppage , Ala.Civ.App., 333 So.2d 829 (1976); Snellings v. Snellings , 272 Ala. 254 , 130 So.2d 363 (1961).

1938Co. v. Bates, 225 Ala. 519 , 144 So. 9 ; Southern Railway Co. v. Drake, 166 Ala. 540 , 51 So. 996 ; Central of Georgia Ry.

1938Co. v. Bates, 225 Ala. 519 , 144 So. 9 ; Southern Railway Co. v. Drake, 166 Ala. 540 , 51 So. 996 ; Central of Georgia Ry.

1938Co. v. Bates, 225 Ala. 519 , 144 So. 9 ; Southern Railway Co. v. Drake, 166 Ala. 540 , 51 So. 996 ; Central of Georgia Ry.

1938Co. v. Bates, 225 Ala. 519 , 144 So. 9 ; Southern Railway Co. v. Drake, 166 Ala. 540 , 51 So. 996 ; Central of Georgia Ry.

1938It appears, the starting of the train was a sort of test, and the train was promptly brought to a second stop on further signal from the rear. *188 “Knowledge of peril, as an essential predicate for guilt of subsequent negligence, means actual knowledge, and not that imputed knowledge which is based upon information merely of facts which, if followed up, would result in actual knowledge.” Young v. Woodward Iron Co., 216 Ala. 330 , 113 So. 223, 227 ; Central of Georgia Ry.

1938It appears, the starting of the train was a sort of test, and the train was promptly brought to a second stop on further signal from the rear. *188 “Knowledge of peril, as an essential predicate for guilt of subsequent negligence, means actual knowledge, and not that imputed knowledge which is based upon information merely of facts which, if followed up, would result in actual knowledge.” Young v. Woodward Iron Co., 216 Ala. 330 , 113 So. 223, 227 ; Central of Georgia Ry.

1933It is sufficient to say in respect to plea 2 that the contention is only by wp.y of mitigation of damages, and such evidence is admissible under the general issue. 38 Cyc. 2103; East v. Pace, 57 Ala. 521 ; Carpenter v. Going, 20 Ala. 587 ; 26 R.

1933It is sufficient to say in respect to plea 2 that the contention is only by wp.y of mitigation of damages, and such evidence is admissible under the general issue. 38 Cyc. 2103; East v. Pace, 57 Ala. 521 ; Carpenter v. Going, 20 Ala. 587 ; 26 R.

1927In Welsh v. State, 96 Ala. 92, 97 , 11 So. 450 , 451, the court said: “There is a sort of presumption of the truth of declarations against interest which the law adjudges as the basis of admissibility.