8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rochagreen2 sentences2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris 2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Bond Forfeiture in Cr-94019213green2 sentences2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris 2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris 2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris 2010In re Bond Forfeiture in CR-94019213, 191 Ariz. 304, ¶ 10 , 955 P.2d 541, 544 (App.1998) (“We conclude the surety must demonstrate that it was, in fact, prejudiced by the court’s failure to promptly inform it of the defendant’s failure to appear before a bond forfeiture order may be reversed on this ground.”); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 300 , 908 P.2d 1081, 1085 (App. 1995) (affirming forfeiture when failure to follow procedure of Rule 7.6 did not result in prejudice); State v. Rogers, 117 Ariz. 258, 261 , 571 P.2d 1054, 1057 (App.1977) (time limits of prior version of Rule 7.6 not juris | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harry Shololagreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir.1997); Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141 — 42; see also Gant, 202 Ariz. at 244 n. 3, 43 P.3d at 192 n. 3 (recognizing a split in authority and collecting eases rejecting the “initiating contact” construction of Belton). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Marcus Thorntongreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir.1997); Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141 — 42; see also Gant, 202 Ariz. at 244 n. 3, 43 P.3d at 192 n. 3 (recognizing a split in authority and collecting eases rejecting the “initiating contact” construction of Belton). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gantgreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir.1997); Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141 — 42; see also Gant, 202 Ariz. at 244 n. 3, 43 P.3d at 192 n. 3 (recognizing a split in authority and collecting eases rejecting the “initiating contact” construction of Belton). 2003See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir.1997); Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141 — 42; see also Gant, 202 Ariz. at 244 n. 3, 43 P.3d at 192 n. 3 (recognizing a split in authority and collecting eases rejecting the “initiating contact” construction of Belton). | 1 | 1 |
Cella Barr Associates, Inc. v. Cohengreen1 sentence1997Id. at 482, 868 P.2d at 1065. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pearson v. Reed
green
2 sentences1977The opinion, however, provides little guidance as to what constitutes a judicial or quasi-judicial function. 2 The reasons given by the court would equally apply to allow immunity to any government official. *396 “Paraphrasing a statement appearing in Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal.App.2d 277 , 44 P.2d 592, 597 , we can also say that we are well aware of the fact that in thus shielding public officers, who act strictly within their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial capacity, against actions of this sort the rule may work hardship and injustice in individual cases. 1948Paraphrasing a statement appearing in Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal.App.2d 277 , 44 P.2d 592, 597 , we can also say that we are well aware of the fact that in thus shielding public officers, who act strictly within their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial capacity, against actions of this sort the rule may work hardship and injustice in individual cases. | 2 | 1948–1977 |
Woodruff v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1977The opinion, however, provides little guidance as to what constitutes a judicial or quasi-judicial function. 2 The reasons given by the court would equally apply to allow immunity to any government official. *396 “Paraphrasing a statement appearing in Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal.App.2d 277 , 44 P.2d 592, 597 , we can also say that we are well aware of the fact that in thus shielding public officers, who act strictly within their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial capacity, against actions of this sort the rule may work hardship and injustice in individual cases. 1948Paraphrasing a statement appearing in Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal.App.2d 277 , 44 P.2d 592, 597 , we can also say that we are well aware of the fact that in thus shielding public officers, who act strictly within their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial capacity, against actions of this sort the rule may work hardship and injustice in individual cases. | 2 | 1948–1977 |
Glasco v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir.1997); Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141 — 42; see also Gant, 202 Ariz. at 244 n. 3, 43 P.3d at 192 n. 3 (recognizing a split in authority and collecting eases rejecting the “initiating contact” construction of Belton). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ontiveros v. Borak
green
2 sentences1994Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 , 667 P.2d 200 (1983). 1994Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 , 667 P.2d 200 (1983). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Michael H. v. Gerald D.
green
2 sentences1991Id. at 124 , 109 S.Ct. at 2342 , 105 L.Ed.2d at 106 . 1991Id. at 124 , 109 S.Ct. at 2342 , 105 L.Ed.2d at 106 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wilson v. Hirst
green
2 sentences1977The words of Justice Udall in Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197 , 193 P.2d 461 (1948), which the majority overrules, are as true now as they were then: "[W]e can also say that we are well aware of the fact that in thus shielding public officers, who act strictly within their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial capacity, against actions of this sort the rule may work hardship and injustice in individual cases. 1977The words of Justice Udall in Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197 , 193 P.2d 461 (1948), which the majority overrules, are as true now as they were then: "[W]e can also say that we are well aware of the fact that in thus shielding public officers, who act strictly within their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial capacity, against actions of this sort the rule may work hardship and injustice in individual cases. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.