sort inquiry in Ohio

2012Nevertheless, his counsel did not present any evidence on these issues so that the trial court would know that he lacked competence to waive his constitutional rights.” But there is nothing in the record to establish, or even to suggest, that Schiessler had mental deficiencies or mental illness. {¶ 25} If there were such evidence, then we would agree that Schiessler’s trial counsel should have offered it at the suppression hearing, so that the trial court could have performed the sort of analysis that we performed in State v. Lail, supra. But we cannot find Schiessler’s trial counsel to have b

2006Political subdivisions must defend this sort of claim on a negligence basis, not immunity.'" {¶ 19} In Hall , we thus concluded that "as a matter of law * * * the maintenance of a political subdivision's property, as opposed to decisions concerning the acquisition and utilization of such property, do not involve a sufficient amount of budgeting, management, or planning to bring such decisions into the purview of R.C. 2744.03 (A)(3) or (5)." Id. at 702 . {¶ 20} In the case at bar, the city's decision regarding the sewer repair does not involve the creative exercise of political judgment that go

2005No. 2003-L-049, 2005-Ohio-412, at ¶¶ 56-60 , citing United States v. Harris (2002), 536 U.S. 545 , 562 ; State v. Adams, 2003-L-110, 2005-Ohio-1107, at ¶¶ 78-79 ; State v. Jenkins, 9th Dist.

2005No. 2003-L-049, 2005-Ohio-412, at ¶¶ 56-60 , citing United States v. Harris (2002), 536 U.S. 545 , 562 ; State v. Adams, 2003-L-110, 2005-Ohio-1107, at ¶¶ 78-79 ; State v. Jenkins, 9th Dist.

2005No. 2003-L-049, 2005-Ohio-412, at ¶¶ 56-60 , citing United States v. Harris (2002), 536 U.S. 545 , 562 ; State v. Adams, 2003-L-110, 2005-Ohio-1107, at ¶¶ 78-79 ; State v. Jenkins, 9th Dist.

1996Judge Cook’s dissenting opinion was later adopted by the court when it overruled Vallish in Hallett, 89 Ohio App.3d at 314 , 624 N.E.2d at 275 .

1996Judge Cook’s dissenting opinion was later adopted by the court when it overruled Vallish in Hallett, 89 Ohio App.3d at 314 , 624 N.E.2d at 275 .

1994State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222 , 15 OBR 311, 360-361, 473 N.E.2d 264, 313 . *406 Submitting an unsworn document when an affidavit is required is not the same sort of error as checking the wrong box on a form.

1994State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222 , 15 OBR 311, 360-361, 473 N.E.2d 264, 313 . *406 Submitting an unsworn document when an affidavit is required is not the same sort of error as checking the wrong box on a form.

1993In a case decided prior to Connelly , the Ohio Supreme Court held: “In deciding whether the defendant’s confession in this case was involuntarily induced, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 40-41 , 3 O.O.3d 18, 23 , 358 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 , vacated in part on other grounds (1978), 438

1993In a case decided prior to Connelly , the Ohio Supreme Court held: “In deciding whether the defendant’s confession in this case was involuntarily induced, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 40-41 , 3 O.O.3d 18, 23 , 358 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 , vacated in part on other grounds (1978), 438

1993In a case decided prior to Connelly , the Ohio Supreme Court held: “In deciding whether the defendant’s confession in this case was involuntarily induced, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 40-41 , 3 O.O.3d 18, 23 , 358 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 , vacated in part on other grounds (1978), 438

1993In Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 484 , the Supreme Court held that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” As to any inquiry into a defendant’s unique mental condition, absent such police misconduct, “the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area.” Id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. at 521 , 93 L.E

1993In Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 484 , the Supreme Court held that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” As to any inquiry into a defendant’s unique mental condition, absent such police misconduct, “the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area.” Id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. at 521 , 93 L.E