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24 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bridges v. State Board of Electionsgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
People v. Holmangreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Olsongreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
In Re APgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
Village of Mundelein v. Wisconsin Central Railroadgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
Edwards v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc.green2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non 2016See, e.g., Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 33 (“We need not address the question of whether these amendments could be applied retroactively to the case at bar because we find that even assuming that the amendments can be applied prospectively only as plaintiff suggests, they would then merely indicate a presumption that the legislature has changed the law from not requiring any action from the employer faced with an invalid notice to now requiring the employer to respond with its reason for noncompliance, but only provided that the obligee first gives notice of the non | 2 | 2 |
People v. Shaw-Sodarogreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., People v. Hood, 2024 IL App (4th) 230102-U, ¶¶ 31-35 (considering the seriousness of the victim’s injuries that served as the basis for the great bodily harm element in an aggravated domestic battery case); People v. Shaw-Sodaro, 2023 IL App (4th) 220704, ¶ 70 (considering the age of the victim in an aggravated criminal sexual abuse case); People v. Williams, 2022 IL App (4th) 210526-U, ¶ 38 (considering the location of the shooting in an aggravated battery with a firearm case). ¶ 112 Because we conclude that the trial court committed no error at defendant’s sentencing hearing, ther | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ivorygreen1 sentence2022See People v. Ivory, 139 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Portergreen1 sentence2016People v. Porter, 111 Ill. 2d 386, 403 (1986). ¶ 66 Despite the fact that defendants were granted a hearing on this issue that included testimony by Bass, they claim that the trial court improperly denied their request for a broader hearing that would allow them to determine "what role" Bass played during the 30 minutes of deliberation, in order to determine if he exposed the other 13 jurors to "extraneous information," but this sort of hearing is inappropriate, as it pertains to the deliberative process. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hobleygreen1 sentence2016See People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 463-64 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nitzgreen1 sentence1999We acknowledge that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holds this view (Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475-76 ); however, the Illinois Supreme Court does not (see People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134-35 (1991)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Golla v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences2011A good source of jurisprudence in this area is found in our supreme court's decision in Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill.2d 353 , 212 Ill.Dec. 549 , 657 N.E.2d 894 (1995). ¶ 20 In Golla , our supreme court stated that "where a plaintiff's injury is caused by a `sudden traumatic event,' such as the automobile accident that occurred in this case, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the date the injury occurs." Id. at 362-63 , 212 Ill.Dec. 549 , 657 N.E.2d 894 . 2011A good source of jurisprudence in this area is found in our supreme court's decision in Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill.2d 353 , 212 Ill.Dec. 549 , 657 N.E.2d 894 (1995). ¶ 20 In Golla , our supreme court stated that "where a plaintiff's injury is caused by a `sudden traumatic event,' such as the automobile accident that occurred in this case, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the date the injury occurs." Id. at 362-63 , 212 Ill.Dec. 549 , 657 N.E.2d 894 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Dix Mutual Insurance v. LaFramboise
green
2 sentences2011Indeed, this is exactly the sort of analysis the supreme court counseled against in Dix, 149 Ill.2d at 320 , 173 Ill.Dec. 648 , 597 N.E.2d 622 , where it explained, "In Illinois, courts must look to the lease `as a whole' and the spirit of the agreement between the parties rather than search for an express provision in the lease." Plaintiff's analysis also conflicts with ordinary principles of contractual construction. 2011Indeed, this is exactly the sort of analysis the supreme court counseled against in Dix, 149 Ill.2d at 320 , 173 Ill.Dec. 648 , 597 N.E.2d 622 , where it explained, "In Illinois, courts must look to the lease `as a whole' and the spirit of the agreement between the parties rather than search for an express provision in the lease." Plaintiff's analysis also conflicts with ordinary principles of contractual construction. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Emerson Electric Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
2 sentences2010The court reasoned: “Though the location of the insured risk is often seen as the most important factor in this sort of analysis, that is not the case where, as here, the risk locations are scattered through several states.” Emerson Electric, 319 Ill. 2010The court reasoned: “Though the location of the insured risk is often seen as the most important factor in this sort of analysis, that is not the case where, as here, the risk locations are scattered through several states.” Emerson Electric, 319 Ill. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Kernats v. Smith Industries Medical Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998The court determined that the claims based on the manufacture of the CVS catheter, the failure to warn and inadequate instruction, and the claims for defective design and inadequate testing arose from “general obligations” applicable to all manufacturers and were “not the sort of state requirement that section 360k was intended to preempt.” Kernats, 283 Ill. 1998The court determined that the claims based on the manufacture of the CVS catheter, the failure to warn and inadequate instruction, and the claims for defective design and inadequate testing arose from "general obligations" applicable to all manufacturers and were "not the sort of state requirement that section 360k was intended to preempt." Kernats , 283 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Holman
red
1 sentence2023People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
1 sentence2023People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Livonia Property Holdings, L.L.C. v. 12840-12976 Farmington Road Holdings, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2012Livonia Property Holdings, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 735 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
American Country Insurance v. Cline
green
1 sentence2000This sort of claim lies outside the scope of the additional insured endorsement because it does not allege the sole negligence of [the subcontractor].” Cline, 309 Ill. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Charles Bland, Jr. v. California Department of Corrections Attorney General of the State of California
green
1 sentence1999We acknowledge that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holds this view (Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475-76 ); however, the Illinois Supreme Court does not (see People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134-35 (1991)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
David Junior Brown v. Gary Dixon, Warden, Central Prison, David Junior Brown v. Gary Dixon, Warden, Central Prison
green
2 sentences1991(See Brown v. Dixon (4th Cir.1989), 891 F.2d 490 ; People v. Davis (Colo.1990), 794 P.2d 159 ; State v. Allen (1988), 323 N.C. 208 , 372 S.E.2d 855 .) We conclude that Batson does not mandate the sort of inquiry requested by the present defendant. 1991(See Brown v. Dixon (4th Cir. 1989), 891 F.2d 490 ; People v. Davis (Colo. 1990), 794 P.2d 159 ; State v. Allen (1988), 323 N.C. 708 , 372 S.E.2d 855 .) We conclude that Batson does not mandate the sort of inquiry requested by the present defendant. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences1991(See Brown v. Dixon (4th Cir.1989), 891 F.2d 490 ; People v. Davis (Colo.1990), 794 P.2d 159 ; State v. Allen (1988), 323 N.C. 208 , 372 S.E.2d 855 .) We conclude that Batson does not mandate the sort of inquiry requested by the present defendant. 1991(See Brown v. Dixon (4th Cir. 1989), 891 F.2d 490 ; People v. Davis (Colo. 1990), 794 P.2d 159 ; State v. Allen (1988), 323 N.C. 708 , 372 S.E.2d 855 .) We conclude that Batson does not mandate the sort of inquiry requested by the present defendant. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Allen
green
2 sentences1991(See Brown v. Dixon (4th Cir.1989), 891 F.2d 490 ; People v. Davis (Colo.1990), 794 P.2d 159 ; State v. Allen (1988), 323 N.C. 208 , 372 S.E.2d 855 .) We conclude that Batson does not mandate the sort of inquiry requested by the present defendant. 1991(See Brown v. Dixon (4th Cir. 1989), 891 F.2d 490 ; People v. Davis (Colo. 1990), 794 P.2d 159 ; State v. Allen (1988), 323 N.C. 708 , 372 S.E.2d 855 .) We conclude that Batson does not mandate the sort of inquiry requested by the present defendant. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences1989Second, the statement by the Supreme Court in Connelly that “the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry [into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed] to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own” (Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 , 93 L. 1989Second, the statement by the Supreme Court in Connelly that “the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry [into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed] to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own” (Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 , 93 L. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Johnson v. Board of Education of Decatur School District No. 61
green
1 sentence1983To read section 10 — 21.4 otherwise would be to fail to construe a statute creating new liabilities for a school board strictly, contrary to the policy of Johnson v. Board of Education (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 338 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Great Lakes Carbon Corporation
green
1 sentence1983A misinterpretation by the district court of its power to grant post-judgment relief does not convert an otherwise valid judgment into “one which from its inception was legally ineffective.” ( 624 F.2d 822, 825 .) At most, the Federal judgment can be described, not as void, but as erroneous, and it cannot be denied res judicata effect for that reason. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Redmond
green
1 sentence1983App. 3d 407, 412-13 , 449 N.E.2d 533 .) The only statement of this sort is the claim that on July 5, 1981, no one left his apartment in a semi-intoxicated or drugged condition. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Stanley v. Taylor green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Browdy neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Swanlund v. Rockford & Interurban Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.