innocence exception in Delaware

2023The “Persuasiveness” Requirement As to the second prong of the actual innocence inquiry, we explained in Purnell that the defendant must “convince us that the new evidence, when considered in the context of all the relevant evidence by a properly instructed jury, is such as will probably change the result if a new trial were granted.”129 “[T]he court must assess all of the evidence, including that which was properly excluded and that which was wrongfully admitted.”130 Purnell presented a significant amount of new evidence in his second Rule 61 motion, which we divided into six categories: (1)

2021We conclude here, much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require, this petitioner has not satisfied it.”). 196 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 (alterations added). 76 After the 2014 amendments to Rule 61, the Superior Court in Sykes v. State noted a dearth of Delaware authorities on what constitutes “new” evidence for purposes of our postconviction remedy, and so it relied on federal cases analyzing Schlup’s actual innocence test for the “newness” prong.197 In subsequent cases, the Superior Court has relied on Schlup’s formulation for the “persuasive

2023Oct. 4, 1982); Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1149 , 1195 (Del. 2008); Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 433 (Del. 1982). 35 Fowler v. State, 194 A.3d 16, 17 , 26–27 (Del. 2018). 36 Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (alterations omitted) (quoting Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 338 (3d Cir. 2012)). 11 Satisfying the actual innocence test is, by design, a heavy burden, and such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.

2021Under both Lloyd and Schlup, a defendant must present additional evidence that was not available at trial and would not have been despite 218 Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (alterations omitted) (quoting Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 338 (3d Cir. 2012)). 219 At the time, Chief Justice Rehnquist objected to the confusing verbiage of the Schlup standard: The Court informs us that a showing of “actual innocence” requires a habeas petitioner to “show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Ante, at 867.

2023Oct. 4, 1982); Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1149 , 1195 (Del. 2008); Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 433 (Del. 1982). 35 Fowler v. State, 194 A.3d 16, 17 , 26–27 (Del. 2018). 36 Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (alterations omitted) (quoting Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 338 (3d Cir. 2012)). 11 Satisfying the actual innocence test is, by design, a heavy burden, and such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.

2021Under both Lloyd and Schlup, a defendant must present additional evidence that was not available at trial and would not have been despite 218 Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (alterations omitted) (quoting Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 338 (3d Cir. 2012)). 219 At the time, Chief Justice Rehnquist objected to the confusing verbiage of the Schlup standard: The Court informs us that a showing of “actual innocence” requires a habeas petitioner to “show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Ante, at 867.

2024R. 61(i)(5). 53 Taylor v. State, 180 A.3d 41 (Del. 2018) (citing Downes v. State, 771 A.2d 289, 291 (Del. 2001). 54 Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053 , 1100 (Del. 2021). 10 new evidence that a person other than the petitioner committed the crime.’” 55 The Delaware Supreme Court also held in Purnell v. State that “a body of new evidence that goes only to the weight or credibility of that which was presented to the jury is almost never adequate to meet the demanding bar for being granted a new trial.”56 Attacking a witness’s credibility in general will not be sufficient to satisfy the actual innoc

2021R. 61(d)(2)(i). 50 Taylor v. State, 180 A.3d 41 (Del. 2018) (citing Downes v. State, 771 A.2d 289, 291 (Del. 2001). 14 unreliable identification methods.51 The proffered evidence does not satisfy the actual innocence requirement. 1.

2025He told his counsel that he intended to testify, that he was engaged in an ongoing sexual relationship with Bonistall, and that the day before her murder, between 10:45 p.m. and 11:45 p.m., they had consensual sex.212 Cooke’s 207 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 . 208 See Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 475 , 504 (Del. 1999); Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374 , 383–84 (Del. 2011). 209 United States v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1073 (D.C.

1994See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 .

2025He told his counsel that he intended to testify, that he was engaged in an ongoing sexual relationship with Bonistall, and that the day before her murder, between 10:45 p.m. and 11:45 p.m., they had consensual sex.212 Cooke’s 207 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 . 208 See Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 475 , 504 (Del. 1999); Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374 , 383–84 (Del. 2011). 209 United States v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1073 (D.C.

2023Oct. 4, 1982); Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1149 , 1195 (Del. 2008); Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 433 (Del. 1982). 35 Fowler v. State, 194 A.3d 16, 17 , 26–27 (Del. 2018). 36 Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (alterations omitted) (quoting Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 338 (3d Cir. 2012)). 11 Satisfying the actual innocence test is, by design, a heavy burden, and such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.

2022This approach is a valid trial strategy and deserves deference.40 If there is such an all-or- nothing strategy in this case, then there is no ineffective assistance under Strickland because Morris’s claim fails the first prong of the Strickland standard.41 37 Id. 38 Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346, 354 (Del. 2012)). 39 Allison, 2010 WL 3733919 at *2 (finding counsel was not ineffective for not requesting a lesser- included offense instruction because it would have been inconsistent with the defendant's actual innocence defense). 40 Id. 41 Id. 12 Under the facts of this case, I find th

2022This approach is a valid trial strategy and deserves deference.40 If there is such an all-or- nothing strategy in this case, then there is no ineffective assistance under Strickland because Morris’s claim fails the first prong of the Strickland standard.41 37 Id. 38 Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346, 354 (Del. 2012)). 39 Allison, 2010 WL 3733919 at *2 (finding counsel was not ineffective for not requesting a lesser- included offense instruction because it would have been inconsistent with the defendant's actual innocence defense). 40 Id. 41 Id. 12 Under the facts of this case, I find th

2022This approach is a valid trial strategy and deserves deference.40 If there is such an all-or- nothing strategy in this case, then there is no ineffective assistance under Strickland because Morris’s claim fails the first prong of the Strickland standard.41 37 Id. 38 Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346, 354 (Del. 2012)). 39 Allison, 2010 WL 3733919 at *2 (finding counsel was not ineffective for not requesting a lesser- included offense instruction because it would have been inconsistent with the defendant's actual innocence defense). 40 Id. 41 Id. 12 Under the facts of this case, I find th

2022Aug. 4, 2021) (affirming dismissal of postconviction relief where defendant’s claims of new evidence, e.g., that the prosecution’s ballistics expert pleaded guilty to providing false activity sheets to the police and was paid for work not performed, did not give rise to any inference of actual innocence warranting new trial). 57 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014) (“If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’”): Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013) (“It s

2022Aug. 4, 2021) (affirming dismissal of postconviction relief where defendant’s claims of new evidence, e.g., that the prosecution’s ballistics expert pleaded guilty to providing false activity sheets to the police and was paid for work not performed, did not give rise to any inference of actual innocence warranting new trial). 57 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014) (“If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’”): Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013) (“It s