innocence doctrine in Washington

2011Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir.1997) (dismissing actual innocence claim where offender argues he is innocent of a noncapital sentence because another federal criminal statute was intended to subsume the statute under which he was sentenced); [2] United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir.1993) (dismissing actual innocence claim to a noncapital sentence, where offender bases innocence to enhanced sentence on a subsequent change in the interpretation of a sentencing law). [3] In prohibiting application of the actual innocence doctrine to a purely *1247 legal err

2011Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir.1997) (dismissing actual innocence claim where offender argues he is innocent of a noncapital sentence because another federal criminal statute was intended to subsume the statute under which he was sentenced); [2] United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir.1993) (dismissing actual innocence claim to a noncapital sentence, where offender bases innocence to enhanced sentence on a subsequent change in the interpretation of a sentencing law). [3] In prohibiting application of the actual innocence doctrine to a purely *1247 legal err

2011Because his court documents use his former name, this opinion does as well. [2] The Court of Appeals relied on Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 380-81 (8th Cir.1991) when it stated that the Eighth Circuit does apply the actual innocence doctrine in the noncapital sentencing context.

2011The Court of Appeals relied on Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1991) when it stated that the Eighth Circuit does apply the actual innocence doctrine in the noncapital sentencing context.

2011Actual Innocence Doctrine ¶ 9 The roots of the actual innocence doctrine are found "in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments based on adequate and independent state law procedural grounds." Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 , 124 S.Ct. 1847 , 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004).

2011Actual Innocence Doctrine ¶ 9 The roots of the actual innocence doctrine are found "in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments based on adequate and independent state law procedural grounds." Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 , 124 S.Ct. 1847 , 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004).

2005App. 909, 914 , 86 P.3d 1266 (2004) (noting that Michigan and Ohio cases did not address public policy rationale supporting holding in Falkner). ¶6 The Respondents point out that in the Wiley opinion, cited repeatedly with approval in Falkner, the California court reviewed the difference between criminal and civil legal malpractice claims and the public policy rationale for the innocence requirement in criminal malpractice claims, and observed that where criminal defense attorneys are negligent, whether at trial or concerning sentencing matters or plea bargaining, “postconviction relief will p

2005The innocence requirement is based on a public policy determination that "`[r]egardless of the attorney's negligence, a guilty defendant's conviction and sentence are the direct consequence of his own perfidy,' and thus, cannot be the basis for civil damages." Falkner, 108 Wash.App. at 120 , 29 P.3d 771 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 987 (1998)).

2016Piris does not ask us to overrule Ang, but asks us instead to recognize and apply an exception to the actual innocence requirement that was crafted in Powell v. Associated Counsel for the Accused, 125 Wn.

2016These policy concerns still serve as the underpinning of the actual innocence requirement. ¶13 Piris does not ask us to overrule Ang, but asks us instead to recognize and apply an exception to the actual innocence requirement that was crafted in Powell v. Associated Counsel for the Accused, 125 Wn.

2005To support his contention that application of the rule to his case would be unfair, Powell refers to authorities considered in Falkner: Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994), Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989), and Susan M.

2005To support his contention that application of the rule to his case would be unfair, Powell refers to authorities considered in Falkner: Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994), Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989), and Susan M.

2005To support his contention that application of the rule to his case would be unfair, Powell refers to authorities considered in Falkner: Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994), Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989), and Susan M.

2005To support his contention that application of the rule to his case would be unfair, Powell refers to authorities considered in Falkner: Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994), Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989), and Susan M.

2016We reasoned that for legal causation to satisfy proximate cause, the actual innocence requirement was rooted in public policy: "To determine whether the cause in fact ... should also be deemed the legal cause of [plaintiffs] harm, a court may consider, among other things, the public policy implications of holding the defendant liable." Ang, 154 Wn.2d at 482 (citingHartleyv.

2016We reasoned that for legal causation to satisfy proximate cause, the actual innocence requirement was rooted in public policy: “To determine whether the cause in fact . . . should also be deemed the legal cause of [plaintiff’s] harm, a court may consider, among other things, the public policy implications of holding the defendant liable.” Ang, 154 Wn.2d at 482 (citing Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 779 , 698 P.2d 77 (1985)).

2016Va. 2007) (holding the actual innocence requirement should not apply when the criminal malpractice plaintiff alleges his attorney's negligence resulted in a sentencing error, and noting that the exception would not allow the plaintiff to profit from his crimes "because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence"); Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56 , 960 A.2d 337, 344 (2008) (recognizing an exception to the actual innocence requirement when the criminal malpractice plaintifflost the benefit of a plea agreement due to his attorney's unauthorized action, and noting the plai

2016Va. 2007) (holding the actual innocence requirement should not apply when the criminal malpractice plaintiff alleges his attorney's negligence resulted in a sentencing error, and noting that the exception would not allow the plaintiff to profit from his crimes "because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence"); Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56 , 960 A.2d 337, 344 (2008) (recognizing an exception to the actual innocence requirement when the criminal malpractice plaintifflost the benefit of a plea agreement due to his attorney's unauthorized action, and noting the plai

2016Va. 2007) (holding the actual innocence requirement should not apply when the criminal malpractice plaintiff alleges his attorney's negligence resulted in a sentencing error, and noting that the exception would not allow the plaintiff to profit from his crimes "because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence"); Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56 , 960 A.2d 337, 344 (2008) (recognizing an exception to the actual innocence requirement when the criminal malpractice plaintifflost the benefit of a plea agreement due to his attorney's unauthorized action, and noting the plai

2016See id. ("[W]e are not persuaded that an actual innocence requirement is needed to prevent a proliferation of nuisance suits.

2016Cf, e.g., MacFarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that "even a single extra day of incarceration is of substantial significance for constitutional purposes"), vacated as moot sub nom.

2016Cf., e.g., MacFarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that “even a single extra day of incarceration is of substantial significance for constitutional purposes”), vacated as moot sub nom.

2016App. 2d 596 , 313 P.3d 64, 86 (2013) (Atcheson, J., dissenting) (ultimately rejecting the actual innocence requirement for criminal malpractice plaintiffs))). 1 Allowing Piris to proceed with his malpractice case without respect to whether he is innocent of the underlying charges in fact enhances respect for the justice system by underscoring that courts recognize the very real injury that occurs when a person is deprived of his liberty for longer than his sentence allows.

2016App. 2d 596 , 313 P.3d 64, 86 (2013) (Atcheson, J., dissenting) (ultimately rejecting the actual innocence requirement for criminal malpractice plaintiffs))). 2 ¶26 Allowing Piris to proceed with his malpractice case without respect to whether he is innocent of the underlying charges in fact enhances respect for the justice system by underscoring that courts recognize the very real injury that occurs when a person is deprived of his liberty for longer than his sentence allows.

2016Va. 2007) (holding the actual innocence requirement should not apply when the criminal malpractice plaintiff alleges his attorney's negligence resulted in a sentencing error, and noting that the exception would not allow the plaintiff to profit from his crimes "because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence"); Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56 , 960 A.2d 337, 344 (2008) (recognizing an exception to the actual innocence requirement when the criminal malpractice plaintifflost the benefit of a plea agreement due to his attorney's unauthorized action, and noting the plai

2016Va. 2007) (holding the actual innocence requirement should not apply when the criminal malpractice plaintiff alleges his attorney's negligence resulted in a sentencing error, and noting that the exception would not allow the plaintiff to profit from his crimes "because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence"); Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56 , 960 A.2d 337, 344 (2008) (recognizing an exception to the actual innocence requirement when the criminal malpractice plaintifflost the benefit of a plea agreement due to his attorney's unauthorized action, and noting the plai

2011Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir.1997) (dismissing actual innocence claim where offender argues he is innocent of a noncapital sentence because another federal criminal statute was intended to subsume the statute under which he was sentenced); [2] United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir.1993) (dismissing actual innocence claim to a noncapital sentence, where offender bases innocence to enhanced sentence on a subsequent change in the interpretation of a sentencing law). [3] In prohibiting application of the actual innocence doctrine to a purely *1247 legal err

2011Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir.1997) (dismissing actual innocence claim where offender argues he is innocent of a noncapital sentence because another federal criminal statute was intended to subsume the statute under which he was sentenced); [2] United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir.1993) (dismissing actual innocence claim to a noncapital sentence, where offender bases innocence to enhanced sentence on a subsequent change in the interpretation of a sentencing law). [3] In prohibiting application of the actual innocence doctrine to a purely *1247 legal err

2011Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d Cir.2003) (dismissing actual innocence claim *1246 where petitioner claims that he is actually innocent of persistent offender sentence because his three prior undisputed convictions should have only counted as one conviction for the purposes of his persistent offender sentence).

2011Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing actual innocence claim where petitioner claims that he is actually innocent of persistent offender sentence because his three prior undisputed convictions should have counted as only one conviction for the purposes of his persistent offender sentence).

2005On these facts, we conclude that the innocence requirement articulated in Falkner v. Foshaug, 108 Wn.

2005The innocence requirement is based on a public policy determination that “ ‘[rjegardless of the attorney’s negligence, a guilty defendant’s conviction and sentence are the direct consequence of his own perfidy,’ and thus, cannot be the basis for civil damages.” Falkner, 108 Wn.

2005App. 113 , 29 P.3d 771 (2001), the Court of Appeals “conclude [d] that postconviction relief is a prerequisite to maintaining [a criminal malpractice] suit and proof of innocence is an additional element a criminal defendant/malpractice plaintiff must prove to prevail at trial in his legal malpractice action.” Id. at 124 (emphasis added); see also id. at 123 (referring to "an actual innocence requirement”). ¶11 The trial court in the present case thus instructed the jury as follows on the elements of the Angs’ criminal malpractice claims: To prove their legal malpractice claims, the plaintiffs

2005On these facts, we conclude that the innocence requirement articulated in Falkner v. Foshaug 108 Wash.App. 113 , 29 P.3d 771 (2001) and its progeny — Ang v. Martin, 118 Wash.App. 553 , 76 P.3d 787 (2003), review granted, 151 Wash.2d 1039 , 95 P.3d 352 (2004), and Owens v. Harrison, 120 Wash.App. 909 , 86 P.3d 1266 (2004) — does not require dismissal of the lawsuit as a matter of law.