innocence claim in Pennsylvania

2025Rather, “a defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Id. at 1292 .

2025Carrasquillo, supra at 705-06 , 115 A.3d at 1292 (internal citation omitted). “[B]oth the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with the relationship of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence, are relevant.” Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1190 (Pa.Super. 2017) (internal footnote omitted).

2026Further, this Court has recognized that “both the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with the relationship of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence, are relevant.” Islas, 156 A.3d at 1191 .

2026A -3- J-A03025-26 presentence motion to withdraw a plea “should not be permitted if the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1192 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen a defendant files a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea based upon a claim of innocence, the innocence claim must be at least plausible” to establish a fair and just reason.

2026Like here, in situations where a defendant makes a presentence request to withdraw his guilty plea based upon a claim of innocence, “the innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Norton, 201 A.3d at 120 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [I]t is important that appellate courts honor trial court[s’] discretion in these matters, as trial courts are in the unique position to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and measure, under the circumstances, whether defendants have made s

2025Furthermore, in situations where a when a defendant makes a pre- sentence request to withdraw his guilty plea based upon a claim of innocence, “the innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Norton, 201 A.3d at 120 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [I]t is important that appellate courts honor trial court’s discretion in these matters, as trial courts are in the unique position to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and measure, under the circumstances, whether defendants ha

2023Carrasqullio, supra at 706 n.9, 115 A.3d at 1293 n.9 (declining to address prejudice to Commonwealth, because defendant failed to assert plausible claim of innocence); Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa. 3, 9 , 116 A.3d 1103, 1107 (2015) (holding pre-sentence request to withdraw plea failed where defendant made only bare assertion of innocence).

2017Rather, the trial court retains a degree of discretion in determining whether the defendant’s innocence claim “is plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Id. at 1292 ; see also Hvizda, 116 A.3d at 1107 .

2017It is well-settled that, “[i]f a defendant does not admit that he killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence on diminished capacity is inadmissible.” Commonwealth v. Laird, 605 Pa. 137 , 988 A.2d 618, 632 (2010).

2013We have held that “[i]f a defendant does not admit that he killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence of diminished capacity is inadmissible.” Hutchinson, 25 A.3d at 312 ; Commonwealth v. Laird, 605 Pa. 137 , 988 A.2d 618, 632 (2010); Spotz, 896 A.2d at 1218 (“Absent an admission from [the defendant] that he had shot and killed [the victim], trial counsel could not have presented a diminished capacity defense.”).

2019Considering all of the foregoing, his claim of innocence is, in our view, implausible, and thus, without more, not a "fair and just reason" for granting his request.5 See Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. at 704 , 115 A.3d at 1291 ("a defendant's innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea"), quoted in, e.q., Baez, 169 A.3d at 39 ; cf. Islas, 156 A.3d at 1191 ("The defendant need only proffer a "colorable" or "plausible" claim of innocence, which Islas has surely done."). 5 This seems especially so because his mot

2018In Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 39 (Pa.Super. 2017), we found that an innocence claim was not sufficiently plausible to require the trial court to allow him to withdraw a guilty plea, where the defendant first asserted his innocence three months after pleading guilty and he offered no evidence to support the claim.

2020Williams, 602 Pa. 360 , 980 A.2d 510, 527 (2009); [C]ommonwealth v. [G]ibson, 597 PA. 402, 951 [A].2d 1110, 1131 (2008); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1 , 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006) (“Absent an admission from [the defendant] that he had shot and killed [the victim], trial counsel could not have presented a diminished capacity defense.”)[.] If a defendant does not admit that he killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence on diminished capacity is inadmissible.

2020Williams, 602 Pa. 360 , 980 A.2d 510, 527 (2009); [C]ommonwealth v. [G]ibson, 597 PA. 402, 951 [A].2d 1110, 1131 (2008); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1 , 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006) (“Absent an admission from [the defendant] that he had shot and killed [the victim], trial counsel could not have presented a diminished capacity defense.”)[.] If a defendant does not admit that he killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence on diminished capacity is inadmissible.

2023“If a defendant does not admit that he[, or she,] killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence on diminished capacity is inadmissible.” Id.

2013We have held that “[i]f a defendant does not admit that he killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence of diminished capacity is inadmissible.” Hutchinson, 25 A.3d at 312 ; Commonwealth v. Laird, 605 Pa. 137 , 988 A.2d 618, 632 (2010); Spotz, 896 A.2d at 1218 (“Absent an admission from [the defendant] that he had shot and killed [the victim], trial counsel could not have presented a diminished capacity defense.”).

2025Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d 1019, 1024 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 293 A.3d 566 (Pa. 2023).

2025Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d 1019, 1024 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 293 A.3d 566 (Pa. 2023). “[A] mere, bare, or non- -5- J-S32044-25 colorable assertion of innocence is insufficient, in and of itself, to support withdrawal of a plea.” Islas, 156 A.3d at 1189 (citation omitted).

2025See Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418, 420-21 (Pa. Super. 2016) (declining to construe federal habeas corpus case law, which permits a federal petitioner to overcome the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations with an actual innocence claim, as creating an additional exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements).

2024Pennsylvania courts have specifically stated, “[ w ]hile McQuiggin represents a further development in federal habeas corpus law . . . this change in federal law is irrelevant to the time restrictions of our PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418 , 421 (Pa. Super. 2016).

2020Williams, 602 Pa. 360 , 980 A.2d 510, 527 (2009); [C]ommonwealth v. [G]ibson, 597 PA. 402, 951 [A].2d 1110, 1131 (2008); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1 , 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006) (“Absent an admission from [the defendant] that he had shot and killed [the victim], trial counsel could not have presented a diminished capacity defense.”)[.] If a defendant does not admit that he killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence on diminished capacity is inadmissible.

2020Williams, 602 Pa. 360 , 980 A.2d 510, 527 (2009); [C]ommonwealth v. [G]ibson, 597 PA. 402, 951 [A].2d 1110, 1131 (2008); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1 , 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006) (“Absent an admission from [the defendant] that he had shot and killed [the victim], trial counsel could not have presented a diminished capacity defense.”)[.] If a defendant does not admit that he killed the victim, but rather advances an innocence defense, then evidence on diminished capacity is inadmissible.

2018In this regard, Carrasquillo did not hold that cases such as Commonwealth v. Tennison, 969 A.2d 572, 578 (Pa.Super. 2009), which held that an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea was properly denied as pre- textual in that the defendant simply wished to delay the proceedings, were incorrectly decided. -5- J-S46029-17 The Dissent discusses Commonwealth v. Reider, 386 A.2d 559 (Pa.Super. 1978) (per curiam), in which the Court appeared to embrace ineffectiveness as a basis for permitting withdrawal.

2017Car rasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1293 (Stevens, J., concurring); accord Commonwealh v. Tennison, 969 A.2d 572, 573 (Pa.Super. 2009).

2023Carrasqullio, supra at 706 n.9, 115 A.3d at 1293 n.9 (declining to address prejudice to Commonwealth, because defendant failed to assert plausible claim of innocence); Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa. 3, 9 , 116 A.3d 1103, 1107 (2015) (holding pre-sentence request to withdraw plea failed where defendant made only bare assertion of innocence).

2017See also Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa. 3 , 116 A.3d 1103 (2015) (companion case to Carrasquillo).

2025See Pa.R.A.P. -6- J-S15041-25 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”); Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 851 A.2d 883, 889 (Pa. 2004) (reiterating that “[c]laims not raised in the PCRA court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

2025Cf. Commonwealth v. Abu–Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 728 (Pa. 2003) (holding that while term “actual innocence” is not enumerated claim under PCRA, such contention is nevertheless cognizable because PCRA is meant to: (1) provide means of relief for those convicted of crimes they did not commit; and (2) be sole means of obtaining collateral relief).

2023Furthermore, “[e]vidence that the defendant lacked the ability to control his or her actions or acted impulsively is irrelevant to specific intent to kill, and thus is not admissible to support a diminished capacity defense.” Id. “[D]iagnosis with a personality disorder does not suffice to establish - 14 - J-S31011-23 diminished capacity.” Id. “[T]he authority to concede criminal liability and to authorize the presentation of a diminished capacity defense rests solely with the accused.” Id. at 313 (emphasis omitted), citing, Commonwealth v. Weaver, 457 A.2d 505, 506-507 (Pa. 1983).

2023See Hardy, 274 A.3d at 1250, 1251 (explaining that certain evidence requested to undergo DNA testing had been touched by several others and therefore, DNA testing would not produce exculpatory results).

2023Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

2022Instead, “a defendant's innocence claim must be at least plausible to (Footnote Continued Next Page) -5- J-S31034-22 In Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124 (Pa.Super. 2009), this Court described the less stringent standard and noted that “prior to the imposition of sentence, a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason, provided there is no substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.” Broaden, 980 A.2d at 128 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2022Instead, “a defendant's innocence claim must be at least plausible to (Footnote Continued Next Page) -5- J-S31034-22 In Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124 (Pa.Super. 2009), this Court described the less stringent standard and noted that “prior to the imposition of sentence, a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason, provided there is no substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.” Broaden, 980 A.2d at 128 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2020Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007). - 12 - J-S13008-20 tested materials, by itself, cannot satisfy the actual innocence standard.

2020Payne, 129 A.3d at 558 ; see also Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1255 (“in DNA testing cases, an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”).

2020“Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019).

2015The Carrasquillo Court also noted that the timing of a defendant’s innocence claim is a factor ____________________________________________ 2 “In order to be applied to a defendant, the new decision must be handed down during the pendency of the defendant's direct appeal and the issue must be properly preserved during that direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Carr, 535 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Pa. Super. 1987) (emphasis omitted).