356 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 256 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026Our supreme court has stressed “[t]he conclusive character of the new evidence is the most important element of an actual innocence claim.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 (citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996)). 2026Defendant’s admission of guilt was formally memorialized in his plea, and it was supported by a factual basis that included his identification by three of his friends who witnessed the murder. ¶ 18 While a guilty plea does not foreclose an actual innocence claim, to prevail, the postconviction petitioner must meet a “more stringent” standard than that articulated in People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996)—he must establish by clear and convincing evidence that “a trial would probably result in acquittal.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶¶ 48-49 . | 44 | 68 |
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2026Our court has emphasized that the conclusive character of the new evidence is the “most important element of an actual innocence claim.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 . 2026This is evident where the circuit court listed all the - 17 - evidence it reviewed and stated, “the evidence presented at this evidentiary hearing by the petitioner, when considered along with the trial evidence, failed to be of such a conclusive nature, it would probably change the result on retrial of petitioner.” See Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 48 (when a court reviews the evidence in an actual innocence claim, it must consider “whether the fact finder would reach a different result after considering the prior evidence along with the new evidence”); Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97 (the circui | 35 | 145 |
People v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2023We disagree because the affidavits are not newly discovered evidence. ¶ 46 In People v. Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶¶ 46, 48 , 175 N.E.3d 1131 , the - 11 - First District explained what constitutes newly discovered evidence and wrote the following: “Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been obtained earlier through due diligence. [Citation.] It includes testimony from a witness who ‘essentially made himself [or herself] unavailable as a witness’ by moving out of state [citation] or who had been made unavailable through threats or intimidation to not testify. [Citati 2023An actual innocence claim does not require a showing of cause and prejudice (People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 330 (2009)); rather, defendant must provide supporting evidence that is “(1) newly discovered, (2) material and not cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 . | 24 | 39 |
People v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2026People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 ; People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 24 . ¶ 38 Our supreme court has emphasized that the conclusive character of the new evidence is the “most important element of an actual innocence claim.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 . 2025See Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 47 (finding it is appropriate to address only one element of the actual innocence test if that element is dispositive). | 20 | 57 |
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2026An actual innocence claim requires the defendant to “present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 , ¶ 96. 2026This is evident where the circuit court listed all the - 17 - evidence it reviewed and stated, “the evidence presented at this evidentiary hearing by the petitioner, when considered along with the trial evidence, failed to be of such a conclusive nature, it would probably change the result on retrial of petitioner.” See Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 48 (when a court reviews the evidence in an actual innocence claim, it must consider “whether the fact finder would reach a different result after considering the prior evidence along with the new evidence”); Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97 (the circui | 17 | 87 |
Schlup v. Delored2 sentences2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp 2021An actual innocence claim “requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). | 9 | 11 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2025(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 . ¶ 51 The Illinois Supreme Court has acknowledged that the standard for an actual innocence claim “is extraordinarily difficult to meet.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 94 . 2024We break no new ground by relying on the 2 We note that, on the third element of an actual innocence claim, Edwards and Robinson use the phrase “of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” (Emphasis added.) Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 ; Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 32 . | 8 | 50 |
People v. Molstadgreen2 sentences2021People v Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984). ¶ 52 The critical element of an actual innocence claim is the conclusiveness of the new evidence—evidence that, when considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead to a different result. 2021Id.; see also People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 136 , 461 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1984) (“[T]his does not mean that [the defendant] is innocent, merely that all of the facts and surrounding circumstances *** should be scrutinized more closely to determine [his] guilt or innocence.”). “[T]he new evidence supporting an actual innocence claim need not be entirely dispositive to be likely to alter the result on retrial.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 56 . | 8 | 8 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2024See id. ¶ 83 (“a freestanding actual-innocence claim is independent of any claims of constitutional error at trial and focuses solely on a defendant's factual innocence in light of new evidence” (emphasis added)). ¶ 52 In People v. Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490 , an appeal from the second-stage dismissal of a successive postconviction petition, this court commented that Hobley “identified no principle or purpose that would be furthered by prohibiting a defendant from using the same evidence to assert both a constitutional claim of trial error and an actual innocence claim.” Id. ¶ 102. 2024Furthermore, the Hobley rule would potentially force a defendant to choose to forgo a meritorious claim of trial error in order to pursue an actual innocence claim.” Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490, ¶ 102 . ¶ 100 We agree with Martinez that Hobley, thusly interpreted, would represent an unprincipled modification of the law established in Washington. | 7 | 12 |
People v. Colliergreen2 sentences2021Here, defendant does not allege “cause and prejudice” in his postconviction petition but, instead, asserts an “actual innocence” claim. -3- ¶ 18 The evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be (1) newly discovered, (2) material and not merely cumulative, and (3) “of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” Id. ¶ 32. “ ‘[A]ctual innocence’ is not within the rubric of whether a defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Collier, 387 Ill. 2020In the context of an actual innocence claim, “[e]vidence that merely impeaches a witness will typically not be of such conclusive character as to justify postconviction relief.” People v. Collier, 387 Ill. | 7 | 11 |
People v. Reedgreen2 sentences2026Defendant’s admission of guilt was formally memorialized in his plea, and it was supported by a factual basis that included his identification by three of his friends who witnessed the murder. ¶ 18 While a guilty plea does not foreclose an actual innocence claim, to prevail, the postconviction petitioner must meet a “more stringent” standard than that articulated in People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996)—he must establish by clear and convincing evidence that “a trial would probably result in acquittal.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶¶ 48-49 . 2026An actual innocence claim, as here, “does not depend on—and is separate from—a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or an allegation of error in the court below.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 29 . ¶ 40 Griffin recognized that the bar to successive postconviction petitions may be relaxed in two situations: (i) “if a petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for not raising the claim in an initial postconviction petition” (Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 32 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002))) and (ii) when the petitioner shows “actual innocence,” an exception | 6 | 26 |
People v. Pitsonbargergreen2 sentences2026An actual innocence claim, as here, “does not depend on—and is separate from—a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or an allegation of error in the court below.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 29 . ¶ 40 Griffin recognized that the bar to successive postconviction petitions may be relaxed in two situations: (i) “if a petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for not raising the claim in an initial postconviction petition” (Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 32 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002))) and (ii) when the petitioner shows “actual innocence,” an exception 2024An actual innocence claim, as here, “does not depend on—and is separate from—a challenge to the -8- 1-21-1543 sufficiency of the evidence or an allegation of error in the court below.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 29 . ¶ 38 Griffin recognized that the bar to successive postconviction petitions may be relaxed in two situations: (i) “if a petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for not raising the claim in an initial postconviction petition” (Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 32 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002))) and (ii) when the petitioner shows “actual innocence, | 6 | 6 |
People v. Morgangreen2 sentences2023Thus, even if the court were to assume that the recanted testimony was reliable, the remaining evidence in the case is sufficient to support a dismissal of defendant’s claims, citing People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , and People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148 (2004), in support. ¶ 163 We now set forth the requirements of an actual innocence claim. 2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp | 5 | 15 |
People v. Hobleygreen2 sentences2024There, the court held that an actual innocence claim “is not being used to supplement an assertion of a constitutional violation with respect to his trial.” Id. at 479. ¶ 43 Our supreme court subsequently decided People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404 (1998). 2024See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 444 (wherein evidence of fingerprint report and second gas can was used both to argue due-process trial violation and claim of actual innocence). ¶ 61 In its brief on appeal, the State pointed out that certain decisions of our court have interpreted Hobley to mean that we cannot consider an actual innocence claim that relies on the same evidence used to support another claim of a constitutional violation. | 5 | 11 |
People v. Hodgesgreen2 sentences2024(West 2020)) provides a three- 10 No. 1-23-0961 step process by which a criminal defendant may challenge his conviction on the basis of a “substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights.” People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 26 ; People v. Tate, 2012 IL 11214, ¶ 8; People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21 ; People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009); People v. Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d 480, 509 (2002). 2023Defendant, citing People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009), replies that as a pro se pleading, the 2006 petition should be given a liberal construction, and that it is clear on its face that he was advancing an actual innocence claim. - 17 - No. 1-22-1070 ¶ 49 We agree with defendant that, while inartful, the 2006 petition included an attempt to raise a claim of actual innocence supported by Love’s affidavit. | 5 | 6 |
People v. Hortongreen2 sentences2025See People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 301-02 (2002) (supreme court rejected an actual innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence where the State presented overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt); People v. Horton, 2021 IL App (1st) 180551 (we affirmed denial of Horton’s motion for leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, which relied on the insufficient, cumulative affidavit of another witness and failed to present a colorable claim of actual innocence based on self-defense). ¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 22 Affirm 2024See People v. Horton, 2021 IL App (1st) 180551, ¶ 46 , 192 N.E.3d 710 (“Self-defense may serve as the basis for an actual innocence claim because it is a justifying or exonerating circumstance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). | 4 | 8 |
People v. Harpergreen2 sentences2022Fields expanded on the basic standard for “newly discovered evidence” as follows: “Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been obtained earlier through due diligence. [Citation] It includes testimony from a witness who ‘essentially made himself [or herself] unavailable as a witness’ by moving out of state [citation] or who had been made unavailable through threats or intimidation to not testify. [Citation.] For example, in People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (1st) 102181 , ¶ 42 the witness’s affidavit ‘attested that his trial testimony was a lie and that police officers threatened 2022Further, when newly discovered evidence 10 “contradicts the State’s evidence at trial, it is capable of producing a different outcome at trial.” People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (1st) 102181, ¶ 49 . ¶ 32 The evidence presented here is not of such conclusive character that it would “ ‘ “probably change the result on retrial,” ’ ” which is the most important element of an actual innocence claim. | 4 | 7 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2026In this context, new evidence is “evidence that was -5- No. 1-24-2141 unavailable at trial and could not have been discovered sooner through due diligence.” People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 301 (2002). 2025See People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 301-02 (2002) (supreme court rejected an actual innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence where the State presented overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt); People v. Horton, 2021 IL App (1st) 180551 (we affirmed denial of Horton’s motion for leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, which relied on the insufficient, cumulative affidavit of another witness and failed to present a colorable claim of actual innocence based on self-defense). ¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 22 Affirm | 4 | 4 |
| People v. Savorygreen | 4 | 4 |
People v. Griffingreen2 sentences2026An actual innocence claim, as here, “does not depend on—and is separate from—a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or an allegation of error in the court below.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 29 . ¶ 40 Griffin recognized that the bar to successive postconviction petitions may be relaxed in two situations: (i) “if a petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for not raising the claim in an initial postconviction petition” (Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 32 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002))) and (ii) when the petitioner shows “actual innocence,” an exception 2025“In assessing whether a petitioner has satisfied the low threshold applicable to a colorable claim of actual innocence, the court considers only whether the new evidence, if believed and not positively rebutted by the record, could lead to acquittal on retrial.” Id. ¶ 40 (citing Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 60 ). ¶ 35 With these principles in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments. ¶ 36 A. The State’s Forfeiture Argument ¶ 37 We first address the State’s argument that Rayvonne is barred from raising an actual innocence claim based on a defense that he never asserted below. | 3 | 6 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2024People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 ; see also People v. Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 41 . 2021“Within the context of an actual innocence claim, newly discovered evidence means evidence that was discovered after trial and that the petitioner could not have discovered earlier through the exercise of due -8- diligence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 42; see also People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 53 ; People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 334 (2009). ¶ 50 In Jackson, 2021 IL 124818 , the Illinois Supreme Court recently considered a similar postconviction claim, in which a witness later claimed the defendant was not the shooter. | 3 | 5 |
| People v. Addisongreen | 3 | 4 |
| People v. Englishgreen | 3 | 4 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 3 | 4 |
| People v. Andersongreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Colemangreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Evansgreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Stoeckergreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Edwardsgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Miller v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen | 3 | 3 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Schneidergreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Gutierrezgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Yonga v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
| Woods v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
| Norris v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
People v. Woodsgreen2 sentences2025Defendant argued, citing People v. Woods, 2020 IL App (1st) 163031 , that this evidence supported his claim of self-defense which could serve as an actual innocence claim. 2025See People v. Woods, 2020 IL App (1st) 163031, ¶ 41 (self-defense may serve as the basis for an actual innocence claim). ¶ 26 When a defendant requests leave to file a successive petition based on actual innocence, the circuit court should deny leave only where it is clear from a review of the petition and supporting documentation that the defendant cannot set forth a colorable claim as a matter of law. | 2 | 8 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2023Further, defendant argues that his petition sufficiently set forth a Brady violation claim (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)), ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, and an actual innocence claim. 2021In his motion, he asserted (1) an actual innocence claim, (2) an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (3) denial of the ability to raise a defense of entrapment, and (4) a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). | 2 | 8 |
People v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2023“In advancing an actual innocence claim, it is the evidence in support of the claim that must be ‘newly discovered,’ not necessarily the source.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Class, 2023 IL App (1st) 200903, ¶ 76 (citing People v. Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 48 ). 2023Class, 2023 IL App (1st) 200903, ¶ 76 (citing Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 48 ). ¶ 134 Having satisfied the first two requirements of an actual innocence claim, the defendant must establish that this new evidence places the trial evidence in a different light and undermines confidence in the verdict. | 2 | 6 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Taliani
green
2 sentences2025Id. ¶ 23 An actual innocence challenge is “based on principles of fundamental fairness and borne out of our constitutional obligation to afford a person who presents new evidence that persuasively -6- No. 1-23-2068 indicates that he or she is factually innocent with the additional process necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 67 . 2023“For purposes of the actual innocence exception, actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶ 20 (cited approvingly by People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 58 ). | 7 | 2021–2025 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2025Although defendant asserted an actual innocence claim in his second successive petition, he does not address this issue on appeal. -11- 1-22-0625 and 1-23-1609 (cons.) petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 . ¶ 50 If a court grants the defendant leave to file the successive petition, the matter progresses to second-stage proceedings, where the State may seek dismissal on any grounds, including the defendant’s failure to prove cause and prejudice for not raising the claims in the initial postconviction petition. 2021Although Horton involved an actual innocence claim, in People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 21 , our supreme court held that meeting the cause and prejudice test for a successive petition requires “the defendant to ‘submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination;’ ” further clarifying that “ ‘[t]his is so under either exception, cause and prejudice or actual innocence.’ ” (quoting People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 30 ). | 4 | 2021–2025 |
| People v. Jones green | 4 | 2018–2023 |
| Paulsen v. Cochran green | 4 | 2011–2021 |
| Morris v. Margulis green | 4 | 2005–2011 |
| People v. Dorsey green | 3 | 2022–2025 |
| People v. Shaw green | 3 | 2020–2021 |
| Miller v. State green | 3 | 2018–2019 |
| Jacob Lee Schmidt v. State of Iowa green | 3 | 2018–2019 |
| People v. Rivera green | 3 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Domagala green | 2 | 2020–2026 |
| People v. Bailey green | 2 | 2021–2025 |
| People v. Brown green | 2 | 2020–2025 |
| People v. Smith green | 2 | 2024–2025 |
| People v. Cotto green | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.