Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Piris v. Kitchinggreen2 sentences2023See also Skindzelewski v. Smith, 944 N.W.2d 575, 587-88 (Wis. 2020) (Dallet, J., dissenting); Piris v. Kitching, 375 P.3d 627, 632-36 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (Stephens, J., dissenting); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 (2000) (“[U]nder this Section it is not necessary to prove that the convicted defendant was in fact innocent.”). 12 Requiring a criminal-malpractice plaintiff to prove actual innocence of uncharged offenses could impose additional burdens far afield of ensuring that an attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of the criminal-malpractice plaintiff’s injur 2023See also Skindzelewski v. Smith, 944 N.W.2d 575, 587-88 (Wis. 2020) (Dallet, J., dissenting); Piris v. Kitching, 375 P.3d 627, 632-36 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (Stephens, J., dissenting); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 (2000) (“[U]nder this Section it is not necessary to prove that the convicted defendant was in fact innocent.”). 12 Requiring a criminal-malpractice plaintiff to prove actual innocence of uncharged offenses could impose additional burdens far afield of ensuring that an attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of the criminal-malpractice plaintiff’s injur | 2 | 2 |
Powell v. Associated Counsel for Accusedgreen2 sentences2023Counsel for the Accused, 129 P.3d 831, 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (finding an exception to the actual innocence requirement where the criminal-malpractice plaintiff served a substantially longer sentence than the court was allowed to impose)); Johnson v. Babcock, 136 P.3d 77 , 80 n.2 (Or. 2023Counsel for the Accused, 129 P.3d 831, 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (finding an exception to the actual innocence requirement where the criminal-malpractice plaintiff served a substantially longer sentence than the court was allowed to impose)); Johnson v. Babcock, 136 P.3d 77 , 80 n.2 (Or. | 2 | 2 |
Adkins v. Dixongreen2 sentences2023In such a case, pleading that the “attorney’s negligence resulted in a sentencing error . . . [and] that plaintiff obtained post- conviction sentencing relief” is sufficient, as “excusing plaintiff from the actual innocence requirement does not permit plaintiff to ‘profit from the [crime’s] commission’ because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence.” Jones, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (third alteration in original) (quoting Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 281-82 (1997)).11 In addition, in 11 More and more jurists have questioned the logic of equating damages from a legal 2023In such a case, pleading that the “attorney’s negligence resulted in a sentencing error . . . [and] that plaintiff obtained post- conviction sentencing relief” is sufficient, as “excusing plaintiff from the actual innocence requirement does not permit plaintiff to ‘profit from the [crime’s] commission’ because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence.” Jones, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (third alteration in original) (quoting Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 281-82 (1997)).11 In addition, in 11 More and more jurists have questioned the logic of equating damages from a legal | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Linkgreen2 sentences2023In such a case, pleading that the “attorney’s negligence resulted in a sentencing error . . . [and] that plaintiff obtained post- conviction sentencing relief” is sufficient, as “excusing plaintiff from the actual innocence requirement does not permit plaintiff to ‘profit from the [crime’s] commission’ because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence.” Jones, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (third alteration in original) (quoting Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 281-82 (1997)).11 In addition, in 11 More and more jurists have questioned the logic of equating damages from a legal 2023In such a case, pleading that the “attorney’s negligence resulted in a sentencing error . . . [and] that plaintiff obtained post- conviction sentencing relief” is sufficient, as “excusing plaintiff from the actual innocence requirement does not permit plaintiff to ‘profit from the [crime’s] commission’ because plaintiff is still required to serve the legally warranted sentence.” Jones, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (third alteration in original) (quoting Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 281-82 (1997)).11 In addition, in 11 More and more jurists have questioned the logic of equating damages from a legal | 2 | 2 |
Mashaney v. Board of Indigents' Defense Servicesgreen2 sentences2023On remand, Wright will have to meet his burden to prove Graves’s malpractice proximately caused his harm, and the majority opinion does not resolve whether an exception to the actual innocence requirement may apply such that he does not have to show actual innocence of the uncharged offense.12 Id. (quoting Mashaney, 313 P.3d at 87 (Atcheson, J., dissenting)). 2023On remand, Wright will have to meet his burden to prove Graves’s malpractice proximately caused his harm, and the majority opinion does not resolve whether an exception to the actual innocence requirement may apply such that he does not have to show actual innocence of the uncharged offense.12 Id. (quoting Mashaney, 313 P.3d at 87 (Atcheson, J., dissenting)). | 2 | 2 |
David Skindzelewski v. Joseph Smith, Jr.green2 sentences2023See also Skindzelewski v. Smith, 944 N.W.2d 575, 587-88 (Wis. 2020) (Dallet, J., dissenting); Piris v. Kitching, 375 P.3d 627, 632-36 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (Stephens, J., dissenting); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 (2000) (“[U]nder this Section it is not necessary to prove that the convicted defendant was in fact innocent.”). 12 Requiring a criminal-malpractice plaintiff to prove actual innocence of uncharged offenses could impose additional burdens far afield of ensuring that an attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of the criminal-malpractice plaintiff’s injur 2023See also Skindzelewski v. Smith, 944 N.W.2d 575, 587-88 (Wis. 2020) (Dallet, J., dissenting); Piris v. Kitching, 375 P.3d 627, 632-36 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (Stephens, J., dissenting); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 (2000) (“[U]nder this Section it is not necessary to prove that the convicted defendant was in fact innocent.”). 12 Requiring a criminal-malpractice plaintiff to prove actual innocence of uncharged offenses could impose additional burdens far afield of ensuring that an attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of the criminal-malpractice plaintiff’s injur | 2 | 2 |
Kenneth L. Wilson v. Fred W. Greene, Warden, Mecklenburg Correctional Centergreen1 sentence2025Cf. Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 405 (4th Cir. 1998) (considering defendant’s voluntary-intoxication claim, which would have reduced his conviction from premeditated murder to, at most, second-degree murder), with Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1015 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding no relief is possible for “petitioners, like Rozzelle, who did the killing and whose alleged ‘actual innocence’ of a non-capital homicide conviction is premised on being guilty of only a lesser degree of homicide”). | 1 | 1 |
Rozzelle v. Secretary, Florida Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2025Cf. Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 405 (4th Cir. 1998) (considering defendant’s voluntary-intoxication claim, which would have reduced his conviction from premeditated murder to, at most, second-degree murder), with Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1015 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding no relief is possible for “petitioners, like Rozzelle, who did the killing and whose alleged ‘actual innocence’ of a non-capital homicide conviction is premised on being guilty of only a lesser degree of homicide”). | 1 | 1 |
Schlup v. Delored2 sentences2018Costello & Craig S. Lerner, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure § 62.13[2], at 1090 (4th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2017) (noting that the Attorney General "may add to the record any additional evidence bearing on the issue of guilt, including evidence suppressed at trial"); see also Schlup , 513 U.S. at 328 , 115 S.Ct. 851 (holding that a federal habeas court reviewing an actual innocence claim "must make its determination concerning the petitioner's innocence 'in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evide 2018Costello & Craig S. Lerner, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure § 62.13[2], at 1090 (4th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2017) (noting that the Attorney General "may add to the record any additional evidence bearing on the issue of guilt, including evidence suppressed at trial"); see also Schlup , 513 U.S. at 328 , 115 S.Ct. 851 (holding that a federal habeas court reviewing an actual innocence claim "must make its determination concerning the petitioner's innocence 'in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evide | 1 | 1 |
Carpitcher v. Hinklegreen1 sentence2006See Carpitcher v. Hinkle, 62 Va. Cir. 391, 395 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Babcock
green
2 sentences2023Counsel for the Accused, 129 P.3d 831, 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (finding an exception to the actual innocence requirement where the criminal-malpractice plaintiff served a substantially longer sentence than the court was allowed to impose)); Johnson v. Babcock, 136 P.3d 77 , 80 n.2 (Or. 2023Counsel for the Accused, 129 P.3d 831, 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (finding an exception to the actual innocence requirement where the criminal-malpractice plaintiff served a substantially longer sentence than the court was allowed to impose)); Johnson v. Babcock, 136 P.3d 77 , 80 n.2 (Or. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
In Re: Brown
green
1 sentence2025Id. 12 In assessing an actual innocence claim, Code § 19.2-327.5 requires this Court to consider “the petition, the response by the Commonwealth, previous records of the case, the record of any hearing held under this chapter and the record of any hearings held pursuant to § 19.2-327.1, and if applicable, any findings certified from the circuit court pursuant to § 19.2-327.4.” We have described our inquiry as determining the probable outcome of “a hypothetical new trial in which a rational factfinder hears all of the evidence in the aggregate.” Watford, 295 Va. at 125 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.