innocence claim in Texas

2023To succeed in an actual innocence claim, the applicant must show “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 545 (quoting Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2022App. 2006). “[T]o succeed in an actual innocence claim the applicant must show ‘by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.’” Id. (quoting Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2015However, when an actual innocence claim has been raised in a writ of habeas corpus, under Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App, 2002), the applicant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

2015App. 1996), governs actual innocence claims* However, when an actual innocence claim has been raised in a writ of habeas corpus, under Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App, 2002), the applicant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

2015First, under an actual innocence claim, under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (315).

2015The other actual innocence claim, a Schlup-type claim, "is a procedural claim in which applicant's claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial." Ibid. (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314 , 115 S.Ct. 851 ) (emphasis added). 5 A. Appellant's Herrera-type claim of innocence is supported by the record.

2025It recommends denying the actual innocence claim, see Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim.

2025In Ex parte Tuley, this Court filed and set a writ application to determine whether an actual innocence claim under Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim.

2025Establishing an actual innocence claim “is a Herculean task.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. Crim.

2023To succeed in an actual innocence claim, the applicant must show “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 545 (quoting Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2015“A prototypical example of ‘actual innocence’ in a colloquial sense is the case where the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime.”26 An actual innocence claim must be accompanied by new “affirmative evidence of the applicant’s innocence.”27 In the past we have evaluated the merits of actual innocence claims supported by new evidence in the form of witness recantations,28 scientific testing like DNA,29 and new expert testimony.30 Applicants’ requests for relief on a bare actual innocence basis do not allege any evidence 25 Id. 26 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992). 27 Ex par

2010The state asserts, “A prototypical example of ‘actual innocence’ in a colloquial sense is the case where the state has convicted the wrong person of the crime.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 , 112 S.Ct. 2514 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).

2015Appellee insists that a Schlup claim can only be raised after a prior writ asserting an actual innocence claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) has been denied, citing Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 208 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), and Ex Parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2011An applicant who pleaded guilty can later bring an actual innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence.9 Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 (citing Ex parte 6 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). 7 Texas courts recognize two types of innocence claims, the second of which is a ―Schlup claim‖—e.g., ―a procedural claim in which applicant‘s claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial.‖ Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. Crim.

2015Therefore, it is possible that he intended to possess a controlled substance (which is not alone an offense) or that he attempted to possess 21 State v. Wilson, 324 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. Crim.

2014State v. Wilson, 324 S.W.3d 595, 598 (Tex. Crim.

2024However, in an actual innocence analysis, “our job is not to review the jury’s verdict, but to decide whether the newly discovered evidence would have convinced the jury of applicant’s innocence.” Ex parte Mayhugh, 512 S.W.3d 285, 298 (Tex. Crim.

2022In holding that newly discovered evidence of actual innocence undermined “the legally sufficient, but hard-to-believe version of events” that led to the convictions of four women for sexual assaults of two children, the high court noted that the legal sufficiency standard is not a suitable standard for an actual innocence claim in a habeas proceeding because “no one would ever be found actually innocent on habeas review if the original trial evidence was legally sufficient to support guilt.” Id. at 288, 298 .

2023See, e.g., Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 274 (Tex. Crim.

2023See, e.g., Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 274 (Tex. Crim.

2015“A prototypical example of ‘actual innocence’ in a colloquial sense is the case where the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime.”26 An actual innocence claim must be accompanied by new “affirmative evidence of the applicant’s innocence.”27 In the past we have evaluated the merits of actual innocence claims supported by new evidence in the form of witness recantations,28 scientific testing like DNA,29 and new expert testimony.30 Applicants’ requests for relief on a bare actual innocence basis do not allege any evidence 25 Id. 26 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992). 27 Ex par

2015Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim.

2013Court’s opinion at 9 — 10, n. 12 ("The objection of ‘I request a mistrial’ seeks to stop the invalid proceedings, while the request for a 'new trial’ seeks to put aside a completed trial and start over.”) .Rodriguez v. State, 852 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). .

2013App. 2005) (attorney’s comments regarding witness recantation, urged in connection with an actual innocence claim on motion for new trial, did not preserve claim regarding suppression of exculpatory evidence that was never expressly articulated to the trial judge). 2 Court’s opinion at 9 - 10, n. 12 (“The objection of ‘I request a mistrial’ seeks to stop the invalid proceedings, while the request for a ‘new trial’ seeks to put aside a completed trial and start over.”) 3 Rodriguez v. State, 852 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim.

2012Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). 4.

2012Ex parte Briggs , 187 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. Crim.

2010Ex parte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815, 817 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).

2010Ex parte Van Alstyne , 239 S.W.3d 815, 817 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).

2003Ex parte Easter, 615 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (attack on sufficiency of the evidence at trial may not be raised in habeas proceedings).

2003Ex parte Easter, 615 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (attack on sufficiency of the evidence at trial may not be raised in habeas proceedings).

2023See id.; Franklin, 310 S.W.3d at 920 .

2016Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918, 921-23 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2010, no pet.)(victim’s affidavit admitting past claims of sexual molestation were untrue constituted “affirmative evidence” of defendant’s innocence that entitled him to evidentiary hearing).

2025However, it is admittedly not an issue in controversy in this case. 14 Short, Philip, Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare 299 (Henry Holt & Co. 2006). 15 See supra note 3 (discussing Blackstone’s Ratio: “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”). 20 Accomplishing the “twofold aim” here The great irony here in this case is that this Court does not have to choose between “guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

2025This is not an actual innocence standard; the question is “whether the results ‘would cast affirmative doubt upon the validity of 4 the inmate’s conviction.’” Flores v. State, 491 S.W.3d 6, 9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting Raby v. State, No. AP–76,970, 2015 WL 1874540 , at *5–6 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Reyes, 753 S.W.2d at 383 .

2016See Ex parte Thomas, 906 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex.Crim.

2016April 22, 2015) (distinguishing the reasonable probability finding from the actual innocence inquiry); Glover v. State, 445 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd).

2015See Ludicore v. New York, 209 F.3d 107, 114 (2nd Cir. 2000).