hybrid analysis in Texas

2015Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 476 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2014See Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 476 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2021Id. (citing In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)).

2015Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 476 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2023Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588 .

2022Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587-88 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).

2021See Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 591-92 ; Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d at 477 .

2021Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tip-pit, 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle, 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tip-pit, 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle, 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2025Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313 (Tex. 2006).

2008Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 312-13 (Tex.2006).

2021See Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 591-92 ; Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d at 477 .

2007Id. at 477-78 ; Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tip-pit, 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle, 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tippit , 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (Tex. 1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle , 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon , 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2024“Under an abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error, but rather are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion.” In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d 44 , 9 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (en banc); see also Stamper v. Knox, 254 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (noting that “appellate courts apply a hybrid analysis because sufficiency-of-the- evidence and abuse-of-discretion standards of review often overlap in family law cases.”).

2022Stamper v. Knox, 254 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). 3 Courts apply a hybrid analysis because of the overlap between the abuse-of-discretion and sufficiency-of-the-evidence standards of review, engaging in a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether the trial court (1) had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its application of that discretion.

2026“Rule 203 is a hybrid rule by which the presentation of the law to the court resembles the presentment of evidence but which ultimately is decided as a question of law.” Lawrenson v. Global Marine, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied).

2026“Rule 203 is a hybrid rule by which the presentation of the law to the court resembles the presentment of evidence but which ultimately is decided as a question of law.” Lawrenson v. Global Marine, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied).

2010Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986).

2004Mercer v. Ross , 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tip-pit, 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle, 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tippit , 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (Tex. 1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle , 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon , 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tip-pit, 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle, 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2008See Gonzalez v. Tippit , 167 S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing In re Estate of King , 244 S.W.2d 660, 660 (Tex. 1951)); see also Doyle v. Doyle , 955 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997) (under abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether trial court abused its discretion); Landon , 724 S.W.2d at 935 (one factor to determine whether abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the appellate record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could act rationally in an exercise of its discretion).

2000See Ahumada, 992 S.W.2d at 558 ; Gardner v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 474, 483 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).

1998See, e.g., Gardner v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 474, 483 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (in Texas, questions of foreign law are mixed questions of law and fact; rule 203 is a hybrid rule by which presentation of the law resembles presentment of evidence, but which ultimately court decides as matter of law); Volkswagen, AG v. Valdez, 897 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding) (rule 203 aptly characterized as a hybrid *708 rule; court will accept uncontroverted opinions of foreign law expert as true so long as they are reasonable and consistent wi

2021Kubbernus, 574 S.W.3d at 486 ; City of Houston v. Kallinen, 516 S.W.3d 617, 626 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

2019City of Hous. v. Kallinen, 516 S.W.3d 617, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

2009We noted that the applicable review process “creates a hybrid standard of review wherein a trial court must determine, by an examination of the evidence presented at trial, whether there is substantial evidence to support the [Board’s] ruling.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

2009We noted that the applicable review process “creates a hybrid standard of review wherein a trial court must determine, by an examination of the evidence presented at trial, whether there is substantial evidence to support the [Board’s] ruling.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

2020Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133-34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering “issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation,” appellate courts “employ a hybrid analysis”).

2020Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133-34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering “issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation,” appellate courts “employ a hybrid analysis”).

2020Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133-34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering “issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation,” appellate courts “employ a hybrid analysis”).

2020Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133-34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering “issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation,” appellate courts “employ a hybrid analysis”).

2020Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133-34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering “issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation,” appellate courts “employ a hybrid analysis”).

2020Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133-34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering “issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation,” appellate courts “employ a hybrid analysis”).

2011See id.

2011See id.

2024Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim.

2023Compare slip op. at 11 (“Accordingly, here, the question is whether the findings and conclusions made against Volvo’s 6 CSI and SSI programs will preclude Volvo from contesting the same issues in a future proceeding brought by a different dealer.” (emphasis added)) with Buddy Gregg, 320 S.W.3d at 916 (summarizing Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Subaru and stating that “the legislature contemplated a ‘hybrid claims resolution process’ whereby a plaintiff must first exhaust his remedies before the Division ‘to obtain a [Division] decision about Code violations, if any, to support a [Code-based]