16 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1929–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tranakos v. Millergreen2 sentences2022See also Tranakos v. Miller, 220 Ga. App. 829, 833 (1) ( 470 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (“written transcripts satisfy the writing requirement by providing certainty and finality as to the exact terms of the agreement”). 2022See also Tranakos v. Miller, 220 Ga. App. 829, 833 (1) ( 470 SE2d 440 ) (1996) (“written transcripts satisfy the writing requirement by providing certainty and finality as to the exact terms of the agreement”). | 2 | 2 |
Troutman v. Troutmangreen2 sentences2022See also Troutman v. Troutman, 297 Ga. App. 62, 65 (1) ( 676 SE2d 787 ) (2009) (Statute of Frauds does not extend to cases where there has been part performance of the contract that would render it a fraud if performance of the refusing party were not compelled). 2022See also Troutman v. Troutman, 297 Ga. App. 62, 65 (1) ( 676 SE2d 787 ) (2009) (Statute of Frauds does not extend to cases where there has been part performance of the contract that would render it a fraud if performance of the refusing party were not compelled). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mojicagreen2 sentences2014See State v. Mojica, 316 Ga. App. 619, 622 (2), n. 8 ( 730 SE2d 94 ) (2012). 2014See State v. Mojica, 316 Ga. App. 619, 622 (2), n. 8 ( 730 SE2d 94 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Carter v. Parishgreen2 sentences2022“Under that part performance exception, the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable ‘where there has been such part performance of the contract as would render it a fraud of the party refusing to comply if the court did not compel a performance.’ OCGA § 13-5-31 (3).” Carter v. Parish, 274 Ga. App. 97, 99 (1) ( 616 SE2d 877 ) (2005). 2022“Under that part performance exception, the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable ‘where there has been such part performance of the contract as would render it a fraud of the party refusing to comply if the court did not compel a performance.’ OCGA § 13-5-31 (3).” Carter v. Parish, 274 Ga. App. 97, 99 (1) ( 616 SE2d 877 ) (2005). | 1 | 2 |
Isbell v. Credit Nation Lending Service, LLCgreen1 sentence2026Thus, the exception to the writing requirement in the statute of frauds does not apply because Legacy Ford never admitted—in a pleading, through testimony, or otherwise—that a final, binding contract for the sale 30 Isbell, 319 Ga. App. at 28 (3)(b) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Vildibill v. Palmer Johnson of Savannah, Inc.green1 sentence2022See Brumbelow, 251 Ga. at 676 (citing OCGA § 15-19-5) (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, for an attorney to bind his client to a settlement agreement where there is a dispute as to terms, the agreement must be in writing,” and “letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement” satisfy that 2 Cf. Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (1) (attorney’s letter proposing use of a different release form was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance where offer was conditioned on execution of particular release); Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) ( 730 SE2d 518 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
Herring v. Dunninggreen1 sentence2022See McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (2) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“A purported acceptance of a plaintiff’s settlement offer which imposes conditions . . . will be construed as a counter-offer.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Herring, 213 Ga. App. at 698-99 (language asking about the existence of liens did not create a counteroffer because it merely sought confirmation of counsel’s belief about the absence of liens rather than impose a new condition).2 Finally, Jett’s letter satisfies the writing requirement for settlement agreements whose existence or terms are in dispute. | 1 | 1 |
Torres v. Elkingreen2 sentences2022See Brumbelow, 251 Ga. at 676 (citing OCGA § 15-19-5) (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, for an attorney to bind his client to a settlement agreement where there is a dispute as to terms, the agreement must be in writing,” and “letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement” satisfy that 2 Cf. Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (1) (attorney’s letter proposing use of a different release form was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance where offer was conditioned on execution of particular release); Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) ( 730 SE2d 518 ) ( 2022See Brumbelow, 251 Ga. at 676 (citing OCGA § 15-19-5) (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, for an attorney to bind his client to a settlement agreement where there is a dispute as to terms, the agreement must be in writing,” and “letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement” satisfy that 2 Cf. Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (1) (attorney’s letter proposing use of a different release form was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance where offer was conditioned on execution of particular release); Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) ( 730 SE2d 518 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Williamsongreen1 sentence2022See Brumbelow, 251 Ga. at 676 (citing OCGA § 15-19-5) (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, for an attorney to bind his client to a settlement agreement where there is a dispute as to terms, the agreement must be in writing,” and “letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement” satisfy that 2 Cf. Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (1) (attorney’s letter proposing use of a different release form was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance where offer was conditioned on execution of particular release); Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) ( 730 SE2d 518 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
Ballard v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2022See Brumbelow, 251 Ga. at 676 (citing OCGA § 15-19-5) (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, for an attorney to bind his client to a settlement agreement where there is a dispute as to terms, the agreement must be in writing,” and “letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement” satisfy that 2 Cf. Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (1) (attorney’s letter proposing use of a different release form was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance where offer was conditioned on execution of particular release); Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) ( 730 SE2d 518 ) ( 2022See Brumbelow, 251 Ga. at 676 (citing OCGA § 15-19-5) (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, for an attorney to bind his client to a settlement agreement where there is a dispute as to terms, the agreement must be in writing,” and “letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement” satisfy that 2 Cf. Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (1) (attorney’s letter proposing use of a different release form was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance where offer was conditioned on execution of particular release); Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) ( 730 SE2d 518 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co.green1 sentence2022See Brumbelow, 251 Ga. at 676 (citing OCGA § 15-19-5) (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, for an attorney to bind his client to a settlement agreement where there is a dispute as to terms, the agreement must be in writing,” and “letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the agreement” satisfy that 2 Cf. Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (1) (attorney’s letter proposing use of a different release form was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance where offer was conditioned on execution of particular release); Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 142-43 (2) ( 730 SE2d 518 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
McReynolds v. Krebsgreen2 sentences2022See McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (2) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“A purported acceptance of a plaintiff’s settlement offer which imposes conditions . . . will be construed as a counter-offer.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Herring, 213 Ga. App. at 698-99 (language asking about the existence of liens did not create a counteroffer because it merely sought confirmation of counsel’s belief about the absence of liens rather than impose a new condition).2 Finally, Jett’s letter satisfies the writing requirement for settlement agreements whose existence or terms are in dispute. 2022See McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (2) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“A purported acceptance of a plaintiff’s settlement offer which imposes conditions . . . will be construed as a counter-offer.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Herring, 213 Ga. App. at 698-99 (language asking about the existence of liens did not create a counteroffer because it merely sought confirmation of counsel’s belief about the absence of liens rather than impose a new condition).2 Finally, Jett’s letter satisfies the writing requirement for settlement agreements whose existence or terms are in dispute. | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Caballesgreen2 sentences2013Thus, “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 ( 125 SCt 834 , 160 LEd2d 842 ) (2005). 7 In this case, Walker contends that Chapeau illegally prolonged the traffic stop by requiring him to exit the car; asking him a number of questions that were unrelated to the window tint violation; interrupting the writing of the warning to change his portable radio; and delaying the retrieval of his window tint t 2013Thus, “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 ( 125 SCt 834 , 160 LEd2d 842 ) (2005). 7 In this case, Walker contends that Chapeau illegally prolonged the traffic stop by requiring him to exit the car; asking him a number of questions that were unrelated to the window tint violation; interrupting the writing of the warning to change his portable radio; and delaying the retrieval of his window tint t | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Nevertheless, because Uniform Superior Court Rule 1 states that the Superior Court Rules “shall yield to substantive law” in case of conflict, we will treat OCGA § 17-7-110 as controlling authority. 9 Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 315, 316 (3) ( 416 SE2d 789 ) (1992). 10 (Citation omitted.) Id. at 317 (3). 7 judgment[,]”11 we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Mojica’s second and third motions to reconsider. (b) The state next contends that the trial court did not have the authority to revoke the denial of the motion to suppress after the court term had expire 2012Nevertheless, because Uniform Superior Court Rule 1 states that the Superior Court Rules “shall yield to substantive law” in case of conflict, we will treat OCGA § 17-7-110 as controlling authority. 9 Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 315, 316 (3) ( 416 SE2d 789 ) (1992). 10 (Citation omitted.) Id. at 317 (3). 7 judgment[,]”11 we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Mojica’s second and third motions to reconsider. (b) The state next contends that the trial court did not have the authority to revoke the denial of the motion to suppress after the court term had expire | 1 | 1 |
Alkaril Chemicals, Inc. v. O'Lenickgreen2 sentences2005“Such performance, however, is not sufficient... to remove an oral agreement from [the Statute of Frauds] unless the part performance is consistent with the presence of a contract and inconsistent with the lack of a contract.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Alkaril Chem. v. O’Lenick, 202 Ga. App. 230, 231 (1) ( 414 SE2d 257 ) (1991). 2005“Such performance, however, is not sufficient... to remove an oral agreement from [the Statute of Frauds] unless the part performance is consistent with the presence of a contract and inconsistent with the lack of a contract.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Alkaril Chem. v. O’Lenick, 202 Ga. App. 230, 231 (1) ( 414 SE2d 257 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. State
green
1 sentence2012Clark, 284 Ga. at 355 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Penny Profit Foods, Inc. v. McMullen
green
1 sentence1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Phoenix Properties of Atlanta, Inc. v. Umstead
green
2 sentences1996Kutz, 201 Ga. App. at 340 . “ ‘Verdicts and judgments rendered by consent of counsel in good faith and without any fraud or violation of express instructions given by the client to the attorney and known to the adverse party or his attorney are binding upon the client, the consent of counsel being in law the consent of the parties they represent.’ (Cits.)” Phoenix Properties &c. v. Umstead, 245 Ga. 172 ( 264 SE2d 8 ) (1980). 1996Kutz, 201 Ga. App. at 340 . “ ‘Verdicts and judgments rendered by consent of counsel in good faith and without any fraud or violation of express instructions given by the client to the attorney and known to the adverse party or his attorney are binding upon the client, the consent of counsel being in law the consent of the parties they represent.’ (Cits.)” Phoenix Properties &c. v. Umstead, 245 Ga. 172 ( 264 SE2d 8 ) (1980). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Crystal Cubes of Stone Mountain, Inc. v. Kutz
green
1 sentence1996Kutz, 201 Ga. App. at 340 . “ ‘Verdicts and judgments rendered by consent of counsel in good faith and without any fraud or violation of express instructions given by the client to the attorney and known to the adverse party or his attorney are binding upon the client, the consent of counsel being in law the consent of the parties they represent.’ (Cits.)” Phoenix Properties &c. v. Umstead, 245 Ga. 172 ( 264 SE2d 8 ) (1980). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Battise
green
2 sentences1991See OCGA § 37-3-1 (c); State v. Battise, 177 Ga. App. 583 ( 340 SE2d 240 ) (1986). 1991See OCGA § 37-3-1 (c); State v. Battise, 177 Ga. App. 583 ( 340 SE2d 240 ) (1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cole v. Bank of Bowersville
green
2 sentences1929Civil Code (1910), § 5788; Cole v. Bank of Bowersville, 31 Ga. App. 435 ( 120 S. E. 790 ); 3 R. 1929Civil Code (1910), § 5788; Cole v. Bank of Bowersville, 31 Ga. App. 435 ( 120 S. E. 790 ); 3 R. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Loewenherz v. Weil
green
2 sentences1929Furthermore, since it fully appears that the bank accepted the note as a contract between it and the defendant (Loewenherz v. Weil, 33 Ga. App. 760 , 127 S. E. 883 ), it would be a contradiction of the writing and a violation of the parol-evidence rule to permit the defendant to plead and prove that the plaintiff did not extend the credit thereon, it being perfectly apparent that such fact was not expressed in any writing to which the bank was a party, and that the defendant anticipates proof of the same only by oral evidence, notwithstanding its inconsistency with his accepted written promise 1929Furthermore, since it fully appears that the bank accepted the note as a contract between it and the defendant (Loewenherz v. Weil, 33 Ga. App. 760 , 127 S. E. 883 ), it would be a contradiction of the writing and a violation of the parol-evidence rule to permit the defendant to plead and prove that the plaintiff did not extend the credit thereon, it being perfectly apparent that such fact was not expressed in any writing to which the bank was a party, and that the defendant anticipates proof of the same only by oral evidence, notwithstanding its inconsistency with his accepted written promise | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.