writing requirement in Washington

2015In Topline Equip., Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., we examined the writing requirement of RCW 19. 52. 010, and held that the writing must specify the interest rate sought, or at least provide information sufficient to calculate the interest rate. 31 Wn.

2015In Topline Equipment, Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., we examined the writing requirement of RCW 19.52.010, and held that the writing must specify the interest rate sought, or at least provide information sufficient to calculate the interest rate. 31 Wn.

2008RCW 51.12.010; McIndoe v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 144 Wn.2d 252, 256-57 , 26 P.3d 903 (2001). ¶41 Consistent with this view, although a writing is required for claim filing, our Supreme Court has held that the filings of injured workers should be viewed liberally.

2008RCW 51.12.010; McIndoe v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus., 144 Wash.2d 252, 256-57 , 26 P.3d 903 (2001). ¶ 41 Consistent with this view, although a writing is required for claim filing, our Supreme Court has held that the filings of injured workers should be viewed liberally.

2008RCW 51.12.010; McIndoe v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 144 Wn.2d 252, 256-57 , 26 P.3d 903 (2001). ¶41 Consistent with this view, although a writing is required for claim filing, our Supreme Court has held that the filings of injured workers should be viewed liberally.

2008RCW 51.12.010; McIndoe v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus., 144 Wash.2d 252, 256-57 , 26 P.3d 903 (2001). ¶ 41 Consistent with this view, although a writing is required for claim filing, our Supreme Court has held that the filings of injured workers should be viewed liberally.

2001This statement flows from case law cited on page 1004. "[E]x parte writings are sufficient to bring a contract within the 6 year statute of limitations if the writing contains all of the elements of a contract." Kloss, 77 Wash.App. at 298 , 890 P.2d 480 (citing the dissent in Evans v. Yakima Valley Grape Growers Ass'n, 52 Wash.2d 634, 644 , 328 P.2d 671 (1958)).

2001This statement flows from case law cited on page 561. “[E]x parte writings are sufficient to bring a contract within the 6-year statute of limitations if the writing contains all of the elements of a contract.” Kloss, 77 Wn.

2019Third, in support of its argument that David’s trial testimony satisfies the writing requirement, HMD cites Powers v. Hastings, 20 Wn.

2019App. 837, 846 , 582 P.2d 897 (1978), aff’d on other grounds, 93 Wn.2d 709 , 612 P.2d 371 (1980).

2019App. 837, 846 , 582 P.2d 897 (1978), aff’d on other grounds, 93 Wn.2d 709 , 612 P.2d 371 (1980).

2019App. 837, 846 , 582 P.2d 897 (1978), aff’d on other grounds, 93 Wn.2d 709 , 612 P.2d 371 (1980).

2019Hamlin v. Flick, 130 Wash. 126, 130 , 226 P. 484 (1924). 64 No. 34443-6-III In re Marriage of Carlson No writing confirms the 2003 and 2007 loans to South 80 Orchards.

2019Hamlin v. Flick, 130 Wash. 126, 130 , 226 P. 484 (1924). 64 No. 34443-6-III In re Marriage of Carlson No writing confirms the 2003 and 2007 loans to South 80 Orchards.

2011MRC Receivables Corp. v. Zion, 152 Wn.

2009The insured must decline coverage by an "affirmative and conscious act." Clements, 121 Wash.2d at 254 , 850 P.2d 1298 . ¶ 20 Division One of this court has specifically rejected the contention that "writings prepared by the insured's broker may not serve to waive UIM coverage." Galbraith, 78 Wash.App. at 531 , 897 P.2d 417 . "`[T]here is nothing in Washington's UIM statute or our case law precluding an agent from acting on behalf of an insured in rejecting UIM coverage.'" Id. (quoting Weir, 63 Wash.App. at 191 , 816 P.2d 1278 ). ¶ 21 Moreover, cases in which the writing requirement was not sat

2009The insured must decline coverage by an "affirmative and conscious act." Clements, 121 Wash.2d at 254 , 850 P.2d 1298 . ¶ 20 Division One of this court has specifically rejected the contention that "writings prepared by the insured's broker may not serve to waive UIM coverage." Galbraith, 78 Wash.App. at 531 , 897 P.2d 417 . "`[T]here is nothing in Washington's UIM statute or our case law precluding an agent from acting on behalf of an insured in rejecting UIM coverage.'" Id. (quoting Weir, 63 Wash.App. at 191 , 816 P.2d 1278 ). ¶ 21 Moreover, cases in which the writing requirement was not sat

2009The insured must decline coverage by an "affirmative and conscious act." Clements, 121 Wash.2d at 254 , 850 P.2d 1298 . ¶ 20 Division One of this court has specifically rejected the contention that "writings prepared by the insured's broker may not serve to waive UIM coverage." Galbraith, 78 Wash.App. at 531 , 897 P.2d 417 . "`[T]here is nothing in Washington's UIM statute or our case law precluding an agent from acting on behalf of an insured in rejecting UIM coverage.'" Id. (quoting Weir, 63 Wash.App. at 191 , 816 P.2d 1278 ). ¶ 21 Moreover, cases in which the writing requirement was not sat

2009The insured must decline coverage by an "affirmative and conscious act." Clements, 121 Wash.2d at 254 , 850 P.2d 1298 . ¶ 20 Division One of this court has specifically rejected the contention that "writings prepared by the insured's broker may not serve to waive UIM coverage." Galbraith, 78 Wash.App. at 531 , 897 P.2d 417 . "`[T]here is nothing in Washington's UIM statute or our case law precluding an agent from acting on behalf of an insured in rejecting UIM coverage.'" Id. (quoting Weir, 63 Wash.App. at 191 , 816 P.2d 1278 ). ¶ 21 Moreover, cases in which the writing requirement was not sat

2009The insured must decline coverage by an "affirmative and conscious act." Clements, 121 Wash.2d at 254 , 850 P.2d 1298 . ¶ 20 Division One of this court has specifically rejected the contention that "writings prepared by the insured's broker may not serve to waive UIM coverage." Galbraith, 78 Wash.App. at 531 , 897 P.2d 417 . "`[T]here is nothing in Washington's UIM statute or our case law precluding an agent from acting on behalf of an insured in rejecting UIM coverage.'" Id. (quoting Weir, 63 Wash.App. at 191 , 816 P.2d 1278 ). ¶ 21 Moreover, cases in which the writing requirement was not sat

2009The insured must decline coverage by an "affirmative and conscious act." Clements, 121 Wash.2d at 254 , 850 P.2d 1298 . ¶ 20 Division One of this court has specifically rejected the contention that "writings prepared by the insured's broker may not serve to waive UIM coverage." Galbraith, 78 Wash.App. at 531 , 897 P.2d 417 . "`[T]here is nothing in Washington's UIM statute or our case law precluding an agent from acting on behalf of an insured in rejecting UIM coverage.'" Id. (quoting Weir, 63 Wash.App. at 191 , 816 P.2d 1278 ). ¶ 21 Moreover, cases in which the writing requirement was not sat

2001This statement flows from case law cited on page 1004. "[E]x parte writings are sufficient to bring a contract within the 6 year statute of limitations if the writing contains all of the elements of a contract." Kloss, 77 Wash.App. at 298 , 890 P.2d 480 (citing the dissent in Evans v. Yakima Valley Grape Growers Ass'n, 52 Wash.2d 634, 644 , 328 P.2d 671 (1958)).

2001This statement flows from case law cited on page 1004. "[E]x parte writings are sufficient to bring a contract within the 6 year statute of limitations if the writing contains all of the elements of a contract." Kloss, 77 Wash.App. at 298 , 890 P.2d 480 (citing the dissent in Evans v. Yakima Valley Grape Growers Ass'n, 52 Wash.2d 634, 644 , 328 P.2d 671 (1958)).

1991Indeed, the purpose of the writing requirement is to ensure that a waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. *559 State v. Downs, 36 Wn.

1991App. 143, 145 , 672 P.2d 416 (1983), review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1040 (1984). 3 Here, not only did Lund sign a written waiver, but Lund's counsel stated in court that Lund waived his right to trial by jury, Lund orally stated to the court that he waived his right to trial by jury, and the trial judge engaged in an extended colloquy with Lund regarding the effects of the waiver.

1983United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1981).

1983Wicke , at 642; State v. Bray, 23 Wn.

1983See United States v. Anderson, 704 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. *146 Scott, 583 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978). 3 These decisions are persuasive because the writing requirement applied in the federal courts is virtually identical to CrR 6.1(a) in both language and purpose.

1982Cf. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fisher, 409 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1966); see also Hazard v. Maxon, 1 Wash. Terr. 584 (1878) (under the original statute governing interest rates only the legal rate of interest could be recovered on a contract which was so ambiguous as to render it uncertain whether more than such rate was stipulated for).