writing requirement in Utah

2023See Q-2 L.L.C. v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8 , ¶ 10 n.15, 368 P.3d 86 (explaining that boundary by acquiescence requires, among other things, ―occupation‖ and ―mutual acquiescence‖ for ―at least 20 years‖ (cleaned up)); Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 25 , 379 P.3d 1186 (―[O]ne who claims property by adverse possession must show that his use and possession of the property has been actual, open and notorious, and continuous for the statutory period.‖ (cleaned up)); Kiernan Fam.

2023See Q-2 L.L.C. v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8 , ¶ 10 n.15, 368 P.3d 86 (explaining that boundary by acquiescence requires, among other things, ―occupation‖ and ―mutual acquiescence‖ for ―at least 20 years‖ (cleaned up)); Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 25 , 379 P.3d 1186 (―[O]ne who claims property by adverse possession must show that his use and possession of the property has been actual, open and notorious, and continuous for the statutory period.‖ (cleaned up)); Kiernan Fam.

2023See Q-2 L.L.C. v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8 , ¶ 10 n.15, 368 P.3d 86 (explaining that boundary by acquiescence requires, among other things, ―occupation‖ and ―mutual acquiescence‖ for ―at least 20 years‖ (cleaned up)); Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 25 , 379 P.3d 1186 (―[O]ne who claims property by adverse possession must show that his use and possession of the property has been actual, open and notorious, and continuous for the statutory period.‖ (cleaned up)); Kiernan Fam.

2023See Q-2 L.L.C. v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8 , ¶ 10 n.15, 368 P.3d 86 (explaining that boundary by acquiescence requires, among other things, ―occupation‖ and ―mutual acquiescence‖ for ―at least 20 years‖ (cleaned up)); Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 25 , 379 P.3d 1186 (―[O]ne who claims property by adverse possession must show that his use and possession of the property has been actual, open and notorious, and continuous for the statutory period.‖ (cleaned up)); Kiernan Fam.

2018Because Reperex points only to the emails and the documents Bradshaw gave to it, its claim to the writing exception fails. ¶ 58 Reperex cites Reynolds v. Bickel , 2013 UT 32 , 307 P.3d 570 , in support of its contrary conclusion.

2018Because Reperex points only to the emails and the documents Bradshaw gave to it, its claim to the writing exception fails. ¶ 58 Reperex cites Reynolds v. Bickel , 2013 UT 32 , 307 P.3d 570 , in support of its contrary conclusion.

2022In fact, the Act‟s writing requirement presumes that the business relationship already exists.28 And it says that this preexisting relationship “shall be in a writing”—not that it shall be created by a writing.29 So, as the Act is written, a business relationship arises and jurisdiction is triggered once there is an _____________________________________________________________ 24 See supra ¶ 13. 25 Id. § 34-44-102(1). 26 See id. § 34-44-103(1) (“An action under this chapter may be brought against a principal in a court of this state if . . . the principal enters into a business relationship in

2017Addressing contractual privity, the court determined, “It is undisputed that Defendants and Plaintiffs were not in privity of contract for the purpose of Defendants providing accounting services to Plaintiffs.” Addressing the writing exception, the court concluded that it was undisputed that no •writing existed from the Accountant to the Seller, to the Business, or to the Buyers that would satisfy the statute. ¶55 “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable *917 inferences

2017Addressing contractual privity, the court determined, “It is undisputed that Defendants and Plaintiffs were not in privity of contract for the purpose of Defendants providing accounting services to Plaintiffs.” Addressing the writing exception, the court concluded that it was undisputed that no •writing existed from the Accountant to the Seller, to the Business, or to the Buyers that would satisfy the statute. ¶55 “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable *917 inferences

2013Citing legislative history of Section 602 and caselaw interpreting similar statutes from other states, Mr. Reynolds argues that requiring an accountant to provide a client with "[wJritten acknowledgement of [the] client's own undisputed intentions ... is a meaningless exercise that the law does not require." We disagree with Mr. Reynolds's interpretation of Section 602. 110 "When interpreting statutory language, our primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the legislature." Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2011 UT 54, ¶ 21 , 266 P.3d 751 .

2013Citing legislative history of Section 602 and caselaw interpreting similar statutes from other states, Mr. Reynolds argues that requiring an accountant to provide a client with "[wJritten acknowledgement of [the] client's own undisputed intentions ... is a meaningless exercise that the law does not require." We disagree with Mr. Reynolds's interpretation of Section 602. 110 "When interpreting statutory language, our primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the legislature." Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2011 UT 54, ¶ 21 , 266 P.3d 751 .

2002In Matsamas, we did not mention a writing requirement. 1 30 Two years later, in State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah 1993), we addressed an issue factually similar to the one raised here.

1998Bennett, 545 A.2d at 558 ; see also Pirsig, supra, at 692 (at common law "[i]t was considered unwise to permit an irrevocable arbitration agreement to be left to the uncertainties of a claimed oral transaction").

1998Bennett, 545 A.2d at 558 ; see also Pirsig, supra, at 692 (at common law “[i]t was considered unwise to permit an irrevocable arbitration agreement to be left to the uncertainties of a claimed oral transaction”).