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6 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Planned Environments Management Corp. v. Robertgreen1 sentence2012B The Use of the Word “Commission” in the Statute of Frauds It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that “when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Planned Environments Management Corp., 966 A.2d at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Drs. | 1 | 1 |
Washington Highway Development, Inc. v. Bendickgreen1 sentence2007See Washington Highway Development, Inc. v. Bendick, 576 A.2d 115 , 117 n. 1 (R.I.1990) ("Nothing in this opinion should be construed to deny the right of an applicant to seek mandamus relief ordering the director to decide a case within a reasonable time after the six-week period has passed."). [13] See G.L. 1956 § 45-23-40(e), (f), and § 45-23-63. [14] I am of the opinion that the minutes of the planning board that are "written and kept permanently available for public review" satisfies the writing requirement set forth in § 45-23-63(a). [15] General Laws 1956 chapter 46 of title 42, "Open M | 1 | 1 |
Paradis v. Greater Providence Deposit Corp.green2 sentences1998See Paradis, 677 A.2d at 1343 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 90 , 108 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 98 L.Ed.2d 340, 346 (1987), which laid to rest any attempt to avoid the specific writing requirement in 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (e)). 4 Any alleged agreement, including implied agreements sought to be enforced against the receiver of a banking institution or DEPCO, must be supported by some explicit writing. 1998Paradis, 677 A.2d at 1343 . | 1 | 1 |
Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurancegreen2 sentences1998See Paradis, 677 A.2d at 1343 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 90 , 108 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 98 L.Ed.2d 340, 346 (1987), which laid to rest any attempt to avoid the specific writing requirement in 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (e)). 4 Any alleged agreement, including implied agreements sought to be enforced against the receiver of a banking institution or DEPCO, must be supported by some explicit writing. 1998See Paradis, 677 A.2d at 1343 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 90 , 108 S.Ct. 396, 400-01 , 98 L.Ed.2d 340, 346 (1987), which laid to rest any attempt to avoid the specific writing requirement in 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (e)). 4 Any alleged agreement, including implied agreements sought to be enforced against the receiver of a banking institution or DEPCO, must be supported by some explicit writing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Buckingham v. Stille
green
2 sentences2012After a review of our jurisprudence with respect to the distinction between a finder and a broker in relation to the applicability of subsection 6 of the Statute of Frauds, we find ourselves to be in agreement with the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Iowa in Buckingham v. Stille, 379 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa Ct.App.1985), wherein it sagaciously commented as follows: “The nature of real estate transactions, whether they involve brokers or finders, is such that unfounded and multiple claims for commissions are frequently asserted. * * * [W]e are not willing to allow persons to avoid the writing requir 2012After a review of our jurisprudence with respect to the distinction between a finder and a broker in relation to the applicability of subsection 6 of the Statute of Frauds, we find ourselves to be in agreement with the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Iowa in Buckingham v. Stille, 379 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa Ct.App.1985), wherein it sagaciously commented as follows: “The nature of real estate transactions, whether they involve brokers or finders, is such that unfounded and multiple claims for commissions are frequently asserted. * * * [W]e are not willing to allow persons to avoid the writing requir | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Westerly Hospital v. Higgins
green
2 sentences1995The general rule is that ignorance of the contents of a writing is not a defense to an action thereon: "The usual rule is that if there is no fraud, duress or mutual mistake, one who has the capacity to understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature as to all of its terms." Westerly Hospital v. Higgins, 106 R.I. 155 , 160, 256 A.2d 506 (R.I. 1969). 1995The general rule is that ignorance of the contents of a writing is not a defense to an action thereon: "The usual rule is that if there is no fraud, duress or mutual mistake, one who has the capacity to understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature as to all of its terms." Westerly Hospital v. Higgins, 106 R.I. 155 , 160, 256 A.2d 506 (R.I. 1969). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. DiStefano
neutral
2 sentences1992Rule 23(a) provides in pertinent part that “Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant in open court waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court.” In reviewing this plain language, we held that the rule mandates a separate writing signed by the defendant, and that this writing requirement is not satisfied by a trial justice’s recorded colloquy with the defendant. 593 A.2d at 1352 . 1992This decision was not a departure from existing law; rather, it was merely an affirmation that the “clear and unambiguous rule in this jurisdiction requiring a written jury waiver must be adhered to strictly.” Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Binder v. Benson
green
2 sentences1969The scope of the general rule that ignorance of the contents of a writing is not a defense to an action thereon is further articulated in Binder v. Benson, 225 Md. 456, 171 A.2d 248 . “* * the usual rule is that if there is no fraud, duress or mutual mistake, one who has the capacity to understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature as to all of its terms.” Id. at 461 , 171 A.2d at 250 . 1969The scope of the general rule that ignorance of the contents of a writing is not a defense to an action thereon is further articulated in Binder v. Benson, 225 Md. 456, 171 A.2d 248 . “* * the usual rule is that if there is no fraud, duress or mutual mistake, one who has the capacity to understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature as to all of its terms.” Id. at 461 , 171 A.2d at 250 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.