low bar in Oregon

2026As such, we have held that, “[g]enerally, ORS 14.260(1) provides a low bar for parties to obtain a change of judge.” Butler, 346 Or App at 194-95 .

2025Generally, ORS 14.260(1) provides a low bar for parties to Cite as 346 Or App 187 (2025) 195 obtain a change of judge.

2025Defendant argues that the culpable mental state required for PSV is akin to criminal recklessness—“something less Cite as 338 Or App 206 (2025) 213 than actual knowledge but something more than a hunch.” The state argues that the mental state for PSV is “a low bar, similar to the culpable mental state of criminal negligence.” The parties devoted significant portions of their briefs to the construction of the statutory phrase “reason to believe,” 4 but we do not understand there to be a genuine disagreement as to the required mental state.

2025Defendant argues that the culpable mental state required Cite as 338 Or App 206 (2025) 213 for PSV is akin to criminal recklessness—”something less than actual knowledge but something more than a hunch.” The state argues that the mental state for PSV is “a low bar, similar to the culpable mental state of criminal negligence.” The parties devoted significant portions of their briefs to the construction of the statutory phrase “reason to believe,”4 but we do not understand there to be a genuine disagreement as to the required mental state.

2023That is, we understand the trial court to have concluded that T could perceive and commu- nicate generally; however, the court did not delve further into whether T’s perceptions “encompasses the sort of per- ceptions that will be relevant to the issues to be decided at trial” as required by Sarich. 352 Or at 616 .

2023That is, we understand the trial court to have concluded that T could perceive and commu- nicate generally; however, the court did not delve further into whether T’s perceptions “encompasses the sort of per- ceptions that will be relevant to the issues to be decided at trial” as required by Sarich. 352 Or at 616 .

2015Stevens, 319 Or at 584 ; State v. Davis, 351 Or 35, 48 , 261 P3d 1197 (2011) (relevance standard for admissibility is a low bar).

2015Stevens, 319 Or at 584 ; State v. Davis, 351 Or 35, 48 , 261 P3d 1197 (2011) (relevance standard for admissibility is a low bar).

2015Stevens, 319 Or at 584 ; State v. Davis, 351 Or 35, 48 , 261 P3d 1197 (2011) (relevance standard for admissibility is a low bar).

2015Stevens, 319 Or at 584 ; State v. Davis, 351 Or 35, 48 , 261 P3d 1197 (2011) (relevance standard for admissibility is a low bar).

2009Here, the court found that—at the time of dissolution—husband's income was $4,800 per month while wife's was significantly lower, at $1,700. *631 Moreover, one of the reasons that wife had such a low standard of living during the marriage is that she largely stayed out of the workforce in order to care for the parties' children; the marriage thus negatively affected her "capability * * * for economic self-sufficiency." Lemke, 289 Or. at 148 , 611 P.2d 295 .

2009Moreover, one of the reasons that wife had such a low standard of living during the marriage is that she largely stayed out of the workforce in order to care for the parties’ children; the marriage thus negatively affected her “capability * * * for economic self-sufficiency.” Lemke, 289 Or at 148 .

2022Id. at 549 .

2022Findings must be supported by “any evidence,” which is a low standard, but “requires the evidence in the record to be sufficient to allow a reasonable inference in favor of the court’s finding.” State v. Nguyen, 268 Or App 789, 795 , 344 P3d 49 (2015).

2022Findings must be supported by “any evidence,” which is a low standard, but “requires the evidence in the record to be sufficient to allow a reasonable inference in favor of the court’s finding.” State v. Nguyen, 268 Or App 789, 795 , 344 P3d 49 (2015).

2021For purposes of a necessity defense, the imminent threat is “one that is immediate, ready to take place, or near at hand.” State v. Taylor, 123 Or App 343, 348 , 858 P2d 1358 (1993); see also State v. Whisman, 33 Or App 147, 151 , 575 P2d 1005 (1978) (the harm a defendant seeks to avoid must be present and impending; “a threat of future injury [is] insufficient”).

2021For purposes of a necessity defense, the imminent threat is “one that is immediate, ready to take place, or near at hand.” State v. Taylor, 123 Or App 343, 348 , 858 P2d 1358 (1993); see also State v. Whisman, 33 Or App 147, 151 , 575 P2d 1005 (1978) (the harm a defendant seeks to avoid must be present and impending; “a threat of future injury [is] insufficient”).

2018For the same reasons, I question the majority's assertion that plaintiff would not be entitled to ask Bageac about, for example, "matters that plaintiff related and supplied to him, such as information about a third physician's treatment of plaintiff and studies on which that physician based her treatment." Ransom , 363 Or. at 567 , 425 P.3d at 421 .

2018For the same reasons, I question the majority's assertion that plaintiff would not be entitled to ask Bageac about, for example, "matters that plaintiff related and supplied to him, such as information about a third physician's treatment of plaintiff and studies on which that physician based her treatment." Ransom , 363 Or. at 567 , 425 P.3d at 421 .

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).

2011State v. Salas-Juarez, 349 Or 419, 427 , 245 P3d 113 (2010); State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 307 , 83 P3d 304 (2004).