low bar in Pennsylvania

2025Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704. 5 Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 648 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).

2023Substantial evidence is a low bar; it need only be “relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” American General Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 648 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).

2023Finally, “[t]his Court is bound ‘to examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the [B]oard has found, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that can logically and reasonably be drawn from the testimony’ to determine if substantial evidence exists for the Board’s findings.” Morgan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 108 A.3d 181, 185 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing United States Banknote Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 575 A.2d 673, 674 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)).

2023Finally, “[t]his Court is bound ‘to examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the [B]oard has found, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that can logically and reasonably be drawn from the testimony’ to determine if substantial evidence exists for the Board’s findings.” Morgan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 108 A.3d 181, 185 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing United States Banknote Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 575 A.2d 673, 674 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)).

2020Thus, in the oft- cited decision of March v. Philadelphia & West Chester Traction Co., 132 A. 355, 356 (Pa. 1926), we articulated a slightly higher standard, in reaffirming the “immemorable right to grant a new trial, whenever, in [the court’s] opinion, the justice of the particular case so requires.” A quarter century later, in Potanko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 84 A.2d 522, 525 (Pa. 1951), we reaffirmed that a trial court may “grant a new trial ‘sua sponte’ whenever in its opinion the justice of the particular case so requires.” At the same time, our Court also utilized the term “miscarriage o

2020Thus, in the oft- cited decision of March v. Philadelphia & West Chester Traction Co., 132 A. 355, 356 (Pa. 1926), we articulated a slightly higher standard, in reaffirming the “immemorable right to grant a new trial, whenever, in [the court’s] opinion, the justice of the particular case so requires.” A quarter century later, in Potanko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 84 A.2d 522, 525 (Pa. 1951), we reaffirmed that a trial court may “grant a new trial ‘sua sponte’ whenever in its opinion the justice of the particular case so requires.” At the same time, our Court also utilized the term “miscarriage o

2020Thus, in the oft- cited decision of March v. Philadelphia & West Chester Traction Co., 132 A. 355, 356 (Pa. 1926), we articulated a slightly higher standard, in reaffirming the “immemorable right to grant a new trial, whenever, in [the court’s] opinion, the justice of the particular case so requires.” A quarter century later, in Potanko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 84 A.2d 522, 525 (Pa. 1951), we reaffirmed that a trial court may “grant a new trial ‘sua sponte’ whenever in its opinion the justice of the particular case so requires.” At the same time, our Court also utilized the term “miscarriage o

2010See In re Smith, 687 A.2d 1229, 1238 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc.1997), referring to "conduct which is so extreme" that it brings the office into disrepute. [2] A charge under Rule 1 which commands that District Judges observe "high standards of conduct" might have been available since conduct resulting in a criminal conviction represents a very low standard of conduct.