low bar in Colorado

2026Ct., 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990). “[P]robable cause is a low standard . . . .” People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo. 2004).

2019Although Rieger never said anything to the girlfriend about destroying or concealing any “original” of the photo, he asked that the photograph on Telmate be removed because it could “incriminate [him].” ¶ 33 Most importantly, in contrast to Costanzo, here we are reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence not in relation to a conviction after trial but in relation to a probable cause determination after preliminary hearing. ¶ 34 “[P]robable cause is a low standard.” People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 976-77 (Colo. 2004).

2025This is a low bar: We have previously explained that "some credible evidence" includes " 'any credible evidence . . . even highly improbable' evidence," and is synonymous with "a scintilla of evidence." Galvan v. People , 2020 CO 82 , ¶ 24 , 476 P.3d 746 , 754 ( first quoting § 18-1-407 (1) ; then quoting Speer , 255 P.3d at 1119 ; and then quoting People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez , 971 P.2d 223, 228 ( Colo. 1998 ) ) .

2025This is a low bar: We have previously explained that "some credible evidence" includes "'any credible evidence . . . even highly improbable' 9 evidence," and is synonymous with "a scintilla of evidence." Galvan v. People , 2020 CO 82, ¶ 24, 476 P.3d 746, 754 (first quoting § 18-1-407(1); then quoting Speer , 255 P.3d at 1119; and then quoting People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez , 971 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo. 1998)).

2024The burden to authenticate presents a low bar; “only a prima facie showing is required.” Glover, ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

2019The burden to authenticate presents a low bar; “only a prima facie showing is required[.]” People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

2020This burden “presents a low bar; ‘only a prima facie showing is required.’” People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 13 ). ¶ 54 Rule 901 does not specify the exact nature or quantity of evidence required.

2019The burden to authenticate presents a low bar; “only a prima facie showing is required[.]” People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

2026Ct., 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990). “[P]robable cause is a low standard . . . .” People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 977 (Colo. 2004).

2026“The prosecution does not have to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime . . . .” People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 221 (Colo. 2000).

2026The prosecution didn’t present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that Cerisene’s injuries involved a “substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of his left eye.” See People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 14 (“A preliminary hearing is designed to provide a judicial determination as to whether probable cause exists to believe that the charged offense was committed by the defendant.”); Duncan, ¶¶ 20-21. ¶ 26 Because the prosecution didn’t establish probable cause that Cerisene suffered SBI, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by dismissing all counts con

2025This is a low bar: We have previously explained that "some credible evidence" includes " 'any credible evidence . . . even highly improbable' evidence," and is synonymous with "a scintilla of evidence." Galvan v. People , 2020 CO 82 , ¶ 24 , 476 P.3d 746 , 754 ( first quoting § 18-1-407 (1) ; then quoting Speer , 255 P.3d at 1119 ; and then quoting People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez , 971 P.2d 223, 228 ( Colo. 1998 ) ) .

2025This is a low bar: We have previously explained that "some credible evidence" includes "'any credible evidence . . . even highly improbable' 9 evidence," and is synonymous with "a scintilla of evidence." Galvan v. People , 2020 CO 82, ¶ 24, 476 P.3d 746, 754 (first quoting § 18-1-407(1); then quoting Speer , 255 P.3d at 1119; and then quoting People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez , 971 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo. 1998)).

2025This is a low bar: We have previously explained that "some credible evidence" includes " 'any credible evidence . . . even highly improbable' evidence," and is synonymous with "a scintilla of evidence." Galvan v. People , 2020 CO 82 , ¶ 24 , 476 P.3d 746 , 754 ( first quoting § 18-1-407 (1) ; then quoting Speer , 255 P.3d at 1119 ; and then quoting People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez , 971 P.2d 223, 228 ( Colo. 1998 ) ) .

2025This is a low bar: We have previously explained that "some credible evidence" includes "'any credible evidence . . . even highly improbable' 9 evidence," and is synonymous with "a scintilla of evidence." Galvan v. People , 2020 CO 82, ¶ 24, 476 P.3d 746, 754 (first quoting § 18-1-407(1); then quoting Speer , 255 P.3d at 1119; and then quoting People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez , 971 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo. 1998)).

2024See, e.g. , People v. Villapando , 984 P.2d 51, 55 (Colo. 1999) ( “[W] hen making the determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, t he trial court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to t he prosecution. ”). 15 established probable cause for internet luring of a child.

2020And the disparate treatment of state employees and political subdivision employees in CADA clears the low bar of rational basis scrutiny because it serves the legitimate governmental objective of protecting the public fisc. 2 ¶33 One of the primary purposes of the CGIA is to create “limitations on the liability of public entities . . . necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens.” § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2020); see also City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 19 , 418 P.3d 489, 496 ; Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2007).

2020And the disparate treatment of state employees and political subdivision employees in CADA clears the low bar of rational basis scrutiny because it serves the legitimate governmental objective of protecting the public fisc. 2 ¶33 One of the primary purposes of the CGIA is to create “limitations on the liability of public entities . . . necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens.” § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2020); see also City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 19 , 418 P.3d 489, 496 ; Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2007).

2020And the disparate treatment of state employees and political subdivision employees in CADA clears the low bar of rational basis scrutiny because it serves the legitimate governmental objective of protecting the public fisc. 2 ¶33 One of the primary purposes of the CGIA is to create “limitations on the liability of public entities . . . necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens.” § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2020); see also City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 19 , 418 P.3d 489, 496 ; Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2007).

2020This burden “presents a low bar; ‘only a prima facie showing is required.’” People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 13 ). ¶ 54 Rule 901 does not specify the exact nature or quantity of evidence required.

2018See Saavedra-Rodriguez, 971 P.2d at 228 ; see also Garcia, 28 P.3d at 347 (scintilla of evidence may consist “of highly improbable testimony by the defendant”). 17 ¶ 35 Also unlike in the 1992 Garcia case and Naranjo case, the availability of the requested instruction here did not depend for its validity on rejection of defendant’s version of events in his own sworn testimony.

2012Porous Media Corp., 186 F.3d at 1081 ("firm denial" of motion to dismiss counterclaims fatal to malicious prosecution claim); Davis, 522 8.E©.2d at 550 ("Where the trial court finds in the alleged abusive litigation that such action withstands the attack by motion for summary judgment ... denial of summary judgment constitutes a legal determination that the action has substantial justification, because it is not groundless or frivolous and can proceed to jury trial."). {39 We decline to conclude that the ability to meet this low standard, particularly where the court's ruling consists of only

2007See Valdez, supra, 966 P.2d at 590 (prosecutor need only supply a facially race-neutral reason for the challenge); People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30, 42 (Colo.App.2005) (cert. granted Aug. 14, 2006, 2006 WL 2338141 ) (burden of proof is critical to a fair trial, and misunderstanding or misapplication of the correct standard provides race-neutral explanation for juror challenge).

2007See Valdez, supra, 966 P.2d at 590 (prosecutor need only supply a facially race-neutral reason for the challenge); People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30, 42 (Colo.App.2005) (cert. granted Aug. 14, 2006, 2006 WL 2338141 ) (burden of proof is critical to a fair trial, and misunderstanding or misapplication of the correct standard provides race-neutral explanation for juror challenge).

2007See Valdez, supra, 966 P.2d at 590 (prosecutor need only supply a facially race-neutral reason for the challenge); People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30, 42 (Colo.App.2005) (cert. granted Aug. 14, 2006, 2006 WL 2338141 ) (burden of proof is critical to a fair trial, and misunderstanding or misapplication of the correct standard provides race-neutral explanation for juror challenge).