transactional immunity in Pennsylvania

1992Commonwealth v. Johnson, 507 Pa. 27 , 30 n. 3, 487 A.2d 1320 , 1321 n. 3 (1985); Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404, 411-412 , 268 A.2d 104, 109 (1970).

1992Commonwealth v. Johnson, 507 Pa. 27 , 30 n. 3, 487 A.2d 1320 , 1321 n. 3 (1985); Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404, 411-412 , 268 A.2d 104, 109 (1970).

1994“Transactional immunity is not required in order to compel testimony over a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege against self-incrimination.” Webster, 323 Pa.Super. at 170 , 470 A.2d at 535 .

1994“Transactional immunity is not required in order to compel testimony over a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege against self-incrimination.” Webster, 323 Pa.Super. at 170 , 470 A.2d at 535 .

1996In Welded Tube Co. of America v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa.Cmwlth. 32 , 515 A.2d 988 (1986), the Commonwealth Court determined that the statutory definition of business income contained two alternative and independent tests for determining whether income is properly classified as business or nonbusiness income: the transactional test and the functional test.

1996In Welded Tube Co. of America v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa.Cmwlth. 32 , 515 A.2d 988 (1986), the Commonwealth Court determined that the statutory definition of business income contained two alternative and independent tests for determining whether income is properly classified as business or nonbusiness income: the transactional test and the functional test.

2016Id. at 693 .

2002The transactional test is derived from the first clause of the statutory definition: “income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business.” Id.

1995This Court discussed the question of who could grant immunity under this statute in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 507 Pa. 27 , 487 A.2d 1320 (1985).

1995This Court discussed the question of who could grant immunity under this statute in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 507 Pa. 27 , 487 A.2d 1320 (1985).

2011Commonwealth v. Webster, 323 Pa.Supper. 164, 470 A.2d 532, 535 (1983). "[I]mmunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is [also] sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege." Id. (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 ).

2011Commonwealth v. Webster, 323 Pa.Supper. 164, 470 A.2d 532, 535 (1983). "[I]mmunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is [also] sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege." Id. (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 ).

1996The court dismissed as irrelevant the mere statement of proposed business activities contained in the 1958 application for a certificate of authority to do business in Pennsylvania filed by Araco Construction and Realty Company, Inc., stating that “the relevant consideration under the transactional test is the frequency and regularity of the similar transactions in which Taxpayer was actually engaged in the past *85 practice of the business.” Ross-Araco v. Commonwealth, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. at 56 , 644 A.2d at 238 (emphasis supplied).

1996The court dismissed as irrelevant the mere statement of proposed business activities contained in the 1958 application for a certificate of authority to do business in Pennsylvania filed by Araco Construction and Realty Company, Inc., stating that “the relevant consideration under the transactional test is the frequency and regularity of the similar transactions in which Taxpayer was actually engaged in the past *85 practice of the business.” Ross-Araco v. Commonwealth, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. at 56 , 644 A.2d at 238 (emphasis supplied).

1986See District of Columbia v. Pierce, 462 A.2d 1129 (D.C.

1985See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984) (stating that conviction does not mean that sentence was imposed). 20 Moreover, it does not seem to us that a transactional analysis of the type appropriate in considering issues of double jeopardy is controlling in deciding whether a convicted murderer’s prior conduct exhibits the uncontrolled recidivistic tendencies to violent assaults upon the person likely to result in death which the Legislature determined warrant death.

1985See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984) (stating that conviction does not mean that sentence was imposed). 20 Moreover, it does not seem to us that a transactional analysis of the type appropriate in considering issues of double jeopardy is controlling in deciding whether a convicted murderer’s prior conduct exhibits the uncontrolled recidivistic tendencies to violent assaults upon the person likely to result in death which the Legislature determined warrant death.

1985See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984) (stating that conviction does not mean that sentence was imposed). [20] Moreover, it does not seem to us that a transactional analysis of the type appropriate in considering issues of double jeopardy is controlling in deciding whether a convicted murderer's prior conduct exhibits the uncontrolled recidivistic tendencies to violent assaults upon the person likely to result in death which the Legislature determined warrant *463 death.

1985See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984) (stating that conviction does not mean that sentence was imposed). 20 Moreover, it does not seem to us that a transactional analysis of the type appropriate in considering issues of double jeopardy is controlling in deciding whether a convicted murderer’s prior conduct exhibits the uncontrolled recidivistic tendencies to violent assaults upon the person likely to result in death which the Legislature determined warrant death.

1983See: Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931 , 92 S.Ct. 2478 , 33 L.Ed.2d 345 (1972); United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 40 (3rd Cir.1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 , 100 S.Ct. 2923 , 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980); Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404, 411-412 , 268 A.2d 104, 109 (1970).

1983See: Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931 , 92 S.Ct. 2478 , 33 L.Ed.2d 345 (1972); United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 40 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 , 100 S.Ct. 2923 , 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980); Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404, 411-412 , 268 A.2d 104, 109 (1970).