transactional test in New Mexico

2015In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 388 ; see also Bank of Santa Fe v. Marcy Plaza Assocs., 2002-NMCA-014, ¶¶ 24-27 , 131 N.M. 537 , 40 P.3d 442 (discussing in consideration of res judicata whether a party was aware at a prior proceeding of its claim of overpayments).

2015In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 388 ; see also Bank of Santa Fe v. Marcy Plaza Assocs., 2002-NMCA-014, ¶¶ 24-27 , 131 N.M. 537 , 40 P.3d 442 (discussing in consideration of res judicata whether a party was aware at a prior proceeding of its claim of overpayments).

2015App. Div. 2010) (holding that res judicata barred a malpractice claim based on legal services considered in a prior claim for fees, litigated and awarded, for the alleged-negligent services); Stangel v. Perkins, 87 S.W.3d 706, 710-11 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding thatfee-application and malpractice claims based on the same representations concerned the same nucleus of operative facts and met the transactional test).

2015App. Div. 2010) (holding that 6 res judicata barred a malpractice claim based on legal services considered in a prior 7 claim for fees, litigated and awarded, for the alleged-negligent services); Stangel v. 8 Perkins, 87 S.W.3d 706, 710-11 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that fee-application and 9 malpractice claims based on the same representations concerned the same nucleus of 10 operative facts and met the transactional test).

2016Accordingly, we conclude that the claims arose from the same transaction. {13} Where “two actions are the same under the transactional test and all other elements are met, [claim preclusion] barfs] a subsequent action [if] the plaintiff could and should have brought the claim in the former proceeding.” Potter, 2015-NMSC-002, ¶ 15 .

2016See id. 11 III.

2013The Pielhaus’ argument is not persuasive because it rests on the different legal theories asserted, -rather than the “common nucleus of operative facts.” Rosette, Inc., 2007-NMCA-136, ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Three Rivers Land Co., 1982-NMSC-111 , ¶ 28 (“Different legal theories arising out of a given episode do not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {17} We turn to the second prong of the transactional test.

2013The Pielhaus’ argument is not persuasive because it rests on the different legal theories asserted, rather than the “common nucleus of operative facts.” Rosette, Inc., 2007-NMCA-136, ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Three Rivers Land Co., 1982-NMSC-111 , ¶ 28 (“Different legal theories arising out of a given episode do not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {17} We turn to the second prong of the transactional test.

2009See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 569 , 91 S.Ct. 520 , 27 L.Ed.2d 596 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

2009See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 569 , 91 S.Ct. 520 , 27 L.Ed.2d 596 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

2015In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 388 ; see also Bank of Santa Fe v. Marcy Plaza Assocs., 2002-NMCA-014, ¶¶ 24-27 , 131 N.M. 537 , 40 P.3d 442 (discussing in consideration of res judicata whether a party was aware at a prior proceeding of its claim of overpayments).

2013Sommer eds., 23 16th ed.) (“The effect of the [amendment] in substitution for the predecessor language 24 does not appear to be significant.”). 9 1 omitted)); In re Intelogic Trace Inc., 200 F.3d at 388 (holding that “the award of 2 professional fees and the . . . malpractice claims concern the same nucleus of operative 3 facts and meet the transactional test,” because the bankruptcy court considered the 4 quality and nature of counsel’s services in the fee adjudication (internal quotation 5 marks and citation omitted)); Capitol Hill Grp., 569 F.3d 485, 490-93 (same). 6 {16} Notably, in each o

2003Under the transactional test adopted by our Supreme Court in Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 695 , 652 P.2d 240, 245 (1982) {overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 59 , 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986)), to determine whether a later claim is precluded, we must “examine the operative facts underlying the claims made in the two lawsuits.” Anaya v. City of Albuquerque, 1996-NMCA-092 , ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 326 , 924 P.2d 735 .

2003Under the transactional test adopted by our Supreme Court in Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 695 , 652 P.2d 240, 245 (1982) {overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 59 , 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986)), to determine whether a later claim is precluded, we must “examine the operative facts underlying the claims made in the two lawsuits.” Anaya v. City of Albuquerque, 1996-NMCA-092 , ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 326 , 924 P.2d 735 .

2013Sommer eds., 23 16th ed.) (“The effect of the [amendment] in substitution for the predecessor language 24 does not appear to be significant.”). 9 1 omitted)); In re Intelogic Trace Inc., 200 F.3d at 388 (holding that “the award of 2 professional fees and the . . . malpractice claims concern the same nucleus of operative 3 facts and meet the transactional test,” because the bankruptcy court considered the 4 quality and nature of counsel’s services in the fee adjudication (internal quotation 5 marks and citation omitted)); Capitol Hill Grp., 569 F.3d 485, 490-93 (same). 6 {16} Notably, in each o

2013See Capitol Hill Grp., 569 F.3d at 491 (stating that “the 11 bankruptcy court was in a position to judge the quality of [the attorneys’] services”); 12 Grausz, 321 F.3d at 473 ; In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 388 ; In re 13 Iannochino, 242 F.3d at 47 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 330 (a)(3)(A) as requiring the 14 bankruptcy court to “undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the services listed in 15 a fee application”).

2007See Kewanee Indus., Inc., 114 N.M. at 789 , 845 P.2d at 1243 ("Applying the transactional test, the evidence also supports the conclusion that the acquisition of tax benefits is normal, typical, and customary procedure of many business entities."). {28} Further, an examination of the nature of the transaction and the prior activities of PNM reveals that it was a new type of undertaking for PNM.

2007See Kewanee Indus., Inc., 114 N.M. at 789 , 845 P.2d at 1243 ("Applying the transactional test, the evidence also supports the conclusion that the acquisition of tax benefits is normal, typical, and customary procedure of many business entities."). {28} Further, an examination of the nature of the transaction and the prior activities of PNM reveals that it was a new type of undertaking for PNM.

2007See Champion Int'l Corp., 88 N.M. at 418 , 540 P.2d at 1307 (Wood, C.J., specially concurring) ("Pertinent in determining whether income arises from transactions in the regular course of business is `the nature of the particular transaction' and `former practices' of the business entity." (citation omitted)).

2007See Champion Int'l Corp., 88 N.M. at 418 , 540 P.2d at 1307 (Wood, C.J., specially concurring) ("Pertinent in determining whether income arises from transactions in the regular course of business is `the nature of the particular transaction' and `former practices' of the business entity." (citation omitted)).

2006See Cagan v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 2005-NMCA-059 , ¶ 19, 137 N.M. 570 , 113 P.3d 393 . {15} It makes sense to use the same standard for priority jurisdiction that we use for res judicata because the policy rationales behind the two doctrines are so similar.

2006See Cagan v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 2005-NMCA-059 , ¶ 19, 137 N.M. 570 , 113 P.3d 393 . {15} It makes sense to use the same standard for priority jurisdiction that we use for res judicata because the policy rationales behind the two doctrines are so similar.

2006See Cagan v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 2005-NMCA-059 , ¶ 19, 137 N.M. 570 , 113 P.3d 393 . {15} It makes sense to use the same standard for priority jurisdiction that we use for res judicata because the policy rationales behind the two doctrines are so similar.

2006See Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 78 , 134 N.M. 77 , 73 P.3d 215 (reiterating the transactional test for res judicata and noting that “a mere change in a legal theory does not create a new cause of action” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Twp.

2006See Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 78 , 134 N.M. 77 , 73 P.3d 215 (reiterating the transactional test for res judicata and noting that “a mere change in a legal theory does not create a new cause of action” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Twp.

2006Oil Co., 413 N.W.2d at 95 (holding that abatement was properly applied to dismiss case even though the plaintiff had claimed more damages in the second action). {17} Second, in the recent case of Brooks Trucking Co. v. Bull Rogers, Inc., 2006-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 16-18 , 139 N.M. 99 , 128 P.3d 1076 (Brooks), we held that res judicata did not bar a subsequent lawsuit where the operative facts underlying the second lawsuit were not in existence when the first suit was brought.

2003Under the transactional test adopted by our Supreme Court in Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 695 , 652 P.2d 240, 245 (1982) {overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 59 , 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986)), to determine whether a later claim is precluded, we must “examine the operative facts underlying the claims made in the two lawsuits.” Anaya v. City of Albuquerque, 1996-NMCA-092 , ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 326 , 924 P.2d 735 .

2003Under the transactional test adopted by our Supreme Court in Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 695 , 652 P.2d 240, 245 (1982) {overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 59 , 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986)), to determine whether a later claim is precluded, we must “examine the operative facts underlying the claims made in the two lawsuits.” Anaya v. City of Albuquerque, 1996-NMCA-092 , ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 326 , 924 P.2d 735 .

2003Under the transactional test adopted by our Supreme Court in Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 695 , 652 P.2d 240, 245 (1982) {overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 59 , 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986)), to determine whether a later claim is precluded, we must “examine the operative facts underlying the claims made in the two lawsuits.” Anaya v. City of Albuquerque, 1996-NMCA-092 , ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 326 , 924 P.2d 735 .

2003Under the transactional test adopted by our Supreme Court in Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 695 , 652 P.2d 240, 245 (1982) {overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 59 , 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986)), to determine whether a later claim is precluded, we must “examine the operative facts underlying the claims made in the two lawsuits.” Anaya v. City of Albuquerque, 1996-NMCA-092 , ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 326 , 924 P.2d 735 .

1998See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601-02 , 16 S.Ct. 644 , 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896).

1998See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601-02 , 16 S.Ct. 644 , 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896).