transactional test in Michigan

2024Garrett, 314 Mich App at 442 .

2018“Under the transactional test, a claim is viewed in factual terms and considered coterminous with the transaction, regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff[.]” Garrett, 314 Mich App at 442 , quoting Adair, 470 Mich at 124 (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).

2015Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch, 308 Mich App 1 ; 862 NW2d 681 (2014). -2- Relying on River Park, Inc v Highland Park, 184 Ill 2d 290, 307-309; 703 NE2d 883 (1998), the Adair Court explained: Under the “same evidence” test, a second suit is barred “if the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both actions.” The “transactional” test provides that “the assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the assertion of relief.

2009In Adair, supra at 124 , the Court clarified the differences between the two tests by quoting at length from River Park, Inc v Highland Park, 184 Ill 2d 290, 307-309; 703 NE2d 883 (1998) (citations omitted): “Under the ‘same evidence’ test, a second suit is barred ‘if the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both actions.’ The ‘transactional’ test provides that ‘the assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to t

2017However, the transactional test was adopted in 1980 in Goss v Monroe Auto Equip Co, 409 Mich 147, 160 ; 294 NW2d 165 (1980), well before the decisions in Van Pembrook and Salem.

2017However, the transactional test was adopted in 1980 in Goss v Monroe Auto Equip Co, 409 Mich 147, 160 ; 294 NW2d 165 (1980), well before the decisions in Van Pembrook and Salem.

2017In Salem Indus, Inc v Mooney Process Equip Co, 175 Mich App 213, 215-216 ; 437 NW2d 641 (1988), we explicitly rejected defendants’ position, holding that MCR 2.203(E) “is permissive, as opposed to compulsory” and “allows a party the option to maintain its counterclaim in a separate independent action.” Defendants do not rebut Leslie, Van Pembrook, or Salem Industries, other than to argue that these cases are no longer good law because Michigan now applies the transactional test.

2017In Salem Indus, Inc v Mooney Process Equip Co, 175 Mich App 213, 215-216 ; 437 NW2d 641 (1988), we explicitly rejected defendants’ position, holding that MCR 2.203(E) “is permissive, as opposed to compulsory” and “allows a party the option to maintain its counterclaim in a separate independent action.” Defendants do not rebut Leslie, Van Pembrook, or Salem Industries, other than to argue that these cases are no longer good law because Michigan now applies the transactional test.

1986People v Parsons, 142 Mich App 751, 756-757 ; 371 NW2d 440 (1985), citing In re Colacasides, 379 Mich 69, 84 ; 150 NW2d 1 (1967), and In re Watson, 293 Mich 263, 276 ; 291 NW 652 (1940).

1986People v Parsons, 142 Mich App 751, 756-757 ; 371 NW2d 440 (1985), citing In re Colacasides, 379 Mich 69, 84 ; 150 NW2d 1 (1967), and In re Watson, 293 Mich 263, 276 ; 291 NW 652 (1940).

1986People v Parsons, 142 Mich App 751, 756-757 ; 371 NW2d 440 (1985), citing In re Colacasides, 379 Mich 69, 84 ; 150 NW2d 1 (1967), and In re Watson, 293 Mich 263, 276 ; 291 NW 652 (1940).

1986People v Parsons, 142 Mich App 751, 756-757 ; 371 NW2d 440 (1985), citing In re Colacasides, 379 Mich 69, 84 ; 150 NW2d 1 (1967), and In re Watson, 293 Mich 263, 276 ; 291 NW 652 (1940).

2025Under this test, res judicata bars litigation of “all rights of the plaintiff with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the original action arose.” To determine whether facts constitute a “transaction” or “series of transactions,” we consider “whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.” So, “[t]he critical issue -3- is whether the two actions are based on t

2024Neal ignores the transactional test and instead directs this Court to Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs for City of Eaton v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 375 ; 521 NW2d 847 (1994) for the proposition that the essential facts in the first action and the subsequent action must be “identical.” However, as explained above, Michigan follows the transactional approach to res judicata.

2024Neal ignores the transactional test and instead directs this Court to Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs for City of Eaton v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 375 ; 521 NW2d 847 (1994) for the proposition that the essential facts in the first action and the subsequent action must be “identical.” However, as explained above, Michigan follows the transactional approach to res judicata.

2022“Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction for purposes of res judicata is to be determined pragmatically, by considering whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit . . . .” Adam v Bell, 311 Mich App 528, 533 ; 879 NW2d 879 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

2022“Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction for purposes of res judicata is to be determined pragmatically, by considering whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit . . . .” Adam v Bell, 311 Mich App 528, 533 ; 879 NW2d 879 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

2015Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch, 308 Mich App 1 ; 862 NW2d 681 (2014). -2- Relying on River Park, Inc v Highland Park, 184 Ill 2d 290, 307-309; 703 NE2d 883 (1998), the Adair Court explained: Under the “same evidence” test, a second suit is barred “if the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both actions.” The “transactional” test provides that “the assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the assertion of relief.

2015Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch, 308 Mich App 1 ; 862 NW2d 681 (2014). -2- Relying on River Park, Inc v Highland Park, 184 Ill 2d 290, 307-309; 703 NE2d 883 (1998), the Adair Court explained: Under the “same evidence” test, a second suit is barred “if the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both actions.” The “transactional” test provides that “the assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the assertion of relief.

2015This transactional test applies to determine “whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action” and “depends on factual overlap, barring claims arising from the same transaction.” United States v Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 US 307, 316 ; 131 S Ct 1723 ; 179 L Ed 2d 723 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2015This transactional test applies to determine “whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action” and “depends on factual overlap, barring claims arising from the same transaction.” United States v Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 US 307, 316 ; 131 S Ct 1723 ; 179 L Ed 2d 723 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2014People v Schmidt, 183 Mich App 817, 826 ; 455 NW2d 430 (1990). -4- extent to which the prosecutor’s allegedly intimidating remark had a coercive effect on Cortez.

2014People v Schmidt, 183 Mich App 817, 826 ; 455 NW2d 430 (1990). -4- extent to which the prosecutor’s allegedly intimidating remark had a coercive effect on Cortez.

2004It cites Sewell v Clean Cut Mgt, Inc, 463 Mich 569, 575-576 ; 621 NW2d 222 (2001), and Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586 ; 597 NW2d 82 (1999), for this proposition.

2004It cites Sewell v Clean Cut Mgt, Inc, 463 Mich 569, 575-576 ; 621 NW2d 222 (2001), and Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586 ; 597 NW2d 82 (1999), for this proposition.

2004It cites Sewell v Clean Cut Mgt, Inc, 463 Mich 569, 575-576 ; 621 NW2d 222 (2001), and Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586 ; 597 NW2d 82 (1999), for this proposition.

2004It cites Sewell v. Clean Cut Mgt., Inc., 463 Mich. 569, 575-576 , 621 N.W.2d 222 (2001), and Dart v. Dart, 460 Mich. 573, 586 , 597 N.W.2d 82 (1999), for this proposition.

1990People v Reddy, 168 Mich App 410, 413 ; 425 NW2d 163 (1988).

1990People v Reddy, 168 Mich App 410, 413 ; 425 NW2d 163 (1988).

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1986Our reading of Couch convinces us that, by analogy, if the defendant in the instant case cannot claim a privilege against self-incrimination by reason of his accountant’s production of the records, he is also not entitled to the transactional immunity from prosecution granted by the statute. 2 Such a holding, of course, does not implicate whatever Fifth Amendment privilege the defen *214 dant might have enjoyed from being compelled to produce the documents and records himself. 3 See Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 402 ; 96 S Ct 1569 ; 48 L Ed 2d 39 (1976).

1986Our reading of Couch convinces us that, by analogy, if the defendant in the instant case cannot claim a privilege against self-incrimination by reason of his accountant’s production of the records, he is also not entitled to the transactional immunity from prosecution granted by the statute. 2 Such a holding, of course, does not implicate whatever Fifth Amendment privilege the defen *214 dant might have enjoyed from being compelled to produce the documents and records himself. 3 See Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 402 ; 96 S Ct 1569 ; 48 L Ed 2d 39 (1976).

1986People v Parsons, 142 Mich App 751, 756-757 ; 371 NW2d 440 (1985), citing In re Colacasides, 379 Mich 69, 84 ; 150 NW2d 1 (1967), and In re Watson, 293 Mich 263, 276 ; 291 NW 652 (1940).

1986People v Parsons, 142 Mich App 751, 756-757 ; 371 NW2d 440 (1985), citing In re Colacasides, 379 Mich 69, 84 ; 150 NW2d 1 (1967), and In re Watson, 293 Mich 263, 276 ; 291 NW 652 (1940).

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1972The Court has never used the test in a case involving successive prosecutions following an initial conviction. 4 The cases in which the test has been used all involved multiple count convictions at a single trial. 5 In the only cited case dealing with the problem presented by the instant case, the Court applied a transactional test. 6 In In re Nielsen, 131 US 176 ; 9 S Ct 672 ; 33 L Ed 118 (1889), the Court held that an initial conviction precluded prosecution for a second crime which required proof of different elements than were required in the first trial.

1972The Court has never used the test in a case involving successive prosecutions following an initial conviction. [4] The cases in which the test has been used all involved multiple count convictions at a single trial. [5] In the only cited case dealing with the problem presented by the instant case, the Court applied a transactional test. [6] In In re *377 Nielsen, 131 US 176 ; 9 S Ct 672 ; 33 L Ed 118 (1889), the Court held that an initial conviction precluded prosecution for a second crime which required proof of different elements than were required in the first trial.

1972The Court has never used the test in a case involving successive prosecutions following an initial conviction. 4 The cases in which the test has been used all involved multiple count convictions at a single trial. 5 In the only cited case dealing with the problem presented by the instant case, the Court applied a transactional test. 6 In In re Nielsen, 131 US 176 ; 9 S Ct 672 ; 33 L Ed 118 (1889), the Court held that an initial conviction precluded prosecution for a second crime which required proof of different elements than were required in the first trial.

1972The Court has never used the test in a case involving successive prosecutions following an initial conviction. 4 The cases in which the test has been used all involved multiple count convictions at a single trial. 5 In the only cited case dealing with the problem presented by the instant case, the Court applied a transactional test. 6 In In re Nielsen, 131 US 176 ; 9 S Ct 672 ; 33 L Ed 118 (1889), the Court held that an initial conviction precluded prosecution for a second crime which required proof of different elements than were required in the first trial.