7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. BL Cos.green1 sentence2023See Smith v. BL Companies, Inc., 198 A.3d 150, 158 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018) (noting that because “claims are the same for res judicata purposes, this court has adopted the transactional test,” which means that “res judicata extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose”). ¶65 Both in the superior court and on appeal, the Trustee has not disputed that these elements were shown. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System & Sourcegreen2 sentences2017Under the transactional analysis, the focus is on whether multiple claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative facts.” Gila River, 212 Ariz. at 71 ¶¶ 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶24 In this case, applying the transactional analysis leads us to conclude that the two proceedings at issue involve the same claim. 2017See id. ¶¶ 19–21. | 1 | 1 |
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbsred2 sentences2006See, e.g., United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130 (holding that for purposes of pendent jurisdiction the “state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”); Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 286 , 62 S.Ct. 1085 , 86 L.Ed. 1478 (1942) (holding that because the plaintiffs “two claims arose out of wholly separate and distinct transactions,” the district court’s decision on one claim was a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b)). ¶ 22 We assume, without deciding, that the federal courts would utilize the Second Restatement’s transactional test for dete 2006See, e.g., United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130 (holding that for purposes of pendent jurisdiction the “state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”); Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 286 , 62 S.Ct. 1085 , 86 L.Ed. 1478 (1942) (holding that because the plaintiffs “two claims arose out of wholly separate and distinct transactions,” the district court’s decision on one claim was a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b)). ¶ 22 We assume, without deciding, that the federal courts would utilize the Second Restatement’s transactional test for dete | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. International Brotherhood Of Electrical Workersgreen1 sentence1997Id.; see Moore et al., supra ¶ 0.410[1] at III-193-94 (stating that any difference between Restatement (Second) § 24 and Rule 13(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. definitions of “transaction or occurrence” is insignificant); cf. Ariz.R.Civ.P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim rule). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vallejosgreen2 sentences1971In each case the facts must be examined to determine whether the transactional test has been met.” 89 Ariz. at 82, 83 , 358 P.2d at 182 . 1971In each case the facts must be examined to determine whether the transactional test has been met.” 89 Ariz. at 82, 83 , 358 P.2d at 182 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rousselle v. Jewett
green
1 sentence2019We then made clear that Arizona courts apply the “same evidence” test, precluding a second action when “no additional evidence is needed to prevail in the second action than that needed in the first.” Id. at 240 (citing Rousselle v. Jewett, 101 Ariz. 510 (1966)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2019Citing this court’s decision in Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of Corrections, 188 Ariz. 237 (App. 1997), Father argues the proper legal standard for deciding whether an “identity of claims” exists between the two proceedings is the “transactional approach.” In that case, however, we merely recognized that most federal circuit courts follow the transactional test, which precludes a second action if it “could and should have been asserted in the first action” because it “arises out of the same events.” 188 Ariz. at 241 . 2019Citing this court’s decision in Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of Corrections, 188 Ariz. 237 (App. 1997), Father argues the proper legal standard for deciding whether an “identity of claims” exists between the two proceedings is the “transactional approach.” In that case, however, we merely recognized that most federal circuit courts follow the transactional test, which precludes a second action if it “could and should have been asserted in the first action” because it “arises out of the same events.” 188 Ariz. at 241 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
General Care Corp. v. Olsen
green
1 sentence2013Care Corp., 705 S.W.2d 642 (superseded by Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-4-2004). ¶ 12 The parties and Amicus Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”) agree that the first clause of A.R.S. § 43-1131(1) imposes a transactional test. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson
green
2 sentences2013“The key inquiry under the functional test should be the relationship of the assets acquired, managed, or disposed of to the taxpayer’s existing business at the time the income was realized, not to some future business operations that may be funded by the proceeds from the property.” Hellerstein ¶ 9.05[2][b], at S9-30 (emphasis in original) (criticizing Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659 , 548 S.E.2d 513 (2001)). ¶ 29 Finally, Taxpayer’s interpretation would result in a lack of symmetry. 2013“The key inquiry under the functional test should be the relationship of the assets acquired, managed, or disposed of to the taxpayer’s existing business at the time the income was realized, not to some future business operations that may be funded by the proceeds from the property.” Hellerstein ¶ 9.05[2][b], at S9-30 (emphasis in original) (criticizing Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659 , 548 S.E.2d 513 (2001)). ¶ 29 Finally, Taxpayer’s interpretation would result in a lack of symmetry. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Reeves v. Beardall
green
2 sentences2006See, e.g., United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130 (holding that for purposes of pendent jurisdiction the “state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”); Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 286 , 62 S.Ct. 1085 , 86 L.Ed. 1478 (1942) (holding that because the plaintiffs “two claims arose out of wholly separate and distinct transactions,” the district court’s decision on one claim was a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b)). ¶ 22 We assume, without deciding, that the federal courts would utilize the Second Restatement’s transactional test for dete 2006See, e.g., United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725 , 86 S.Ct. 1130 (holding that for purposes of pendent jurisdiction the “state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”); Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 286 , 62 S.Ct. 1085 , 86 L.Ed. 1478 (1942) (holding that because the plaintiffs “two claims arose out of wholly separate and distinct transactions,” the district court’s decision on one claim was a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b)). ¶ 22 We assume, without deciding, that the federal courts would utilize the Second Restatement’s transactional test for dete | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company
green
1 sentence1997See Restatement, supra at cmt. e; Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.1987); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Chester R. Robinson and Wife, Frances Earline Robinson, and Roy K. Ewart and David B. Black v. The National Cash Register Company
green
1 sentence1997See Restatement, supra at cmt. e; Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.1987); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Harvey
green
2 sentences1971(Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Harvey, 98 Ariz. 70 , 402 P.2d 17 (1965), we indicated that “the conduct zvhich occurred on the day in question * * * was the basis of both convictions and therefore the latter conviction * * * must be reversed.” 98 Ariz. at 73 , 402 P.2d at 20 . 1971(Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Harvey, 98 Ariz. 70 , 402 P.2d 17 (1965), we indicated that “the conduct zvhich occurred on the day in question * * * was the basis of both convictions and therefore the latter conviction * * * must be reversed.” 98 Ariz. at 73 , 402 P.2d at 20 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.