transactional test in Maryland

2005We have adopted the transactional test of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 to address the latter kinds of cases, which states as follows: *109 “What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction’ and what groupings constitute a ‘series,’ are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Id. at 493, 731 A.2d at 927-28 (1999); see Gertz, 339

2005We have adopted the transactional test of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 to address the latter kinds of cases, which states as follows: *109 “What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction’ and what groupings constitute a ‘series,’ are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Id. at 493, 731 A.2d at 927-28 (1999); see Gertz, 339

2013To make that determination, Maryland courts have adopted the transactional test, i.e., “if the two clams or theories are based upon the same set of facts and one would expect them to be tried together ordinarily, then a party must bring them simultaneously.” Anne Arundel County Bd. of Ed. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93,109 , 887 A.2d 1029 (2005).

2013To make that determination, Maryland courts have adopted the transactional test, i.e., “if the two clams or theories are based upon the same set of facts and one would expect them to be tried together ordinarily, then a party must bring them simultaneously.” Anne Arundel County Bd. of Ed. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93,109 , 887 A.2d 1029 (2005).

2013We therefore apply the test as stated in Crowe, 272 Md. at 485-86 , 325 A.2d 592 , that is, whether, in comparing the amendment with an earlier and timely pleading, “the operative factual situation” remains “essentially the same,” a test reiterated in subsequent cases, having a greater factual similarity, with the instant case, than Crowe .

2013We therefore apply the test as stated in Crowe, 272 Md. at 485-86 , 325 A.2d 592 , that is, whether, in comparing the amendment with an earlier and timely pleading, “the operative factual situation” remains “essentially the same,” a test reiterated in subsequent cases, having a greater factual similarity, with the instant case, than Crowe .

2010See Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, 584-85 (1872) (“It is an ancient and familiar rule of law that only one action can be maintained for the breach of an entire contract, and the judgment obtained by the plaintiff in one suit may be pleaded in bar of any second proceeding.”); Olmstead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 147 , 27 A. 501 (1893) (quoting Dugan, supra, and holding that “[i]t was the appellant’s plain duty to include all that belonged to [the one breach of contract] in the first suit, so that one proceeding and one recovery should settle the rights of the parties.”); Rosenstein v. Hynson, 157 Md.

2010See Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, 584-85 (1872) (“It is an ancient and familiar rule of law that only one action can be maintained for the breach of an entire contract, and the judgment obtained by the plaintiff in one suit may be pleaded in bar of any second proceeding.”); Olmstead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 147 , 27 A. 501 (1893) (quoting Dugan, supra, and holding that “[i]t was the appellant’s plain duty to include all that belonged to [the one breach of contract] in the first suit, so that one proceeding and one recovery should settle the rights of the parties.”); Rosenstein v. Hynson, 157 Md.

2010See Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, 584-85 (1872) (“It is an ancient and familiar rule of law that only one action can be maintained for the breach of an entire contract, and the judgment obtained by the plaintiff in one suit may be pleaded in bar of any second proceeding.”); Olmstead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 147 , 27 A. 501 (1893) (quoting Dugan, supra, and holding that “[i]t was the appellant’s plain duty to include all that belonged to [the one breach of contract] in the first suit, so that one proceeding and one recovery should settle the rights of the parties.”); Rosenstein v. Hynson, 157 Md.

2010See Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, 584-85 (1872) (“It is an ancient and familiar rule of law that only one action can be maintained for the breach of an entire contract, and the judgment obtained by the plaintiff in one suit may be pleaded in bar of any second proceeding.”); Olmstead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 147 , 27 A. 501 (1893) (quoting Dugan, supra, and holding that “[i]t was the appellant’s plain duty to include all that belonged to [the one breach of contract] in the first suit, so that one proceeding and one recovery should settle the rights of the parties.”); Rosenstein v. Hynson, 157 Md.

2010Section 25 of the Restatement, supra, cited in EFCO, supra, and cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Dill v. Avery, supra, 305 Md. at 210 , 502 A.2d 1051 , is titled “Exemplification of the General Rule Concerning Splitting.” It explains the operation of the rule in section 24 (the transactional test) in situations similar to the present case: The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the ease not presented in the first action, or (2

2010Section 25 of the Restatement, supra, cited in EFCO, supra, and cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Dill v. Avery, supra, 305 Md. at 210 , 502 A.2d 1051 , is titled “Exemplification of the General Rule Concerning Splitting.” It explains the operation of the rule in section 24 (the transactional test) in situations similar to the present case: The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the ease not presented in the first action, or (2

2010Section 25 of the Restatement, supra, cited in EFCO, supra, and cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Dill v. Avery, supra, 305 Md. at 210 , 502 A.2d 1051 , is titled “Exemplification of the General Rule Concerning Splitting.” It explains the operation of the rule in section 24 (the transactional test) in situations similar to the present case: The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the ease not presented in the first action, or (2

1993Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the parties did have “ample procedural means” for fully developing the entire transaction in the 1987 zoning case. *620 (v) The principal Maryland discussion of the question of whether the “procedural means” in the initial action were “ample” to permit the parties to develop fully the entire transaction is contained in Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989).

1993Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the parties did have “ample procedural means” for fully developing the entire transaction in the 1987 zoning case. *620 (v) The principal Maryland discussion of the question of whether the “procedural means” in the initial action were “ample” to permit the parties to develop fully the entire transaction is contained in Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989).

1983Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.” For a constitutionally mandated and self-executing "use immunity,” see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). 2 .

1983Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.” For a constitutionally mandated and self-executing "use immunity,” see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). 2 .

1982App. 68 , 334 A.2d 165 , cert. den. 275 Md. 747 (1975). 4 Likewise, if the transactional analysis espoused by the American Law Institute is applied, Restatements (Second) of Judgments, § 24, (1982), the appellees would prevail.