87 New York opinions name it 11 courts 1970–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
O'Brien v. City of Syracusegreen2 sentences2024"This State has adopted the transactional analysis approach in deciding res judicata issues... [O]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." O'Brien v. City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 (1981). 2023"Under 'the transactional analysis approach in deciding res judicata issues . . . once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy'" ( Mooney v Manhattan Occupational, Physical & Speech Therapies, PLLC , 166 AD3d 957 , 959, quoting O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 ). | 16 | 49 |
Reilly v. Reidgreen2 sentences2017Res judicata bars a party from litigating “a claim where a judgment on the merits exists from a prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter.” (.Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005].) Res judicata generally precludes “claims actually litigated,” but also applies to “claims that could have been raised in the prior litigation.” (Id.) To determine whether a claim is barred by res judicata, our courts apply a transactional analysis approach which holds that “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series 2000Under the transactional analysis approach to res judicata applied in this State, as a general rule a valid final judgment on a claim or claims precludes future litigation between the same parties of claims arising from the same causes of actions, i.e., the same transactions or series of transactions, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy (see, Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 347 ; O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 ; Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 192-193 ; Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24, 27 ). | 12 | 27 |
Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co.green2 sentences2018Under "the transactional analysis approach in deciding res judicata issues . . . once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 ; see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co. , 93 NY2d at 347 ; Bayer v City of New York , 115 AD3d 897, 899 ; Sandhu v Mercy Med. 2013Under “the transactional analysis approach in deciding res judicata issues . . . , once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy” (O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]; see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d at 347 ). | 6 | 7 |
Smith v. Russell Sage Collegegreen2 sentences2024Under the transactional analysis, the test is to determine whether a claim should be precluded by viewing a claim or cause of action as conterminous with the transaction, regardless of the number of substantive theories or variant forms of relief available to a litigant ( see Smith v Russell Sage Coll. , 54 NY2d 185, 192 [1981]). 2024Under the transactional analysis, the test is to determine whether a claim should be precluded by viewing a claim or cause of action as conterminous with the transaction, regardless of the number of substantive theories or variant forms of relief available to a litigant ( see Smith v Russell Sage Coll. , 54 NY2d 185, 192 [1981]). | 3 | 17 |
Boronow v. Boronowgreen2 sentences1992The transactional analysis test applies to claims which " ' "are related in time, space, origin, or motivation * * * they form a convenient trial unit, and * * * their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage” ’ ” (Gross v Glick, 183 AD2d 748 ; Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 192-193 , citing Restatement [Second] of Judgments §§ 61, 61.1 [Tent Draft Nos. 1, 5], currently Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24 [2]; see also, Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284 ; Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24 ). 1992Under the transactional analysis test adopted by the Court of Appeals, subsequent claims are barred if they are coterminous with the transaction or series of transactions from which the earlier claims arose, meaning that the facts upon which these claims are based " 'are related in time, space, origin, or motivation * * * they form a convenient trial unit, and * * * their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage’ ” (Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 192-193 , citing Restatement [Second] of Judgments §§ 61, 61.1 [Tent Draft Nos. 1, 5], | 3 | 4 |
CRK Contracting of Suffolk, Inc. v. Jeffrey M. Brown & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2011“Under the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, ‘once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy’ ” (CRK Contr. of Suffolk v Brown & Assoc., 260 AD2d 530, 530 [1999], quoting O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]; see Silberstein, Awad & Miklos, P.C. v Spencer, Maston & McCarthy, LLP, 43 AD3d 902, 903 [2007]). 2005Under the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy” (O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]; see CRK Contr. of Suffolk v Brown & Assoc., supra at 530). | 3 | 3 |
MATTER OF JOSEY v. Goordgreen2 sentences2022"Under the transactional analysis approach to this doctrine, 'once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy'" ( id. , quoting Matter of Josey v Goord , 9 NY3d at 389-390 ; [*2] accord Matter of Gustus v Fischer , 64 AD3d at 1035 ). 2020Under the transactional analysis approach to this doctrine, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( Matter of Josey v Goord , 9 NY3d at 389-390 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Gustus v Fischer , 64 AD3d at 1035 ). | 2 | 4 |
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Allianz Risk Transfer AGgreen2 sentences2025Paramount Pictures Corporation v. Allianz Risk Transfer AG, 31 N.Y.3d 64, 83 [2018]. 2024The analysis embraces a broadened view of the scope of a claim in order to limit the number of possible actions arising out of a single controversy ( see Paramount Pictures Corp. v Allianz Risk Transfer AG , 31 NY3d 64, 74-76 [2018]). | 2 | 2 |
Marinelli Associates v. Helmsley-Noyes Co.green2 sentences2024Footnote 2: As to Eni S.p.A.'s contention that it should not be precluded from litigating the DA counterclaim and the PDA action because they were not subject to mandatory arbitration, that fact is not dispositive under the transactional test ( see Marinelli Assoc. v Helmsley-Noyes Co. , 265 AD2d 1, 8-9 [1st Dept 2000] [finding that even though the claims in the second action brought in Supreme Court could not have been brought in the prior arbitration, they were still barred by claim preclusion because the plaintiff was seeking relief "for harm arising out of the same or related facts such as 2024Footnote 2: As to Eni S.p.A.'s contention that it should not be precluded from litigating the DA counterclaim and the PDA action because they were not subject to mandatory arbitration, that fact is not dispositive under the transactional test ( see Marinelli Assoc. v Helmsley-Noyes Co. , 265 AD2d 1, 8-9 [1st Dept 2000] [finding that even though the claims in the second action brought in Supreme Court could not have been brought in the prior arbitration, they were still barred by claim preclusion because the plaintiff was seeking relief "for harm arising out of the same or related facts such as | 2 | 2 |
In Re the Estate of Huntergreen2 sentences2020Under the transactional analysis approach, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Maki v Bassett Healthcare , 141 AD3d 979, 981 [2016], appeal dismissed, lv dismissed and lv denied 28 NY3d 1130 [2017]). "[R]es judicata bars not only those claims that were actually litigated previously, but also those which might have been raised in the former action" ( Bernstein v S 2019New York has adopted the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, so that once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims between the same parties or those in privity with them arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy ( see Matter of Josey v Goord, 9 NY3d at 389-390 ; Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d at 269 ; O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 ; Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v Feldstein , 72 AD3d 890, 893 ). | 1 | 4 |
Gustus v. Fischergreen2 sentences2022"Under the transactional analysis approach to this doctrine, 'once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy'" ( id. , quoting Matter of Josey v Goord , 9 NY3d at 389-390 ; [*2] accord Matter of Gustus v Fischer , 64 AD3d at 1035 ). 2020Under the transactional analysis approach to this doctrine, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( Matter of Josey v Goord , 9 NY3d at 389-390 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Gustus v Fischer , 64 AD3d at 1035 ). | 1 | 2 |
Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp.green2 sentences1992(Supra.) Chief Judge Cardozo summed up the classic principle of the res judicata doctrine in Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp. ( 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]) in this way: "A judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one not only as to any matters actually litigated therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated, when the two causes of action have such a measure of identity that a different judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first.” Judge Fuchsberg, writing for an unanimous Court in Smith v Russell Sage Coll. (54 1982It has long been the rule that: “A judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one not only as to any matters actually litigated therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated, when the two causes of action have such a measure of identity that a different judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first (Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 ; Reich v. Cochran [ 151 NY 122 ], supra).” (Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 .) The Court of Appeals has recently refined this policy in O’Brien v City of Syr | 1 | 2 |
Maki v. Bassett Healthcaregreen1 sentence2020Under the transactional analysis approach, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Maki v Bassett Healthcare , 141 AD3d 979, 981 [2016], appeal dismissed, lv dismissed and lv denied 28 NY3d 1130 [2017]). "[R]es judicata bars not only those claims that were actually litigated previously, but also those which might have been raised in the former action" ( Bernstein v S | 1 | 1 |
Maki v. Bassett Healthcaregreen1 sentence2020Under the transactional analysis approach, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Maki v Bassett Healthcare , 141 AD3d 979, 981 [2016], appeal dismissed, lv dismissed and lv denied 28 NY3d 1130 [2017]). "[R]es judicata bars not only those claims that were actually litigated previously, but also those which might have been raised in the former action" ( Bernstein v S | 1 | 1 |
Bernstein v. State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2020Under the transactional analysis approach, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Maki v Bassett Healthcare , 141 AD3d 979, 981 [2016], appeal dismissed, lv dismissed and lv denied 28 NY3d 1130 [2017]). "[R]es judicata bars not only those claims that were actually litigated previously, but also those which might have been raised in the former action" ( Bernstein v S | 1 | 1 |
Nevada v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018Fed. 829 , § 2[a]; see also Nevada , 463 U.S. at 130 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 2906 ; Conway, 60 U Chi L Rev at 145 n 23 ; Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24, Comment a ). 7 *747 ***78 As articulated by the Second Circuit, "[w]hether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first" ( Monahan , 214 F.3d at 285 ; see also Ross , 486 F.3d at 283 ). 2018Fed. 829 , § 2[a]; see also Nevada , 463 U.S. at 130 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 2906 ; Conway, 60 U Chi L Rev at 145 n 23 ; Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24, Comment a ). 7 *747 ***78 As articulated by the Second Circuit, "[w]hether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first" ( Monahan , 214 F.3d at 285 ; see also Ross , 486 F.3d at 283 ). | 1 | 1 |
Silberstein, Awad & Miklos, P.C. v. Spencer, Maston & McCarthy, LLPgreen1 sentence2011“Under the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, ‘once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy’ ” (CRK Contr. of Suffolk v Brown & Assoc., 260 AD2d 530, 530 [1999], quoting O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]; see Silberstein, Awad & Miklos, P.C. v Spencer, Maston & McCarthy, LLP, 43 AD3d 902, 903 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
| Fifty CPW Tenants Corp. v. Epsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bauer v. Planning Board of Scarsdalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dorli, Inc. v. RGA Accessories, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rush v. Morduegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Braunstein v. Braunsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schwartz v. Public Administratorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Feigen v. Advance Capital Management Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Chapmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Chingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pondview Corp. v. Blatt
green
2 sentences2013The doctrine bars litigation of a cause of action that either was raised or could have been raised in the prior proceeding (see Pondview Corp. v Blatt, 95 AD3d 980 [2012]; Town of Huntington v Beechwood Carmen Bldg. 2013The doctrine bars litigation of a cause of action that either was raised or could have been raised in the prior proceeding (see Pondview Corp. v Blatt, 95 AD3d 980 [2012]; Town of Huntington v Beechwood Carmen Bldg. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1997Other courts have observed that the transactional immunity conferred under this statute is so broad that the prosecution, in calling witnesses before a Grand Jury, must proceed with caution, lest it unintentionally bestow such immunity upon a witness for "any transaction concerning which he gave testimony” (see, e.g., Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50, 64 , lv denied 60 NY2d 553 ; People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 , affd on decision below 56 NY2d 916 ). 1997(People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 [2d Dept 1981].) CPL 50.10 (1) defines "immunity” in terms of a person’s inability to "be convicted of any offense * * * for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he gave evidence” in a legal proceeding. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Carey v. Kitson
green
2 sentences1997Other courts have observed that the transactional immunity conferred under this statute is so broad that the prosecution, in calling witnesses before a Grand Jury, must proceed with caution, lest it unintentionally bestow such immunity upon a witness for "any transaction concerning which he gave testimony” (see, e.g., Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50, 64 , lv denied 60 NY2d 553 ; People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 , affd on decision below 56 NY2d 916 ). 1985Petitioner’s claim of immunity from prosecution under the indictment is properly asserted in this proceeding (see, Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50 , lv denied 60 NY2d 553 ), and because of the transactional immunity granted to petitioner when he gave evidence before the Grand Jury, we order that respondents be prohibited from proceeding under the indictment. | 2 | 1985–1997 |
Glanzman v. Fischman
neutral
2 sentences1992The transactional analysis test applies to claims which " ' "are related in time, space, origin, or motivation * * * they form a convenient trial unit, and * * * their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage” ’ ” (Gross v Glick, 183 AD2d 748 ; Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 192-193 , citing Restatement [Second] of Judgments §§ 61, 61.1 [Tent Draft Nos. 1, 5], currently Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24 [2]; see also, Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284 ; Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24 ). 1992The transactional analysis test applies to claims which " ' "are related in time, space, origin, or motivation * * * they form a convenient trial unit, and * * * their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage” ’ ” (Gross v Glick, 183 AD2d 748 ; Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 192-193 , citing Restatement [Second] of Judgments §§ 61, 61.1 [Tent Draft Nos. 1, 5], currently Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24 [2]; see also, Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284 ; Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24 ). | 2 | 1992–1992 |
In Re North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986For example, adjudications regarding tax exemptions for one tax year are not binding in future litigation after the statute involved has been amended (Matter of North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary [City of Rye], 48 NY2d 135 ; Matter of American Bible Socy. v Lewisohn, 40 NY2d 78 ). 1981On the res judicata point, three members of the court disagree with the transactional analysis set forth above, but concur in the result on the theory that the revision of the Freedom of Information Law constituted “an intervening change in the applicable legal context” (Restatement, Judgments 2d [Tent Draft No. 4], § 68.1, subd b, and Comment c) rendering inappropriate the application of rules of preclusion (see Matter of North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary [City of Rye], 48 NY2d 135, 142 ; Matter of American Bible Soc. v Lewisohn, 40 NY2d 78, 84 ). . | 2 | 1981–1986 |
American Bible Society v. Lewisohn
green
2 sentences1986For example, adjudications regarding tax exemptions for one tax year are not binding in future litigation after the statute involved has been amended (Matter of North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary [City of Rye], 48 NY2d 135 ; Matter of American Bible Socy. v Lewisohn, 40 NY2d 78 ). 1981On the res judicata point, three members of the court disagree with the transactional analysis set forth above, but concur in the result on the theory that the revision of the Freedom of Information Law constituted “an intervening change in the applicable legal context” (Restatement, Judgments 2d [Tent Draft No. 4], § 68.1, subd b, and Comment c) rendering inappropriate the application of rules of preclusion (see Matter of North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary [City of Rye], 48 NY2d 135, 142 ; Matter of American Bible Soc. v Lewisohn, 40 NY2d 78, 84 ). . | 2 | 1981–1986 |
Gold v. Menna
green
2 sentences1981The Court of Appeals has expressly recognized that these statutes grant “a transactional immunity from prosecution for any crime revealed by a witness’ testimony before a Grand Jury.” (Matter of Gold v Menna, 25 NY2d 475, 481 .) Defendant contends that a literal reading of CPL 50.10 (subd l) 2 requires dismissal of the felony complaints since defendant is now immune from sentence. 1981The Court of Appeals has expressly recognized that these statutes grant “a transactional immunity from prosecution for any crime revealed by a witness’ testimony before a Grand Jury.” (Matter of Gold v Menna, 25 NY2d 475, 481 .) Defendant contends that a literal reading of CPL 50.10 (subd l) 2 requires dismissal of the felony complaints since defendant is now immune from sentence. | 2 | 1978–1981 |
Winkler v. Pennsylvania Railroad
green
2 sentences1970(See People v. lanniello, 21 N Y 2d 418, 425, cert, den. 393 U. S. 827 ; People v. Tomasello, 21 N Y 2d 143, 149; see, also, 1942 Report of N. Y. 1970(See People v. Ianniello, 21 N Y 2d 418, 425, cert. den. 393 U. S. 827 ; People v. Tomasello, 21 N Y 2d 143, 149; see, also, 1942 Report of N. Y. | 2 | 1970–1970 |
Matter of Strauss v. Venettozzi
green
1 sentence2022"Under the transactional analysis approach to this doctrine, 'once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy'" ( id. , quoting Matter of Josey v Goord , 9 NY3d at 389-390 ; [*2] accord Matter of Gustus v Fischer , 64 AD3d at 1035 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v. Feldstein
green
1 sentence2019New York has adopted the transactional analysis approach to res judicata, so that once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims between the same parties or those in privity with them arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy ( see Matter of Josey v Goord, 9 NY3d at 389-390 ; Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d at 269 ; O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 ; Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v Feldstein , 72 AD3d 890, 893 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sandhu v. Mercy Medical Center
green
1 sentence2018Ctr. , 54 AD3d 928, 928 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bayer v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2018Under "the transactional analysis approach in deciding res judicata issues . . . once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 ; see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co. , 93 NY2d at 347 ; Bayer v City of New York , 115 AD3d 897, 899 ; Sandhu v Mercy Med. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Monahan v. New York City Department Of Corrections
green
1 sentence2018Fed. 829 , § 2[a]; see also Nevada , 463 U.S. at 130 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 2906 ; Conway, 60 U Chi L Rev at 145 n 23 ; Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24, Comment a ). 7 *747 ***78 As articulated by the Second Circuit, "[w]hether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first" ( Monahan , 214 F.3d at 285 ; see also Ross , 486 F.3d at 283 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Mahler v. Campagna green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In re Jane HH. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Miller v. Kozakiewicz neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Powell v. Wohlleben green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Zuk green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Nottenberg v. Walber 985 Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Moore v. Morrow green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Hodes v. Axelrod green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Reape v. New York News, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Smith v. Kirkpatrick green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| McLearn v. Cowen & Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Boorman v. Deutsch green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hyman v. Hillelson green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Hyman v. Hillelson neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Patchell v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Gonzalez neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Burnett v. Vance green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor red | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. Ostrer neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Rakowski v. Rakowski green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Cromwell v. County of Sac green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Reich v. . Cochran green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kastigar v. United States green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Rappaport green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.