transactional test in Illinois

2026River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 310 (1998). ¶ 65 Under the transactional test, “separate claims will be considered the same cause of - 19 - action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.” Id. at 311 .

2026River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 310 (1998). ¶ 65 Under the transactional test, “separate claims will be considered the same cause of - 19 - action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.” Id. at 311 .

2023Illinois courts apply a liberal transactional test, where separate claims are treated as the same cause of action for res judicata purposes “regardless of whether different theories of relief are asserted *** ‘even if there is not a substantial overlap of evidence, so long as they arise from the same transaction.’” Lane v. Kalcheim, 394 Ill.App.3d 324, 332 (1st Dist. 2009) (quoting River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 311 (1998)). ¶ 29 O’Connell does not provide any authority to support her contention on appeal that we should find that there is no identity of causes of ac

2019However, contrary to Mo’s argument, the transactional test supports a finding of res judicata under these facts: “Under the transactional analysis, separate claims will be considered the same cause of action for res judicata purposes if they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether different theories of relief are asserted.” Lane v. Kalcheim, 394 Ill.

2004The transactional test classifies income as business income if the gain is “ ‘attributable to a type of business transaction in which [the] taxpayer regularly engages.’ ” Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d at 269 , 695 N.E.2d at 484 , quoting National Realty & Investment Co. v. Department of Revenue, 144 Ill.

2002The first test is the transactional test, where "income is classified as business income if it is attributable to a type of business transaction in which taxpayer regularly engages. [Citation.]" National Realty , 144 Ill.

2025Mary’s Hospital, 149 Ill. 2d 302, 312 (1992)). “[U]nder the same evidence test the definition of what - 24 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240153 constitutes a cause of action is narrower than under the transactional test.” Id. at 309.

2000Notwithstanding the fact that there was an obvious connection between the two cases, having both related to the wife’s treatment at the defendant hospital, the court held that even under the transactional analysis, they were not the same causes of action for res judicata purposes because the “facts essential to each suit did not arise from the same transactions or incidents.” Rodgers, 149 Ill. 2d at 312 .

2013To determine whether there is an identity of cause of action between the first and second lawsuits, a court “ ‘must look to the facts that give rise to plaintiffs’ right to relief, not simply to the facts which support the judgment.’ ” Id. at 309-10 (quoting Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 338-39 ).

2011In River Park , the court set forth the focus of the analysis to determine whether res judicata bars the second litigation. "`[T]o determine whether there is an identity of causes of action between the first and second suits, we must look to the facts that give rise to plaintiffs' right to relief, not simply to the facts which support the judgment in the first action * * *.'" Id. at 309-10 , 234 Ill.Dec. 783 , 703 N.E.2d 883 (quoting Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill.2d 325, 338-39 , 216 Ill.Dec. 642 , 665 N.E.2d 1199 (1996)). ¶ 22 Taylor argues there is an identity of the causes of action

2013Consequently, plaintiffs contend, res judicata precludes First American from asserting its mortgage lien in exchange for consenting to the short sale. ¶ 26 Plaintiffs rely on Skolnik v. Petella, 376 Ill. 500, 507 (1941), for the proposition that under the doctrine of res judicata, a lawsuit to foreclose a mortgage and a lawsuit to enforce personal liability on the underlying note, must be pursued in a single action.

2013Consequently, plaintiffs contend, res judicata precludes First American from asserting its mortgage lien in exchange for consenting to the short sale. ¶ 26 Plaintiffs rely on Skolnik v. Petella, 376 Ill. 500, 507 (1941), for the proposition that under the doctrine of res judicata, a lawsuit to foreclose a mortgage and a lawsuit to enforce personal liability on the underlying note must be pursued in a single action.

2021However, although courts have borrowed the transactional test from the law of res judicata, “[t]he single refiling rule is not simply another name for res judicata.” Cobo, 2018 IL 123038, ¶ 28 .

2021Illinois courts apply the transactional test to the single refiling rule “because it is a convenient test with an established body of case law for determining when two causes of action are the same.” Cobo, 2018 IL 123038, ¶ 28 .

2024We find that the prior court decisions constituted final judgment on the merits that fulfilled this element of res judicata. ¶ 41 Mireles otherwise asserts there is no identity of cause of action because his “initial appeal was about whether or not the Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence” and the merits of whether his termination was justified, whereas “[t]he 2-1401 petition relates to - 10 - No. 1-22-1088 the Board having improperly-seated members and the decision being void as a result.” 5 Thus, he claims his prior appeal and this one do not have “the same body o

2024We find that the prior court decisions constituted final judgment on the merits that fulfilled this element of res judicata. ¶ 40 Mireles otherwise asserts there is no identity of cause of action because his “initial appeal was about whether or not the Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence” - 10 - No. 1-22-1088 and the merits of whether his termination was justified, whereas “[t]he 2-1401 petition relates to the Board having improperly-seated members and the decision being void as a result.”5 Thus, he claims his prior appeal and this one do not have “the same body of

2018App. 3d 750, 758 (2000); see also Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st) 111464, ¶ 23 (finding that separate claims, one alleging personal injury and the other alleging property damage, constituted a single cause of action for purposes of section 13-217 because they arose from the same negligent actions that resulted in the accident). -4- ¶ 17 In the past, to determine whether separate complaints involved the same cause of action Illinois courts utilized two tests: the same evidence test and the transactional test.

2017Claims are identical under section 13-217 if "the parties are the same and both theories of relief arise out of a single core of operative facts." Schrager v. Grossman , 321 Ill.App.3d 750 , 758, 256 Ill.Dec. 456 , 752 N.E.2d 1 (2000) ; see also Mabry v. Boler , 2012 IL App (1st) 111464 , ¶ 23, 362 Ill.Dec. 1 , 972 N.E.2d 716 (finding that separate claims, one alleging personal injury and the other alleging property damage, constituted a single cause of action for purposes of section 13-217 because they arose from the same negligent actions that resulted in the accident). ¶ 17 In the past, to

2006See, e.g., American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 385-86 (2000) (overruling, in part, a prior decision of this court because “the modern trend” in favor of according estoppel effect to criminal convictions was correct); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311 (1998) (noting that our adoption of the transactional test to determine whether identity of causes of action exists for purposes of res judicata is consistent with “the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions”); Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 195 (1981) (explaining that “[tjhis court

2006See, e.g., American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 385-86 , 250 Ill.Dec. 682 , 739 N.E.2d 445 (2000) (overruling, in part, a prior decision of this court because "the modern trend" in favor of according estoppel effect to criminal convictions was correct); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 311 , 234 Ill.Dec. 783 , 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998) (noting that our adoption of the transactional test to determine whether identity of causes of action exists for purposes of res judicata is consistent with "the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions"); Wils

2006See, e.g., American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 385-86 (2000) (overruling, in part, a prior decision of this court because “the modern trend” in favor of according estoppel effect to criminal convictions was correct); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311 (1998) (noting that our adoption of the transactional test to determine whether identity of causes of action exists for purposes of res judicata is consistent with “the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions”); Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 195 (1981) (explaining that “[tjhis court

2006See, e.g., American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 385-86 , 250 Ill.Dec. 682 , 739 N.E.2d 445 (2000) (overruling, in part, a prior decision of this court because "the modern trend" in favor of according estoppel effect to criminal convictions was correct); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 311 , 234 Ill.Dec. 783 , 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998) (noting that our adoption of the transactional test to determine whether identity of causes of action exists for purposes of res judicata is consistent with "the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions"); Wils

2004Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d at 269 , 695 N.E.2d at 484 ; see also Ross-Araco Corp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Board of Finance & Revenue, 544 Fa. 74, 79, 674 A.2d 691, 693 (1996).

1998More broadly, under the functional test, all gain from the disposition of a capital asset is considered business income if the asset disposed of was "used by the taxpayer in its regular trade or business operations." National Realty, 144 Ill.App.3d at 554 , 98 Ill.Dec. 802 , 494 N.E.2d 924 ; see also Ross-Araco, 544 Pa. 74 , 674 A.2d 691 (if asset produced business income while it was owned by the taxpayer); Laurel Pipe Line Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Board of Finance & Revenue, 537 Pa. 205 , 642 A.2d 472 (1994); Pierce, 462 A.2d 1129 .

2002See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. , 22 P.3d 324, 337 (Cal. 2001) ("income arising from 'extraordinary' events such as a 'complete liquidation and cessation of business' cannot satisfy the transactional test"); Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co. , 779 So. 2d 227, 236 (Ala. 2000) ("[a] complete liquidation and cessation of business do not generate business income under the transaction test *** because, by definition, such events are most extraordinary; they do not occur in the 'regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business'").

2002See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 25 Cal. 4th 508, 526-27 , 22 P.3d 324, 337 , 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 563 (2001) (“income arising from ‘extraordinary’ events such as a ‘complete liquidation and cessation of business’ cannot satisfy the transactional test”); Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So. 2d 227, 236 (Ala. 2000) (“[a] complete liquidation and cessation of business do not generate business income under the transaction test *** because, by definition, such events are most extraordinary; they do not occur in the ‘regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business’ ”).

1987Ed. 2d 212 , 92 S. Ct. 1653 .) In interpreting section 106’s predecessor section, which was similarly worded, our supreme court stated that the statute eliminates the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by a grant of immunity that bars the prosecution of the witness for any offense “shown in whole or part by such testimony.” (People v. Walker (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 585, 590 , 192 N.E.2d 819 .) Considering the principles set out in United States v. Doe and the transactional immunity granted by the Illinois immunity provision, the issue presented by the Bernsteins is whether or not t

1985Ed. 2d 212, 222 , 92 S. Ct. 1653, 1661 .) “Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.” 406 U.S. 441, 453 , 32 L.

2004The transactional test classifies income as business income if the gain is “ ‘attributable to a type of business transaction in which [the] taxpayer regularly engages.’ ” Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d at 269 , 695 N.E.2d at 484 , quoting National Realty & Investment Co. v. Department of Revenue, 144 Ill.

2004The transactional test classifies income as business income if the gain is “ ‘attributable to a type of business transaction in which [the] taxpayer regularly engages.’ ” Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d at 269 , 695 N.E.2d at 484 , quoting National Realty & Investment Co. v. Department of Revenue, 144 Ill.

2025Under this approach, a claim is viewed in ‘factual terms’ and considered ‘coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff; *** and regardless of the variations in the evidence needed to support the theories or rights.’ Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment a, at 197 (1982).” Id. ¶ 58 On the other hand, pursuant to the transactional test, “separate claims will be considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single gr

2024“Under the transactional test, the assertion of different theories or kinds of relief still constitute a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts gives rise to the assertion of relief.” Village of Bartonville, 2017 IL 120643, ¶ 50 .

2018Additionally, a "final judgment will bar a plaintiff's claim to all or any part of a transaction or series of connected transactions from which the action arose." Doe v. Gleicher , 393 Ill.

2018Additionally, a “final judgment will bar a plaintiff’s claim to all or any part of a transaction or series of connected transactions from which the action arose.” Doe v. Gleicher, 393 Ill.

2015Lutkauskas, 2015 IL 117090, ¶ 43 . ¶ 22 Applying the transactional test to the question of whether the foreclosure claim shares an identity with Bhutani’s conversion and replevin claims, we conclude that it does not.

2015Under the transactional test, “separate claims will be considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.” River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311 (1998); accord Lutkauskas, 2015 IL 117090, ¶ 47 .