court-made rule in Ohio

2012The purpose of the doctrine is to "prevent [ ] premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as to afford the -3- parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 , 95 S.Ct. 2457 , 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). {¶12} "[I]n Ohio, the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine is a court- made rule of judicial economy." Nemazee v. Mt.

2012The purpose of the doctrine is to "prevent [ ] premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as to afford the -3- parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 , 95 S.Ct. 2457 , 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). {¶12} "[I]n Ohio, the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine is a court- made rule of judicial economy." Nemazee v. Mt.

2008This court-made rule of judicial economy prevents "`premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.'" Id., quoting Weinberger v. Salfi (1975), 422 U.S. 749 , 765 , 95 S.Ct. 2457 .

2002Nemazee at 111 . " `The purpose of the doctrine * * * is to permit an administrative agency to apply its special expertise * * * in developing a factual record without premature judicial intervention.' " Id., quoting S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan (C.A.6, 1985), 774 F.2d 693 , 702 , amended on denial of rehearing (1986), 781 F.2d 57 .

2002The purpose "* * * is to permit an administrative agency to apply its special expertise * * * and in developing a factual record without premature judicial intervention.' Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan (C.A. 6, 1985), 774 F.2d 693 , 702." As explained by this court in The Salvation Army v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Northern Ohio (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 571 , 577 : [t]he doctrine is a court-made rule of judicial economy that allows the agency to function efficiently and to afford it an opportunity to correct its own errors while benefitting the parties and the courts by virtue of the agen

2002Nemazee at 111 . " `The purpose of the doctrine * * * is to permit an administrative agency to apply its special expertise * * * in developing a factual record without premature judicial intervention.' " Id., quoting S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan (C.A.6, 1985), 774 F.2d 693 , 702 , amended on denial of rehearing (1986), 781 F.2d 57 .

2005Because the remainder of this analysis does in fact involve the application of Crim.R. 52(B), we have edited the Riley holding to apply the precise word "forfeiture" and will use "forfeiture" throughout. {¶ 7} The Riley opinion explained that a defendant's "right" to have the trial court articulate its findings on the record is neither an absolute right nor a constitutional right, but rather "a court-made requirement regarding an explanation of the court's personal thought process when imposing sentence." Riley at ¶ 31 , explaining State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , at ¶ 22 .

2004Sinai Medical Ctr. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 109 , 111 (Other citation omitted.). {¶ 17} "In Ohio, the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine is a court-made rule of judicial economy." Nemazee, supra. Accordingly, "a party cannot be deemed to have exhausted its administrative remedies by filing an untimely administrative appeal and having subsequent administrative appeals rejected expressly on that basis." Cooper v. Dayton (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 34 , 38 . {¶ 18} Recently, this court has addressed the specific issue of whether a property owner's failure to exhaust his or her administrative

2002Nemazee at 111 . " `The purpose of the doctrine * * * is to permit an administrative agency to apply its special expertise * * * in developing a factual record without premature judicial intervention.' " Id., quoting S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan (C.A.6, 1985), 774 F.2d 693 , 702 , amended on denial of rehearing (1986), 781 F.2d 57 .

2002The purpose "* * * is to permit an administrative agency to apply its special expertise * * * and in developing a factual record without premature judicial intervention.' Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan (C.A. 6, 1985), 774 F.2d 693 , 702." As explained by this court in The Salvation Army v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Northern Ohio (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 571 , 577 : [t]he doctrine is a court-made rule of judicial economy that allows the agency to function efficiently and to afford it an opportunity to correct its own errors while benefitting the parties and the courts by virtue of the agen

1976As an affirmative defense, it can be waived if it is not “timely asserted.” Driscoll v. Austintown Associates, supra, at page 276.

1965(Thomas v. Leary, 15 A. D. 2d 438 * * *; Simpson v. Eichenbrunner, 31 Misc. 2d 958 , * * *; Amie v. Laure, 16 A. D. 2d 736 * * Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 A. D. 2d 661 * * *.) If the strict requirement of privity is to be liberalized, the distinguishing facts in this case from those in the cases cited would not be controlling.