court-made rule in Texas

2016This “basic framework” for analyzing preserved and unpre-served claims of error in the charge is “not a court-made rule; it is based on this Court’s interpretation of Article 36.19.” Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 4 This Court has held that Almanza is the appropriate standard for conducting a harm analysis in cases reviewing jury-charge error, even when the error was first asserted in a motion for a new trial.

2015Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 60 ; see Tex.Code Crim.

2004Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at 499-501 (5th ed. 1984) (Keeton); see also Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex.1983).

2004Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at 499-501 (5th ed. 1984) (Keeton); see also Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex.1983).

2018The “law of the case” doctrine “is a court-made doctrine designed to promote judicial consistency and efficiency.” Swearingen, 424 S.W.3d at 36 ; see Swearingen, 478 S.W.3d at 720 .

2015Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).

2021See, e.g., Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex.Crim.App. 2017) (“Declaring a statute facially unconstitutional is not finding constitutional court error or announcing a new court-made rule of criminal procedure; it is holding that the Legislature passed a statute so blatantly unconstitutional it should have never been passed.”); Smith v. State, 463 S.W.3d 890, 895-96 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015) (criminal defendant was entitled to seek relief from a conviction for the first time on appeal where he was convicted under a statute later declared facially unconstitutional, as under such circumstance

2017Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 117-18 , 2017 WL 915525, at *10 (Tex. Crim.

2019Duncan v. State, 151 S.W.3d 564, 566 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). “[W]hen the facts 13 and legal issues are virtually identical, they should be controlled by an appellate court’s previous resolution.” State v. Swearingen, 478 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. Crim.

2018The “law of the case” doctrine “is a court-made doctrine designed to promote judicial consistency and efficiency.” Swearingen, 424 S.W.3d at 36 ; see Swearingen, 478 S.W.3d at 720 .

2015See, respectively, Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) and Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977).

2015See, respectively, Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) and Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977).

2015See, respectively, Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) and Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977).

2015See, respectively, Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) and Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977).

2009See id. at 251-52 ; Lubbock County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (stating that supreme court may modify judicially created doctrines).

2009See id . at 251-52; Lubbock County v. Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds , 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (stating that supreme court may modify judicially created doctrines).

2007See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir.2005), and cases cited at 601.

2007See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir.2005), and cases cited at 601.

2018“The doctrine assures trial courts that they can rely on the appellate court’s disposition of an issue in presiding over the case and provides an incentive for trial courts to follow these decisions closely.” Howlett v. State, 994 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. Crim.

2015Howlett, 994 S.W.2d at 666 ; Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d at 516 .

2022This “valid, rational alternative” test is a court-made doctrine we adopted to bring our jurisprudence in line with the federal standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. 23 The test determines whether there is evidence at trial that casts reasonable doubt upon the greater offense, not whether the evidence is legally insufficient to 21 Id. 22 Grey v. State, 298 S.W.3d 644, 648-49 (Tex. Crim.

2022App. 2009) (noting that there is no statutory basis for the “guilty only” requirement for determining when a lesser-included offense should be submitted). 23 Arevalo v. State, 943 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. Crim.

2021See, e.g., Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex.Crim.App. 2017) (“Declaring a statute facially unconstitutional is not finding constitutional court error or announcing a new court-made rule of criminal procedure; it is holding that the Legislature passed a statute so blatantly unconstitutional it should have never been passed.”); Smith v. State, 463 S.W.3d 890, 895-96 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015) (criminal defendant was entitled to seek relief from a conviction for the first time on appeal where he was convicted under a statute later declared facially unconstitutional, as under such circumstance

2021See, e.g., Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex.Crim.App. 2017) (“Declaring a statute facially unconstitutional is not finding constitutional court error or announcing a new court-made rule of criminal procedure; it is holding that the Legislature passed a statute so blatantly unconstitutional it should have never been passed.”); Smith v. State, 463 S.W.3d 890, 895-96 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015) (criminal defendant was entitled to seek relief from a conviction for the first time on appeal where he was convicted under a statute later declared facially unconstitutional, as under such circumstance

2021Justice Thomas of the United States Supreme Court recently explained in a concurring opinion how the “typical formulation of the stare decisis standard does not comport with our judicial duty . . . because it elevates demonstrably erroneous decisions— meaning decisions outside the realm of permissible interpretation—over the text of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal law.” Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. ___ , 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).

2019Duncan v. State, 151 S.W.3d 564, 566 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). “[W]hen the facts 13 and legal issues are virtually identical, they should be controlled by an appellate court’s previous resolution.” State v. Swearingen, 478 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. Crim.

2017Reyes, 753 S.W.2d at 384 (holding that the determination that Article 32A.02 was void due to a violation of the separation of powers rendered the statute void from inception).

2017See Medina v. Herrera , 927 S.W.2d 597 , 600 (Tex. 1996) (concluding that the intentional-injury exception survived legislative changes to the Act).

2016Igo v. State, 210 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

2015In Janecka v. State, the court explained that, although the “retroactive application of an unforeseeable judicial construction of a statute, or a sudden, unanticipated change in a court-made rule, may violate due process,” “the gravamen of this due process guarantee is ‘fair warning’ to the defendant that his conduct was criminal at the time he engaged in it.” 937 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2015Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has stated, “The reasonable-time rule is a court-made standard, which has heretofore been applied only in a limited number of cases involving adult plaintiffs who, because of the nature of their claim, did not have a reasonable opportunity to discover their injuries and bring suit within a prescribed limitations period.” Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added); Ericson v. Roberts, 910 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, no writ) (“To have a valid argument that Section 10.01 was unconstitutional, the Ericsons would have had to alle

2015This Court often speaks of cognizability as a limit on pretrial appellate review, See, e.g., Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim.

2015Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has stated, “The reasonable-time rule is a court-made standard, which has heretofore been applied only in a limited number of cases involving adult plaintiffs who, because of the nature of their claim, did not have a reasonable opportunity to discover their injuries and bring suit within a prescribed limitations period.” Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added); Ericson v. Roberts, 910 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, no writ) (“To have a valid argument that Section 10.01 was unconstitutional, the Ericsons would have had to alle

2015“The framework in Almanza is not a court-made rule.” Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. Crim.

2013Because it often makes no difference to the ultimate application of the federal exclusionary rule (which is not a creature of statute, but a court-made doctrine) whether evidence that is acquired following some instance of police malfeasance is nevertheless admissible because it had an “independent source” from 2 Majority Opinion at 21-27. 3 State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270-71 (Tex. Crim.

2013App. 1996). 4 Majority Opinion at 19-20. 5 Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d at 270-71 .

2009See id. at 251-52 ; Lubbock County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (stating that supreme court may modify judicially created doctrines).