15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1942–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Mourygreen2 sentences2023See Moury, 992 A.2d at 178-79 (finding defendant waived his challenge to the jury’s instructions because he did not object when the court charged the jury and defense counsel responded in the negative when the court asked if the defense wished to add anything to the jury instructions). 2018In Moury, supra, where the appellant did not object when the court charged the jury, and responded in the negative when the court asked if the defense wished to add anything to the jury instructions, the Superior Court concluded the appellant waived his challenge to the jury charge. 992 A.2d at 179 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Venturagreen1 sentence2020Where a sentencing court is informed by a PSI, it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations (including any mitigating factors and the defendant’s background), and “where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co.green2 sentences2012These courts, including our Superior Court, allowed causes of action to proceed against successor corporations under an entirely new and different theory of corporate successor liability known as the "product-line exception." See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106, 109-11 (1981): see also Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 608 Pa. 327 , 11 A.3d 924 (2011). [16] The issues in this appeal concern only Appellant's allegations of breach of contract and breach of express warranty, not those concerning a fraudulent transfer of assets, which were rejected by the trial court. [17] R 2012These courts, including our Superior Court, allowed causes of action to proceed against successor corporations under an entirely new and different theory of corporate successor liability known as the "product-line exception." See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106, 109-11 (1981): see also Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 608 Pa. 327 , 11 A.3d 924 (2011). [16] The issues in this appeal concern only Appellant's allegations of breach of contract and breach of express warranty, not those concerning a fraudulent transfer of assets, which were rejected by the trial court. [17] R | 1 | 1 |
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2012These courts, including our Superior Court, allowed causes of action to proceed against successor corporations under an entirely new and different theory of corporate successor liability known as the "product-line exception." See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106, 109-11 (1981): see also Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 608 Pa. 327 , 11 A.3d 924 (2011). [16] The issues in this appeal concern only Appellant's allegations of breach of contract and breach of express warranty, not those concerning a fraudulent transfer of assets, which were rejected by the trial court. [17] R | 1 | 1 |
Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLCgreen1 sentence2012These courts, including our Superior Court, allowed causes of action to proceed against successor corporations under an entirely new and different theory of corporate successor liability known as the "product-line exception." See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106, 109-11 (1981): see also Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 608 Pa. 327 , 11 A.3d 924 (2011). [16] The issues in this appeal concern only Appellant's allegations of breach of contract and breach of express warranty, not those concerning a fraudulent transfer of assets, which were rejected by the trial court. [17] R | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. Boardman Co.green2 sentences2012These courts, including our Superior Court, allowed causes of action to proceed against successor corporations under an entirely new and different theory of corporate successor liability known as the "product-line exception." See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106, 109-11 (1981): see also Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 608 Pa. 327 , 11 A.3d 924 (2011). [16] The issues in this appeal concern only Appellant's allegations of breach of contract and breach of express warranty, not those concerning a fraudulent transfer of assets, which were rejected by the trial court. [17] R 2012These courts, including our Superior Court, allowed causes of action to proceed against successor corporations under an entirely new and different theory of corporate successor liability known as the "product-line exception." See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Super. 15 , 434 A.2d 106, 109-11 (1981): see also Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 608 Pa. 327 , 11 A.3d 924 (2011). [16] The issues in this appeal concern only Appellant's allegations of breach of contract and breach of express warranty, not those concerning a fraudulent transfer of assets, which were rejected by the trial court. [17] R | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. GOODMANgreen2 sentences1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal 1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence1942See, e.g., Murray v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 144 Pa. Superior Ct. 178, 182 (1941): “The insured may borrow from the company with interest at the rate of five percent per annum, payable armually irp advance ...” This is the amount asked by the rule for judgment, though on the basis of a calculation of total indebtedness, including simple, rather than compound, interest, the amount would be slightly higher. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Ross
green
1 sentence2021I may renew the motion later on in the day; but at this point, I certainly respect the Judge’s – Your Honor’s ruling.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1
green
1 sentence2018Defense counsel responded, “No. There is evidence to suggest that the way they viewed or their opportunity to make an identification would call into question their ability to make an identification.” Id. -7- J-S46012-18 Furthermore, we find no merit in Appellant’s contention that the fact that the two eyewitnesses did not immediately take the initiative to seek out police and offer information can be viewed as opportunities where the witnesses “failed” to make an identification. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Cruz
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez
green
1 sentence2015An expert need not use “magic words.” See Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 727 . 12 At the conclusion of Ms. Sendecki’s testimony, the court asked defense counsel “Anything else . . . ?” and he replied, “No, Your Honor.” N.T., 3/25/13, at 71. 13 See N.T., 3/25/13, at 67. 14 See N.T., 3/25/13, at 51. 15 See N.T., 3/25/13, at 50. - 17 - J. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Badger
green
2 sentences1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal 1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Pierce
green
2 sentences1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal 1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Harvey
green
2 sentences1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal 1999Although a judge sitting as fact finder is deemed more capable than a jury of rendering a fair decision if exposed to inadmissible information, Commonwealth v. Harvey, 514 Pa. 531 , 526 A.2d 330 (1987), there are still times when a judge should not hear a non-jury trial of an accused. ¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 362 , 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973), our Supreme Court stated that a trial court “should honor a request for recusation where prejudicial information is received in a pre-trial proceeding that would be otherwise inadmissible during the trial of the cause.” ¶ 4 In Commonweal | 1 | 1999–1999 |
In re Act 147 of 1990
green
2 sentences1997In In re Act 117 of 1990, 528 Pa. 460 , 598 A.2d 985 (1991), the court was asked to rule upon the constitutionality and validity of Act 147, which provided for the supervision, training, and certification of constables engaged in judicial duties. 1997In In re Act 117 of 1990, 528 Pa. 460 , 598 A.2d 985 (1991), the court was asked to rule upon the constitutionality and validity of Act 147, which provided for the supervision, training, and certification of constables engaged in judicial duties. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Commonwealth v. Crawford
green
2 sentences1981Appellant next contends that because the trial court asked his defense counsel questions concerning whether she had informed appellant, as instructed by the trial court, that the court expected him to rise upon the opening of court that counsel was cast in the role of adverse witness and, therefore, appellant was denied his right to counsel as required by Commonwealth v. Crawford, 466 Pa. 269 , 352 A.2d 52 (1976). 1981Appellant next contends that because the trial court asked his defense counsel questions concerning whether she had informed appellant, as instructed by the trial court, that the court expected him to rise upon the opening of court that counsel was cast in the role of adverse witness and, therefore, appellant was denied his right to counsel as required by Commonwealth v. Crawford, 466 Pa. 269 , 352 A.2d 52 (1976). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Thomasik v. Thomasik
neutral
2 sentences1971In Thomasik v. Thomasik, 413 Pa. 559 , 198 A.2d 511 (1964), the court was asked to rule that section 3-113 of the Uniform Commercial Code permits the defense of want of consideration on a sealed instrument. 1971In Thomasik v. Thomasik, 413 Pa. 559 , 198 A.2d 511 (1964), the court was asked to rule that section 3-113 of the Uniform Commercial Code permits the defense of want of consideration on a sealed instrument. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority
green
2 sentences1970In White Oak Borough Authority Appeal, 872 Pa. 424 , 93 A. 2d 437 (1953), the court stated: “Neither authorities nor municipalities are sovereign; they have no original or inherent or fundamental powers of sovereignty or of legislation; they have only the power and authority granted them by enabling legislation.” In Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151 , 166 A. 2d 278 , (1960) the court was asked to rule on whether an authority board could enter into a binding employment agreement to extend beyond the term of the Board. 1970In White Oak Borough Authority Appeal, 872 Pa. 424 , 93 A. 2d 437 (1953), the court stated: “Neither authorities nor municipalities are sovereign; they have no original or inherent or fundamental powers of sovereignty or of legislation; they have only the power and authority granted them by enabling legislation.” In Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151 , 166 A. 2d 278 , (1960) the court was asked to rule on whether an authority board could enter into a binding employment agreement to extend beyond the term of the Board. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
White Oak Borough Authority Appeal
green
1 sentence1970In White Oak Borough Authority Appeal, 872 Pa. 424 , 93 A. 2d 437 (1953), the court stated: “Neither authorities nor municipalities are sovereign; they have no original or inherent or fundamental powers of sovereignty or of legislation; they have only the power and authority granted them by enabling legislation.” In Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151 , 166 A. 2d 278 , (1960) the court was asked to rule on whether an authority board could enter into a binding employment agreement to extend beyond the term of the Board. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Barraclough v. Barraclough
green
1 sentence1965In order to oust the jurisdiction of a court, the residence of a plaintiff in a divorce action may not be tested by way of preliminary objection: Masefield v. Masefield, 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 6 ; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 608 ; Richardson v. Richardson, 2 Centre 99. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Masefield v. Masefield
green
1 sentence1965In order to oust the jurisdiction of a court, the residence of a plaintiff in a divorce action may not be tested by way of preliminary objection: Masefield v. Masefield, 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 6 ; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 608 ; Richardson v. Richardson, 2 Centre 99. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.