asked defense in California

2020Analysis Batson/Wheeler motions require a three-step analysis. “‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. 7 [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purp

2016However, “a trial court’s request that the prosecutor provide reasons for his or her exercise of a peremptory challenge is not an implicit finding the defendant has established a prima facie case . . . .” (Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 612 .) It is “the better practice” for courts to request that the prosecution make a record of its race-neutral reasons for excusing prospective jurors even when finding no prima facie showing has been made.

2026The trial court asked defense counsel, “this morning when we were discussing your ability to continue representation and the possible conflict, are you satisfied now that if you’re kept in the case, you can continue to represent your client effectively?” Defense counsel said, “Yes.” Defendant then made a motion pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 .

2026The trial court asked defense counsel, “this morning when we were discussing your ability to continue representation and the possible conflict, are you satisfied now that if you’re kept in the case, you can continue to represent your client effectively?” Defense counsel said, “Yes.” Defendant then made a motion pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 .

2024(See Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 705―709.) Fuesz presents no legal authority that the court must resentence a defendant against the defendant’s will.

2023Alternatively, if the trial court determined Wright was entitled to a lower sentence, the People argued the 2019 agreement should be invalidated, his murder conviction should be reinstated, and the resentencing process should begin anew. 4 At the hearing on the resentencing petition, the trial court asked defense counsel whether Wright sought to disrupt his 2019 negotiated plea with the result being a return to the status quo ante under the authority of People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps).

2013After the recess, the court stated that it was going to respond to the jury‟s questions by permitting additional argument, based on People v. Young (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165 (Young), and California Rules of Court, rule 2.1036.13 The court asked defense counsel if he agreed.

2013After the recess, the court stated that it was going to respond to the jury’s questions by permitting additional argument, based on People v. Young (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1165 (Young), and California Rules of Court, rule 2.1036.13 The court asked defense counsel if he agreed.

2026The court was asking counsel to explain why the People had not carried their burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice. “[W]e apply the general rule ‘that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 .) Moreover, the trial court’s 12 purportedly misplaced burden of proof has not affected our de novo decision that the prosecutor carried his burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice.

2026He emphasizes Supreme Court language about parties having an adequate opportunity to object if, after “describ[ing] the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence,” the trial court then “considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 , italics added.) Huerta asserts the court here “conducted the sentencing hearing without letting counsel interrupt while judgment was pronounced.” He provides no record support for this claim, and we find none in our own review of the sentencing hearing.

2026“When the trial court responds to a question from a deliberating jury with a generally correct and pertinent statement of the law, a party who believes the court’s response should be modified or clarified must make a contemporaneous request to that effect; failure to object to the trial court’s wording or to request clarification results in forfeiture of the claim on appeal.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 802 .) Not only are CALCRIM Nos 1002 and 200 generally correct statements of law, but the court asked defense counsel for his input, defense counsel replied by asking for the court’

2024(People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 .) During an initial discussion about jury instructions after the People rested their case, the court asked defense counsel if she planned to request the eyewitness instruction, and she said yes.

2023First, the trial court asked a defense witness named Dr. Podboy if the court could call him “John Boy for short.” (Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 753 .) Second, when a clinical psychiatrist for the defense testified about a person’s capacity to carry out an act of violence, the trial court jokingly granted the witness “permission” to shoot a public defender.

2022DISCUSSION As recently explained by our Supreme Court in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), the prima facie inquiry under section 1170.95 is analogous to the inquiry undertaken in habeas corpus proceedings: A “‘“court takes [a] petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.

2021At the hearing, the trial court announced to the parties: “That brings us to the Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.” The court asked defense counsel, “did you want to object to or make any comment regarding [the expert’s testimony]?” Counsel answered: “We would object and submit.” The court responded, “[s]o this is pretty common now,” and citing People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744 , which explained that Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome “testimony has been held admissible for the limited purpose of disabusing a jury of misconceptions it might hold about how a child react

2021(See, e.g., Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 517–518.) In addition, when the trial court asked defense counsel at the November 22 hearing on the motion for new trial whether Juror No. 11 had verified the statements attributed to him by the defense investigator, defense counsel acknowledged, “I did not ask for an affidavit from the -- from the juror itself [sic].” While defense counsel suggested that his decision not to seek an affidavit from Juror No. 11 was based on the prosecutor’s expression 9 As recounted in part III.A.1.e, ante, the verbatim colloquy is as follows: “[The prosecuto

2021Kim did not respond; instead, defense counsel responded, “Thank you, Your Honor.” Kim then entered a plea of no contest under People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 , to one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted 4 the great bodily injury special allegation (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)4 The court asked defense counsel if he joined in Kim’s waivers and plea and if he was satisfied Kim understood what he just did given his “yellow shirt.”5 Defense counsel responded affirmatively.

2021After the prosecutor 7 As discussed, the court also admitted a photograph of the sale document on Ortiz’s windshield, but Ortiz never challenged the lawfulness of the stop. 8 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 . 17 objected, the trial court asked defense counsel for an offer of proof, and defense counsel stated, “[Tinajero] was driving in Huntington Park[.] He said two deputies stopped him[.] He was unable to recall the reason for the stop.

2021(See People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 100 , internal quotations omitted [recognizing that an out-of-court statement “is not hearsay” if offered “to prove that the statement imparted certain information to the hearer and that the hearer, believing such information to be true, acted in conformity with that belief”].) After indicating that the evidence could be admissible as nonhearsay to “explain[] [appellant’s] 3 actions,” the court asked defense counsel to explain the relevance of Catherine’s purported statement that Adam did not have the money to mail the package.

2021Defense counsel requested “the two years plus the prison prior.” The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of two years in prison for count 1, plus a consecutive one-year term for the prior prison term enhancement, for an aggregate term of three years. 4 Dueñas was decided on January 8, 2019. ( Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 .) At the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing, no other published case had addressed the issues discussed in Dueñas, and a petition for review had been filed but was not denied until March 27, 2019. 7.

2021Defense counsel requested “the two years plus the prison prior.” The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of two years in prison for count 1, plus a consecutive one-year term for the prior prison term enhancement, for an aggregate term of three years. 4 Dueñas was decided on January 8, 2019. ( Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 .) At the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing, no other published case had addressed the issues discussed in Dueñas, and a petition for review had been filed but was not denied until March 27, 2019. 7.

2020Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or abandoned his or her opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions.” (§ 667.6(d).) At sentencing, the trial court explained its imposition of consecutive sentences as follows: “During that chambers conference, I indicated that I believed that I really don’t have any discretion with respect to sentencing. [¶] . . . [T]he sentence in this matter is 75 years to life when you add all five charges together, because eac

2020The court asked defense counsel if 3 We note that concurrent sentences are permitted under section 667, subdivision (c)(6) of the three strikes law, in the trial court’s discretion, “where a sentencing court determines that two or more current felony convictions were either ‘committed on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from the same set of operative facts.’ ” (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 233 .) Here, although the trial court did not state any findings about why it sentenced Atwell concurrently on counts 1 and 3, the complaint alleged the same commission date for both offenses, and

2020After indicating that it read the papers submitted by the parties, the case of People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545 (Anzalone), and the relevant Penal Code sections (sections 1149 and 1164), the trial court asked defense counsel to address the harm suffered by Aguirre.

2016Citing People v. Asbury (1978) 173 Cal.App.3d 362, 365 , Thomas observes that, in cases where counsel objects to evidence on one ground (unsuccessfully) but not another meritorious ground, the possibility the failure to object was a tactical decision is rebutted.