asked defense in Louisiana

1993In State v. Mayer, 589 So.2d 1145, 1151 (La.App. 5th Cir.1991), writ denied, 609 So.2d 251 (La.1992), a panel of this court stated: “A direct or indirect reference to another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by defendant, as to which evidence would not be admissible, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney or court official, during trial or in argument, would require a mistrial on motion of defendant.

1993In State v. Mayer, 589 So.2d 1145, 1151 (La.App. 5th Cir.1991), writ denied, 609 So.2d 251 (La.1992), a panel of this court stated: "A direct or indirect reference to another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by defendant, as to which evidence would not be admissible, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney or court official, during trial or in argument, would require a mistrial on motion of defendant.

2013In State v. Robichaux, 00-1234, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/14/01), 788 So.2d 458, 465 , this Court held that “by virtue of the defense counsel’s statement, defendant announced his readiness for sentencing, which implicitly waived the waiting period.” Also, in State v. Cavazos, 11-0733, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/16/12), 94 So.3d 870, 878 , this Court held that the defendant implicitly waived his right to the delay under La.C.Cr.P. art. 873 when the trial court asked defense counsel if had anything to say before sentencing, and defense counsel responded that there was nothing to put on the 17record.

2013In State v. Robichaux, 00-1234, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/14/01), 788 So.2d 458, 465 , this Court held that “by virtue of the defense counsel’s statement, defendant announced his readiness for sentencing, which implicitly waived the waiting period.” Also, in State v. Cavazos, 11-0733, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/16/12), 94 So.3d 870, 878 , this Court held that the defendant implicitly waived his right to the delay under La.C.Cr.P. art. 873 when the trial court asked defense counsel if had anything to say before sentencing, and defense counsel responded that there was nothing to put on the 17record.

2008Unlike Pierre, 792 So.2d 899 , and Hayden, 767 So.2d 732 , cases where the court asked if the defense was ready for sentencing and then imposed a mandatory sentence, here no sentence was mandatory, and the *1084 trial court asked if the defendant wanted to say anything before sentencing.

2008Unlike Pierre, 792 So.2d 899 , and Hayden, 767 So.2d 732 , cases where the court asked if the defense was ready for sentencing and then imposed a mandatory sentence, here no sentence was mandatory, and the *1084 trial court asked if the defendant wanted to say anything before sentencing.

2004In State v. Stevison, 97-3122, p. 1 (La.10/30/98), 721 So.2d 843, 844 , the supreme court affirmed the validity of a predicate offense, finding that “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 1994 guilty plea demonstrate[d] a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel.” In Stevison , the defendant was not represented by counsel, and when he expressed hesitation, the trial court asked a defense attorney present in the court room to advise him.

1985Defense counsel, in post-argument brief, at page 2, cites Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. ___ , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985), for the proposition that defendant should be granted a new trial because "it is fundamentally unfair to hold an indigent defendant to the burden of proving insanity while at the same time, denying him expert assistance in developing and presenting his defense." However, there is no fundamental unfairness in this case.

1985Defense counsel, in post-argument brief, at page 2, cites Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. ___ , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985), for the proposition that defendant should be granted a new trial because "it is fundamentally unfair to hold an indigent defendant to the burden of proving insanity while at the same time, denying him expert assistance in developing and presenting his defense." However, there is no fundamental unfairness in this case.

1983We find this case falls under the rule of Lawson, supra, and not under State v. Simpson, 371 So.2d 733 (La. 1979), where the court distinguished Lawson on the facts present there and found no consent from the defendant's silence.

1983In State v. Williams, 420 So.2d 1116 (La. 1982), we discounted an assignment of error which complained that the trial judge had refused to allow the defense to use a hypothet with facts unrelated to the case at issue in closing argument.

1983We find this case falls under the rule of Lawson, supra, and not under State v. Simpson, 371 So.2d 733 (La. 1979), where the court distinguished Lawson on the facts present there and found no consent from the defendant's silence.