Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ralph Monroe v. State of Floridared2 sentences2018In response, defense counsel represented that the Defendant was not seeking a judgment of acquittal. 8 Similarly, in Monroe v. State, 191 So. 3d 395, 398 (Fla. 2016), “[a]fter the State rested, the trial court asked defense counsel if they intended to move for judgment of acquittal. 2018Similarly, in Monroe v. State, 191 So. 3d 395, 398 (Fla. 2016), “[a]fter the State rested, the trial court asked defense counsel if they intended to move for judgment of acquittal. | 2 | 2 |
Killingsworth v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Sinkfield, supra.4 3 In addition, in proving that the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony, “the [S]tate must prove the historical fact of a prior felony conviction and the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator.” Killingsworth v. State, 584 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (emphasis in original). 4 In Sinkfield, the trial court asked defense counsel if he had any objection to the introduction of a certified copy of a judgment against a “Paul Sinkfield” as evidence of prior felony conviction of the defendant, a substantive element of possession of a firearm by a convict | 1 | 1 |
Pierre v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Cf. Pierre v. State, 990 So.2d 565, 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination of living victim’s “history as a drug dealer” despite defendant’s argument that the limitation left him “unable to develop a key defense—that a third party committed the crimes” because the defendant’s theory “was entirely speculative and was not supported by any record evidence”); see also Persaud v. State, 755 So.2d 150, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“Trials are fluid proceedings where evidentiary rulings are subject to change depending upon the state of the evidence presented | 1 | 1 |
Persaud v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Cf. Pierre v. State, 990 So.2d 565, 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination of living victim’s “history as a drug dealer” despite defendant’s argument that the limitation left him “unable to develop a key defense—that a third party committed the crimes” because the defendant’s theory “was entirely speculative and was not supported by any record evidence”); see also Persaud v. State, 755 So.2d 150, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“Trials are fluid proceedings where evidentiary rulings are subject to change depending upon the state of the evidence presented | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Merricks
green
1 sentence2025Counsel responded that "having discussed it with my client and co-counsel, simply the answer is no" and that he did not want to draw any "further attention to the issue." The trial proceeded apace. 1 We originally issued a per curiam affirmance in this appeal but granted Jasper's motion for a written opinion addressing this particular argument. 2 The trial lasted seven days, including voir dire and closing arguments. 2 Relying on State v. Merricks, 831 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2002), Jasper argued in his rule 3.850 motion that defense counsel had been ineffective by failing to inquire more thoroughly | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sinkfield v. State
green
1 sentence2025Sinkfield, supra.4 3 In addition, in proving that the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony, “the [S]tate must prove the historical fact of a prior felony conviction and the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator.” Killingsworth v. State, 584 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (emphasis in original). 4 In Sinkfield, the trial court asked defense counsel if he had any objection to the introduction of a certified copy of a judgment against a “Paul Sinkfield” as evidence of prior felony conviction of the defendant, a substantive element of possession of a firearm by a convict | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Burns v. State
green
1 sentence2018I think he understands fully what’s going on today.” Cf. Burns, 884 So. 2d at 1014 n.1 (“Even if we were to pass on the merits of this case, we would be hard pressed to find an abuse of discretion where defense counsel advised the court that the defendant’s competency was not an issue and assured the court that the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings had actually improved since the earlier court proceedings when he was found competent to proceed.”). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Nelson v. State
green
1 sentence2017Nelson Glover next argues that his pretrial complaints regarding his failure to timely receive certain discovery and communication difficulties with his defense counsel should have triggered an inquiry to assess, his, defense counsel’s effectiveness pursuant to Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lopez v. State
green
1 sentence2012Defense counsel replied, “As finally drafted, we have no objection to the charge.” Id. at 941 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Nagle v. Hooks
green
2 sentences2001In Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123 , 460 A.2d 49 (1983), the court was asked to rule on who had the authority to waive the statutory psychiatrist/patient privilege of the child in a child custody proceeding. 2001In Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123 , 460 A.2d 49 (1983), the court was asked to rule on who had the authority to waive the statutory psychiatrist/patient privilege of the child in a child custody proceeding. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence1992Defense counsel responded, "I agree she could be so classified." [2] See Taylor v. State, 576 So.2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.