asked defense in Colorado

2024But the court declined to appoint new counsel because it determined that Bloom’s allegations were either refuted by the record or conclusory, and, therefore, he had failed to prove his counsel had been ineffective or that his pleas had not been entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. ¶9 After denying Bloom’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas, the court asked defense counsel whether they believed any conflict existed requiring a hearing under People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686 (Colo. 2010), before moving forward to sentencing.

2024But the co urt declined to appoint new counsel because it determined that Bloom’s allegations were either refuted by the record or conclusory, and, therefore, he had failed to prove his counsel had been inef fective or that his pleas had not been entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. ¶ 9 After denying Bloom’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas, the court asked defense counsel whether they believed any conflict existed requiring a hearing under People v. Bergerud , 223 P.3d 686 (Colo. 2010), before moving forward to sentencing.

2026Standard of Review ¶ 39 We review a court’s Batson analysis “de novo . . . at step one (regarding whether the objecting party made a prima facie showing that the challenged peremptory strike was race-based) and at step two (regarding whether the striking party gave a race-neutral reason for the strike).” People v. Romero, 2024 CO 62, ¶ 45 , 555 P.3d 582 , 16 595.

2026Standard of Review ¶ 39 We review a court’s Batson analysis “de novo . . . at step one (regarding whether the objecting party made a prima facie showing that the challenged peremptory strike was race-based) and at step two (regarding whether the striking party gave a race-neutral reason for the strike).” People v. Romero, 2024 CO 62, ¶ 45 , 555 P.3d 582 , 16 595.

2025Defense counsel said, “[W]e object — we think the — this trial needs to go to a jury under the United States and Colorado Constitutions.” The prosecution responded that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), defendant was not entitled to a jury on the habitual criminal counts.

2025The court postponed sentencing several times because Valles couldn’t attend the hearing in person. ¶5 During a December 2023 scheduling hearing, the court asked defense counsel if Valles could appear for sentencing from his medical facility via Webex.1 Defense counsel said “[h]e could” and that “we can figure out a way to make it happen.” Defense counsel also relayed that Valles had recently regained his mental acuity and 1 Webex is a “video conferencing platform that allows spectators to see and hear what is happening in a physical courtroom virtually via a computer or phone.” Rios v. People,

2025The platform can also be configured “with two-way video and audio to allow virtual courtroom participation.” Id. 2 cognition, enabling him to execute waivers to release his medical records to defense counsel. ¶6 Five days later, Valles and defense counsel appeared for sentencing via Webex from Valles’s medical facility.

2022And, at the second restitution hearing, which was a continuation of the first, defense counsel reported that defendant did not want to attend it. ¶ 74 A waiver is “knowing” when the “person waiving the particular right . . . ‘know[s]’ of the existence of the right and any other 29 information legally relevant to the making of an informed decision either to exercise or relinquish that right.” Id. at ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 , 121 n.4 (1986)).

2022And, at the second restitution hearing, which was a continuation of the first, defense counsel reported that defendant did not want to attend it. ¶ 74 A waiver is “knowing” when the “person waiving the particular right . . . ‘know[s]’ of the existence of the right and any other 29 information legally relevant to the making of an informed decision either to exercise or relinquish that right.” Id. at ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 , 121 n.4 (1986)).

2021Therefore, we conclude that Johnson waived her argument regarding the constitutionality of section 18-12-111(1) by intentionally relinquishing a known right and, specifically, by urging the court not to provide the jurors with a definition of “transfer.” ¶ 55 Even if Johnson did not waive this argument, we conclude the court did not plainly err by not giving the jury a definition of “transfer.” See Hagos, ¶ 14, 288 P.3d at 120 ; People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 54 , 361 P.3d 1005, 1020 (“Under the plain error standard, the defendant bears the burden to establish that an error occurred, and tha

2004We note that the court asked defense counsel directly, "[AJny objection to the form, content or order of the instructions or jury forms applicable to the three charges remaining at this time?" Defense counsel responded, "No, Judge." Defendant relies on James v. People, 727 P.2d 850 (Colo.1986), to support her contention.