asked defense in Georgia

2013See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) ( 727 SE2d 109 ) (2012).

2013See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) ( 727 SE2d 109 ) (2012).

2021Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Sanders impliedly consented to the mistrial.16 motion.”). 15 See Dotson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 7, 10 (1) ( 443 SE2d 650 ) (1994) (no implied consent where “[t]he trial court gave [the defendant] no opportunity before declaring a mistrial either to object thereto or to present an argument as to [appropriate alternatives]”) (punctuation and emphasis omitted). 16 See Dotson, 213 Ga. App. at 10 (1); see also Smith, 263 Ga. at 783 & n. 2 (1) (no implied consent to a mistrial existed where the trial court asked defense counsel 10 2.

2021Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Sanders impliedly consented to the mistrial.16 motion.”). 15 See Dotson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 7, 10 (1) ( 443 SE2d 650 ) (1994) (no implied consent where “[t]he trial court gave [the defendant] no opportunity before declaring a mistrial either to object thereto or to present an argument as to [appropriate alternatives]”) (punctuation and emphasis omitted). 16 See Dotson, 213 Ga. App. at 10 (1); see also Smith, 263 Ga. at 783 & n. 2 (1) (no implied consent to a mistrial existed where the trial court asked defense counsel 10 2.

2020See Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. 774, 779 (3) (b) ( 809 SE2d 769 ) (2018). 5 The record shows that the trial court asked defense counsel: “So, for the record, you only wanted to raise an argument . . . on Juror number[s] 18, 31 and 42?” Counsel responded: “That’s correct, your honor.” With respect to these jurors, the State gave the following explanations for exercising its peremptory strikes: The burden is now going to shift to the defense concerning whether or not those were, in fact, race-neutral reasons.

2020See Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. 774, 779 (3) (b) ( 809 SE2d 769 ) (2018). 5 The record shows that the trial court asked defense counsel: “So, for the record, you only wanted to raise an argument . . . on Juror number[s] 18, 31 and 42?” Counsel responded: “That’s correct, your honor.” With respect to these jurors, the State gave the following explanations for exercising its peremptory strikes: The burden is now going to shift to the defense concerning whether or not those were, in fact, race-neutral reasons.

2020During the charge conference, the trial court asked defense counsel whether she objected to a jury charge instructing that: evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the alleged victim has been admitted for the sole purpose of illustrating, if it does, the state of feelings between the defendant and the alleged victim, the nature of their relationship, the pattern of behavior of the defendant, his bent of mind at the time of the commission of the acts for which he is being – for which he is now on trial. 17 Jackson v. State, 330 Ga. App. 108, 117 (4) (e) ( 766 SE2d 558 ) (2014),

2020During the charge conference, the trial court asked defense counsel whether she objected to a jury charge instructing that: evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the alleged victim has been admitted for the sole purpose of illustrating, if it does, the state of feelings between the defendant and the alleged victim, the nature of their relationship, the pattern of behavior of the defendant, his bent of mind at the time of the commission of the acts for which he is being – for which he is now on trial. 17 Jackson v. State, 330 Ga. App. 108, 117 (4) (e) ( 766 SE2d 558 ) (2014),

2020During the charge conference, the trial court asked defense counsel whether she objected to a jury charge instructing that: evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the alleged victim has been admitted for the sole purpose of illustrating, if it does, the state of feelings between the defendant and the alleged victim, the nature of their relationship, the pattern of behavior of the defendant, his bent of mind at the time of the commission of the acts for which he is being – for which he is now on trial. 17 Jackson v. State, 330 Ga. App. 108, 117 (4) (e) ( 766 SE2d 558 ) (2014),

2020During the charge conference, the trial court asked defense counsel whether she objected to a jury charge instructing that: evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the alleged victim has been admitted for the sole purpose of illustrating, if it does, the state of feelings between the defendant and the alleged victim, the nature of their relationship, the pattern of behavior of the defendant, his bent of mind at the time of the commission of the acts for which he is being – for which he is now on trial. 17 Jackson v. State, 330 Ga. App. 108, 117 (4) (e) ( 766 SE2d 558 ) (2014),

2011The trial court did not give the instructions, and when the court asked if the defense had any exception to the jury instructions, counsel replied "[n]ot as read." OCGA § 17-8-58(a) [4] states that "[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate. . . ." Thus, under this Code section, unless a party "`specifically object[s] . . . at the conclusion of the jury charge, he has waived his right to urge error on appeal.' [Cit.]"

2011The trial court did not give the instructions, and when the court asked if the defense had any exception to the jury instructions, counsel replied "[n]ot as read." OCGA § 17-8-58(a) [4] states that "[a]ny party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate. . . ." Thus, under this Code section, unless a party "`specifically object[s] . . . at the conclusion of the jury charge, he has waived his right to urge error on appeal.' [Cit.]"

2002We have stated that “[a] trial court’s use of a mechanical sentencing formula or policy as to any portion of a sentence amounts to a refusal to exercise its discretion and therefore is an abdication of judicial responsibility.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 208 Ga. App. 472, 473 ( 431 SE2d 136 ) (1993).

2002We have stated that “[a] trial court’s use of a mechanical sentencing formula or policy as to any portion of a sentence amounts to a refusal to exercise its discretion and therefore is an abdication of judicial responsibility.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 208 Ga. App. 472, 473 ( 431 SE2d 136 ) (1993).

1998However, after charging the jury the court asked whether the defense had any objections to the charge and defense counsel replied, “None, Your Honor.” “Clearly, it is the law of this state, even in criminal cases, that if the trial court asks if there are any objections to the charge given, counsel for the defendant must either state his objections or reserve the right to make such objections on motion for new trial or on appeal or waive any such objections.” Allen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 600, 603 ( 340 SE2d 246 ) (1986).

1998However, after charging the jury the court asked whether the defense had any objections to the charge and defense counsel replied, “None, Your Honor.” “Clearly, it is the law of this state, even in criminal cases, that if the trial court asks if there are any objections to the charge given, counsel for the defendant must either state his objections or reserve the right to make such objections on motion for new trial or on appeal or waive any such objections.” Allen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 600, 603 ( 340 SE2d 246 ) (1986).

1996We would have gone further; we may have, if we’d got it, had a scientific report of our own done.” “Under Georgia law, upon filing of a timely motion a defendant is entitled ‘to have an expert of his choosing, bound by appropriate safeguards imposed by the Court, examine a piece of critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion.’ Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 17 ( 282 SE2d 61 ) (1981).

1996We would have gone further; we may have, if we’d got it, had a scientific report of our own done.” “Under Georgia law, upon filing of a timely motion a defendant is entitled ‘to have an expert of his choosing, bound by appropriate safeguards imposed by the Court, examine a piece of critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion.’ Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 17 ( 282 SE2d 61 ) (1981).

1993“There is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant when an irregularity in the conduct of a juror is shown and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm has occurred.” Lamons v. State, 255 Ga. 511, 512 ( 340 SE2d 183 ) (1986); Martin v. State, 242 Ga. 699, 701 ( 251 SE2d 240 ) (1978).

1993“There is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant when an irregularity in the conduct of a juror is shown and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm has occurred.” Lamons v. State, 255 Ga. 511, 512 ( 340 SE2d 183 ) (1986); Martin v. State, 242 Ga. 699, 701 ( 251 SE2d 240 ) (1978).

1993“There is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant when an irregularity in the conduct of a juror is shown and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm has occurred.” Lamons v. State, 255 Ga. 511, 512 ( 340 SE2d 183 ) (1986); Martin v. State, 242 Ga. 699, 701 ( 251 SE2d 240 ) (1978).

1993“There is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant when an irregularity in the conduct of a juror is shown and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm has occurred.” Lamons v. State, 255 Ga. 511, 512 ( 340 SE2d 183 ) (1986); Martin v. State, 242 Ga. 699, 701 ( 251 SE2d 240 ) (1978).

1987Accord Zant v. Akins, 250 Ga. 5 (2) ( 295 SE2d 313 ) (1982).

1987Accord Zant v. Akins, 250 Ga. 5 (2) ( 295 SE2d 313 ) (1982).

1980A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by him ... or by proof of contradictory statements previously made by him... as to the matters relating to his... testimony [in] the case.” Following the charge, the trial court asked the defense if there were any exceptions to the charge, to which the defense counsel responded, "no.” The error, if it was error in these circumstances to fail to instruct on impeachment by proof of felony conviction, was induced by the appellants, Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 523, 524-525 ( 228 SE2d 898 ).

1980A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by him ... or by proof of contradictory statements previously made by him... as to the matters relating to his... testimony [in] the case.” Following the charge, the trial court asked the defense if there were any exceptions to the charge, to which the defense counsel responded, "no.” The error, if it was error in these circumstances to fail to instruct on impeachment by proof of felony conviction, was induced by the appellants, Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 523, 524-525 ( 228 SE2d 898 ).