15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1928–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Helme v. Philadelphia Life Insurancegreen2 sentences1979In Helme v. Philadephia Life Insurance, 61 Pa. 107, 110 (1869), a case more hoary even than Smith, but cited with approval in Cleveland v. Salwen, 292 Pa. 427 , 141 Atl. 155 (1928), the court said: “If it was the practice of the company to notify the plaintiff of the times her premiums were due and payable, and omitted on the occasion of the default; or if they so dealt with her as to induce a belief that the clause of forfeiture would not be insisted on in her case, in case of a dereliction of payment at the day, . . . and thus put her off her guard, they ought not to be permitted to take adv 1928Co., 61 Pa. 107, 110 , where defendants declared an insurance policy forfeited for alleged nonpayment of premiums on specified dates, it was said: “If it was the practice of the company to notify the plaintiff of the times her premiums were due and payable, and omitted on the occasion of the default; or if they so dealt with her as to induce a belief that the clause of forfeiture would not be insisted on in her case, in case of dereliction of payment at the day,......and thus put her off her guard, they ought not to be permitted to take advantage *433 of a default which, they may themselves ha | 1 | 2 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences1975Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 1972Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, noted that in a number of areas the Supreme Court “has steadfastly rejected any notion that constitutional violations might be disregarded on the ground that they were ‘harmless’.” Chapman v. California, supra at 42. | 1 | 2 |
Mark v. Mosergreen2 sentences2002Some — Arizona, Nevada, and Wisconsin are examples — address the issue under common-law principles of ordinary negligence: Did the participant act reasonably in the light of foreseeable and unreasonable risks. 8 “The primary argument for adhering to the negligence standard is the belief that this standard is flexible enough to be applied to a wide range of situations because it only requires that a person exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.” Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 2002Others, a clear majority, have adopted a standard of “reckless or intentional conduct” or “willful and wanton or intentional misconduct.” Id. at 416 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bollingergreen2 sentences1995It is well established that a bona fide, reasonable mistake of fact may, under certain circumstances, negate the element of criminal intent. 18 Pa.C.S. § 304 (providing, inter alia, that ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if “the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense”); Commonwealth v. Compel, 236 Pa.Super. 404 , 344 A.2d 701 (1975); 2 Commonwealth v. Bollinger, 197 Pa.Super. 492, 496 , 179 A.2d 253, 255 (1962). 1995It is well established that a bona fide, reasonable mistake of fact may, under certain circumstances, negate the element of criminal intent. 18 Pa.C.S. § 304 (providing, inter alia, that ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if “the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense”); Commonwealth v. Compel, 236 Pa.Super. 404 , 344 A.2d 701 (1975); 2 Commonwealth v. Bollinger, 197 Pa.Super. 492, 496 , 179 A.2d 253, 255 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Chaneygreen2 sentences1976See Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407 , 350 A.2d 829 (1975); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 465 Pa. 208 , 348 A.2d 429 (1975); Commonwealth v. Webs ter, — Pa. —, — A. 2d — (1975); Commo nwealth I continue of the belief that the rule which has evolved is unnecessary, unwarranted and unwise, and should be changed. 1976See Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407 , 350 A.2d 829 (1975); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 465 Pa. 208 , 348 A.2d 429 (1975); Commonwealth v. Webs ter, — Pa. —, — A. 2d — (1975); Commo nwealth I continue of the belief that the rule which has evolved is unnecessary, unwarranted and unwise, and should be changed. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Davisgreen2 sentences1975As we stated in Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 177 , 305 A.2d 715, 719 (1973), “[o]ur analysis of the gravity and impact of the error is guided by two general precepts.” We must first be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt before it will be held harmless and a judgment of sentence affirmed. 1975As we stated in Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 177 , 305 A.2d 715, 719 (1973), “[o]ur analysis of the gravity and impact of the error is guided by two general precepts.” We must first be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt before it will be held harmless and a judgment of sentence affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Benton v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1991Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 5 Appellee instead relies solely upon Rule 1120(d), 6 ostensibly in the belief that the rule provides greater pro tection than does the federal constitution. 7 Thus, we focus our inquiry in this appeal upon whether Rule 1120(d) is properly viewed as prohibiting reprosecution on the charges remaining against appellant. 1991Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 5 Appellee instead relies solely upon Rule 1120(d), 6 ostensibly in the belief that the rule provides greater pro tection than does the federal constitution. 7 Thus, we focus our inquiry in this appeal upon whether Rule 1120(d) is properly viewed as prohibiting reprosecution on the charges remaining against appellant. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Coco v. Vandergrift
green
1 sentence2015Citing the lead opinion and Chief Justice Nix’s concurring opinion in John M., this Court wrote: [The Supreme Court] expressed a belief that the presumption should be irrebuttable in all cases in which the mother, child - 10 - J-E02010-15 J-E02011-15 and husband lived together as a family with the husband assuming parental responsibility, including those in which an outside party claims non-access or impotency of the husband.” Id. at 301 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. D'AMBRO
green
1 sentence2014Kellv- Springfield Tire Co, v. D' Ambro, 596 A.2d 867 (Pa. Super. 1991). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Johnson v. United States
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 535-36 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Commonwealth v. Compel
green
2 sentences1995It is well established that a bona fide, reasonable mistake of fact may, under certain circumstances, negate the element of criminal intent. 18 Pa.C.S. § 304 (providing, inter alia, that ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if “the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense”); Commonwealth v. Compel, 236 Pa.Super. 404 , 344 A.2d 701 (1975); 2 Commonwealth v. Bollinger, 197 Pa.Super. 492, 496 , 179 A.2d 253, 255 (1962). 1995It is well established that a bona fide, reasonable mistake of fact may, under certain circumstances, negate the element of criminal intent. 18 Pa.C.S. § 304 (providing, inter alia, that ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if “the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense”); Commonwealth v. Compel, 236 Pa.Super. 404 , 344 A.2d 701 (1975); 2 Commonwealth v. Bollinger, 197 Pa.Super. 492, 496 , 179 A.2d 253, 255 (1962). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Howell v. Clyde
green
2 sentences1994Most recently, in the case of Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151 , 620 A.2d 1107 (1993), two members of our Supreme Court, the two dissenters, indicated a belief that the doctrine of assumption of the risk no longer has any place in our law and stated they would eliminate it as an affirmative defense altogether. 1994Most recently, in the case of Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151 , 620 A.2d 1107 (1993), two members of our Supreme Court, the two dissenters, indicated a belief that the doctrine of assumption of the risk no longer has any place in our law and stated they would eliminate it as an affirmative defense altogether. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Schifalacqua v. Cna Insurance
green
1 sentence1979In Helme v. Philadephia Life Insurance, 61 Pa. 107, 110 (1869), a case more hoary even than Smith, but cited with approval in Cleveland v. Salwen, 292 Pa. 427 , 141 Atl. 155 (1928), the court said: “If it was the practice of the company to notify the plaintiff of the times her premiums were due and payable, and omitted on the occasion of the default; or if they so dealt with her as to induce a belief that the clause of forfeiture would not be insisted on in her case, in case of a dereliction of payment at the day, . . . and thus put her off her guard, they ought not to be permitted to take adv | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Cleveland v. Salwen
green
2 sentences1979In Helme v. Philadephia Life Insurance, 61 Pa. 107, 110 (1869), a case more hoary even than Smith, but cited with approval in Cleveland v. Salwen, 292 Pa. 427 , 141 Atl. 155 (1928), the court said: “If it was the practice of the company to notify the plaintiff of the times her premiums were due and payable, and omitted on the occasion of the default; or if they so dealt with her as to induce a belief that the clause of forfeiture would not be insisted on in her case, in case of a dereliction of payment at the day, . . . and thus put her off her guard, they ought not to be permitted to take adv 1979In Helme v. Philadephia Life Insurance, 61 Pa. 107, 110 (1869), a case more hoary even than Smith, but cited with approval in Cleveland v. Salwen, 292 Pa. 427 , 141 Atl. 155 (1928), the court said: “If it was the practice of the company to notify the plaintiff of the times her premiums were due and payable, and omitted on the occasion of the default; or if they so dealt with her as to induce a belief that the clause of forfeiture would not be insisted on in her case, in case of a dereliction of payment at the day, . . . and thus put her off her guard, they ought not to be permitted to take adv | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Commonwealth v. Riggs
green
2 sentences1976See Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407 , 350 A.2d 829 (1975); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 465 Pa. 208 , 348 A.2d 429 (1975); Commonwealth v. Webs ter, — Pa. —, — A. 2d — (1975); Commo nwealth I continue of the belief that the rule which has evolved is unnecessary, unwarranted and unwise, and should be changed. 1976See Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407 , 350 A.2d 829 (1975); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 465 Pa. 208 , 348 A.2d 429 (1975); Commonwealth v. Webs ter, — Pa. —, — A. 2d — (1975); Commo nwealth I continue of the belief that the rule which has evolved is unnecessary, unwarranted and unwise, and should be changed. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos
green
2 sentences1975While I continue of the belief that our rule relating to discovery should be liberalized, see my concurring opinion in Shiomos, 457 Pa. at 110-111 , 320 A.2d at 137-38 , I believe that revision of that sort must occur through the orderly process of amendment rather than haphazardly, on a piecemeal basis. 1975While I continue of the belief that our rule relating to discovery should be liberalized, see my concurring opinion in Shiomos, 457 Pa. at 110-111 , 320 A.2d at 137-38 , I believe that revision of that sort must occur through the orderly process of amendment rather than haphazardly, on a piecemeal basis. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Thomas v. Boyle
neutral
1 sentence1928That being found against them, the adverse award necessarily followed.” The real purpose to obtain a forfeiture is made emphatically manifest by the admission of one lessor that “we talked about selling the place at the expiration of the lease, and thought we could get a better price for it without a tenant in it.” Here certainly was no proof of good faith on the part of the property owners in their efforts to oust their tenants: Thomas v. Boyle, 265 Pa. 487 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.