14 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1939–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2011In so doing, we follow the example of Davis v. State, an analogous circumstance in which the affidavit at issue was “far from exemplary.” 202 S.W.3d 149, 157-58 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). 2011In so doing, we follow the example of Davis v. State , an analogous circumstance in which the affidavit at issue was "far from exemplary." 202 S.W.3d 149, 157-58 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). | 2 | 2 |
HOLY CROSS CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST v. Wolfgreen2 sentences2008“Because the Petitioner was uncertain of the right of appeal, combined with the heavy burden of proving abuse of discretion, the Petitioner did not file a timely appeal.” “Assertions of fact, not plead in the alternative, in the live pleadings of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions.” Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Houston First Am. 2008“Because the Petitioner was uncertain of the right of appeal, combined with the heavy burden of proving abuse of discretion, the Petitioner did not file a timely appeal.” “Assertions of fact, not plead in the alternative, in the live pleadings of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions.” Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Houston First Am. | 2 | 2 |
Napier v. Mooneyhamgreen2 sentences1990In White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1983, pet. ref’d), the court said: “Proof of an evil or malicious intent is not an element of reckless driving.” The court in Napier v. Mooneyham, 94 S.W.2d 564, 567-68 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1936, writ dism’d), stated that “reckless disregard” includes essential characteristics of gross negligence, and indicates an entire want of care sufficient to raise the belief or presumption that the act or omission complained of was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the person or persons affected by it. 1939Napier v. Mooneyhan, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 564 ; Campbell v. Paschall, 132 Com.App. 226, 121 S.W.2d 593 ; Patterson v. Tomlinson, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 645 , writ refused; Vernon’s Ann. | 1 | 2 |
White v. Stategreen1 sentence1990In White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1983, pet. ref’d), the court said: “Proof of an evil or malicious intent is not an element of reckless driving.” The court in Napier v. Mooneyham, 94 S.W.2d 564, 567-68 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1936, writ dism’d), stated that “reckless disregard” includes essential characteristics of gross negligence, and indicates an entire want of care sufficient to raise the belief or presumption that the act or omission complained of was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the person or persons affected by it. | 1 | 1 |
Burt v. Lochausengreen2 sentences1970There must be an entire want of care so as to raise the belief or presumption that the act complained of was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare or safety of persons affected by it.” As recognized by the courts in many opinions, and noted in passing in Burt v. Lochausen, 151 Tex. 289 , 249 S.W.2d 194, 200 (1952) where excessive speed alone is the cause of an accident the case is one of ordinary negligence and not of gross negligence as contemplated under Texas’ “Guest Statute”. 1970There must be an entire want of care so as to raise the belief or presumption that the act complained of was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare or safety of persons affected by it.” As recognized by the courts in many opinions, and noted in passing in Burt v. Lochausen, 151 Tex. 289 , 249 S.W.2d 194, 200 (1952) where excessive speed alone is the cause of an accident the case is one of ordinary negligence and not of gross negligence as contemplated under Texas’ “Guest Statute”. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chaidez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012Feb. 2, 2012) (“It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court could apply the rule in Padilla itself without a belief that the rule applied retroactively.”); but see Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Padilla v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2012Having concluded that Padilla applies to appellant’s case, we now turn to consider whether appellant has satisfied the first prong of Strickland by demonstrating that his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Ballard
green
1 sentence2007To the contrary, we find that consideration of all of the facts together permits the reasonable inference that Jones’s observations included those made near the statutory distance even if appellant’s vehicle was further away when he first noticed it. 7 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling, Ballard, 987 S.W.2d at 891 , we hold the court did not abuse its discretion by finding reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1998Rule 44.2(a) represents the old Texas standard which was itself based on the federal harm analysis of constitutional error enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , (1967) (to disregard constitutional error, reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt"). 1998Rule 44.2(a) represents the old Texas standard which was itself based on the federal harm analysis of constitutional error enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , (1967) (to disregard constitutional error, reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt"). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls
green
1 sentence1990The language in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.1981), is significant in determining the meaning of “reckless disregard” for the safety of others. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sullivan v. Barnett
green
1 sentence1982A related exception is that previously discussed in Sullivan v. Barnett, supra, that being the subsequent conduct on the part of both grantor and grantee demonstrated a belief no error existed in the deed. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
TEXAS EMPLOYERS'INSURANCE ASSOCIATION v. Hudgins
neutral
1 sentence1974Ass’n v. Hudgins, supra. The ultimate issue in a case such as this is the claimant’s belief that the claim had been filed. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Linn v. Nored
green
1 sentence1949In Linn v. Nored, Tex.Civ.App., 133 S.W.2d 234, 237 , error dismissed, the court announced the classic interpretation of the law in Texas, as follows: “* * * (under our guest statute) the host is not liable for injury to the guest, except where caused by his heedless or his reckless disregard of the rights of others; or, as our courts have construed those terms, where he is guilty of gross negligence as that term has been defined by our courts. * * * And before one may recover under the guest statute he must show that the host’s ‘heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others’ was | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Aycock v. Green
neutral
1 sentence1949In the case of Aycock v. Green, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 894, 898 , error dismissed, the .court said: “ * * * By that last movement, by that slight miscalculation of distance, the grievous tragedy was accomplished. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Wood v. Orts
green
1 sentence1949In Linn v. Nored, Tex.Civ.App., 133 S.W.2d 234, 237 , error dismissed, the court announced the classic interpretation of the law in Texas, as follows: “* * * (under our guest statute) the host is not liable for injury to the guest, except where caused by his heedless or his reckless disregard of the rights of others; or, as our courts have construed those terms, where he is guilty of gross negligence as that term has been defined by our courts. * * * And before one may recover under the guest statute he must show that the host’s ‘heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others’ was | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly
green
1 sentence1942A more complete statement of this appeal, based upon our certificate, the question certified and the Supreme Court’s answer, will be found in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly et ux., Tex.Com.App., 165 S.W.2d 446 , not yet published [in State reports]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Campbell v. Paschall
green
1 sentence1939Napier v. Mooneyhan, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 564 ; Campbell v. Paschall, 132 Com.App. 226, 121 S.W.2d 593 ; Patterson v. Tomlinson, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 645 , writ refused; Vernon’s Ann. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Patterson v. Tomlinson
green
1 sentence1939Napier v. Mooneyhan, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 564 ; Campbell v. Paschall, 132 Com.App. 226, 121 S.W.2d 593 ; Patterson v. Tomlinson, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 645 , writ refused; Vernon’s Ann. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.