belief error in Missouri

2019Given that probable cause only requires a belief that a violation may have occurred, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), it is an insufficiently low standard.

2019Given that probable cause only requires a belief that a violation may have occurred, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), it is an insufficiently low standard.

1990“The patrolman disclosed no known reason to believe, and did not express the belief at the hearing, that the trunk contained any contraband or evidence which could be used in the prosecution of a felony he had probable cause to believe had been or was being committed_” Id. at 283 .

1990"The patrolman disclosed no known reason to believe, and did not express the belief at the hearing, that the trunk contained any contraband or evidence which could be used in the prosecution of a felony he had probable cause to believe had been or was being committed...." Id. at 283 .

1979If Chapman applies, we would be compelled to hold that a failure of counsel to meet the “reasonably competent lawyer” standard would constitute federal constitutional error and that such error would compel an automatic reversal unless the reviewing court were able to declare a belief that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. l.c. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ).

1979If Chapman applies, we would be compelled to hold that a failure of counsel to meet the "reasonably competent lawyer" standard would constitute federal constitutional error and that such error would compel an automatic reversal unless the reviewing court were able to declare a belief that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. l.c. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ).

1979The two federal decisions referred to by the principal opinion, Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978) and Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1979), speak about the petitioner having a “heavy burden” to prove unfairness resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, and that there is a “presumption” that counsel is competent and that petitioner is under a “heavy burden” to override this presumption.

1979The two federal decisions referred to by the principal opinion, Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978) and Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1979), speak about the petitioner having a "heavy burden" to prove unfairness resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, and that there is a "presumption" that counsel is competent and that petitioner is under a "heavy burden" to override this presumption.

1979In my opinion, Hood, supra, erroneously places the burden of showing prejudice on the accused.

1979In my opinion, Hood, supra, erroneously places the burden of showing prejudice on the accused.

1979The two federal decisions referred to by the principal opinion, Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978) and Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1979), speak about the petitioner having a “heavy burden” to prove unfairness resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, and that there is a “presumption” that counsel is competent and that petitioner is under a “heavy burden” to override this presumption.

1979The two federal decisions referred to by the principal opinion, Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978) and Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1979), speak about the petitioner having a "heavy burden" to prove unfairness resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, and that there is a "presumption" that counsel is competent and that petitioner is under a "heavy burden" to override this presumption.

1975See Hester v. Spradling, 508 S.W.2d 194 (Mo.App.1974); Thomas v. Schaffner, 448 S.W.2d 319 (Mo.App.1969); Gooch v. Spradling, supra. The court makes the foregoing observations in order to show that giving persons a reasonable time to exercise their rights to consult with an attorney or someone in their behalf will not undermine the purpose of § 564.441 et seq., nor affect the validity of the test results.

1940There are exceptional circumstances, however, under which the rule of the Schierbaum case is inapplicable. [Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533 , 108 S. W. 46 ; Meier v. Buchter, 197 Mo. 68 , 94 S. W. 883 .] In the Teckenbrock case (1. e. 542) Judge Lamm expressed the belief that the rule Avould not apply “in a case where there is only one devisee or legatee to be affected by avoiding the will.” While his statement was obiter it'is based on sound logic.

1940There are exceptional circumstances, however, under which the rule of the Schierbaum case is inapplicable. [Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533 , 108 S. W. 46 ; Meier v. Buchter, 197 Mo. 68 , 94 S. W. 883 .] In the Teckenbrock case (1. e. 542) Judge Lamm expressed the belief that the rule Avould not apply “in a case where there is only one devisee or legatee to be affected by avoiding the will.” While his statement was obiter it'is based on sound logic.

1940There are exceptional circumstances, however, under which the rule of the Schierbaum case is inapplicable. [Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533 , 108 S. W. 46 ; Meier v. Buchter, 197 Mo. 68 , 94 S. W. 883 .] In the Teckenbrock case (1. e. 542) Judge Lamm expressed the belief that the rule Avould not apply “in a case where there is only one devisee or legatee to be affected by avoiding the will.” While his statement was obiter it'is based on sound logic.

1940There are exceptional circumstances, however, under which the rule of the Schierbaum case is inapplicable. [Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533 , 108 S. W. 46 ; Meier v. Buchter, 197 Mo. 68 , 94 S. W. 883 .] In the Teckenbrock case (1. e. 542) Judge Lamm expressed the belief that the rule Avould not apply “in a case where there is only one devisee or legatee to be affected by avoiding the will.” While his statement was obiter it'is based on sound logic.

1917WILLIAMS, J.. (dissenting) — I dissent for the reason that while I am of the opinion that the proviso in the Assessors’ Act (Sec. 11341, R.~ S. 1909) is unconstitutional, yet I am of the further opinion that the remaining portion of the act supplies a valid, statute complete within itself, and that the remaining portion is of such character as to justify the belief and presumption that the Legislature would have enacted it even though the proviso had been omitted or its invalidity been known. [State ex rel. v. Gordon, 236 Mo. 142 , l. c. 170; State ex inf. v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680 ; Cooley’s C

1917WILLIAMS, J.. (dissenting) — I dissent for the reason that while I am of the opinion that the proviso in the Assessors’ Act (Sec. 11341, R.~ S. 1909) is unconstitutional, yet I am of the further opinion that the remaining portion of the act supplies a valid, statute complete within itself, and that the remaining portion is of such character as to justify the belief and presumption that the Legislature would have enacted it even though the proviso had been omitted or its invalidity been known. [State ex rel. v. Gordon, 236 Mo. 142 , l. c. 170; State ex inf. v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680 ; Cooley’s C

1917WILLIAMS, J.. (dissenting) — I dissent for the reason that while I am of the opinion that the proviso in the Assessors’ Act (Sec. 11341, R.~ S. 1909) is unconstitutional, yet I am of the further opinion that the remaining portion of the act supplies a valid, statute complete within itself, and that the remaining portion is of such character as to justify the belief and presumption that the Legislature would have enacted it even though the proviso had been omitted or its invalidity been known. [State ex rel. v. Gordon, 236 Mo. 142 , l. c. 170; State ex inf. v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680 ; Cooley’s C