Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiayellow1 sentence1970In the case before us we are of the belief that the error in admitting the evidence of the prior conviction for drunkenness, assuming, arguendo, that it was error, “was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yourik v. Mallonee
green
2 sentences2008The Yourik Court also quoted with approval from the Restatement (First) of Property, stating, 174 Md.App. at 430-31 , 921 A.2d 869 (emphasis added and omitted): “To be adverse it is not essential that a use ... be made either in the belief or under a claim that it is legally justified. 2008The Yourik Court also quoted with approval from the Restatement (First) of Property, stating, 174 Md.App. at 430-31 , 921 A.2d 869 (emphasis added and omitted): “To be adverse it is not essential that a use ... be made either in the belief or under a claim that it is legally justified. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Miller v. Montgomery County
green
1 sentence2019Together with other evidence, that could lead to a further inference that Montgomery County tampered with the evidence because it was guilty of the wrong of which it was accused[.]" *131 Id. at 560-61 , 694 A.2d 150 (quoting Miller , 64 Md. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Anderson v. Litzenberg
green
1 sentence2019Together with other evidence, that could lead to a further inference that Montgomery County tampered with the evidence because it was guilty of the wrong of which it was accused[.]" *131 Id. at 560-61 , 694 A.2d 150 (quoting Miller , 64 Md. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wilson v. State
green
1 sentence2008The Yourik Court also quoted with approval from the Restatement (First) of Property, stating, 174 Md.App. at 440-41 , 921 A.2d 881 (emphasis added and omitted): “To be adverse it is not essential that a use ... be made either in the belief or under a claim that it is legally justified. ■ It is, however, necessary that the one making it shall not recognize in those as against whom it is claimed *345 to be adverse an authority either to prevent or to permit its continuance. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Halper
red
2 sentences1995The Court expressed the belief that the principle it was announcing was intended “for the rare case ... such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small- gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused.” Id. at 449 , 109 S.Ct. at 1902 . 1995The Court expressed the belief that the principle it was announcing was intended “for the rare case ... such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small- gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused.” Id. at 449 , 109 S.Ct. at 1902 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Trusty v. State
green
2 sentences1987Upon its independent constitutional appraisal of the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress, it was unable to share the belief of the hearing court that the State had met its burden of establishing that the police had probable cause for the arrest. 3 After carefully reviewing the evidence produced at the hearing, the intermediate appellate court concluded: “[T]he State simply failed to prove affirmatively the foundation for [the arresting officer’s] belief that he was witnessing a drug transaction.” Trusty v. State, 67 Md.App. 620, 629 , 508 A.2d 1018 (1986). 1987Upon its independent constitutional appraisal of the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress, it was unable to share the belief of the hearing court that the State had met its burden of establishing that the police had probable cause for the arrest. 3 After carefully reviewing the evidence produced at the hearing, the intermediate appellate court concluded: “[T]he State simply failed to prove affirmatively the foundation for [the arresting officer’s] belief that he was witnessing a drug transaction.” Trusty v. State, 67 Md.App. 620, 629 , 508 A.2d 1018 (1986). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences1986Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). 1986Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fahy v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence1970Of course, if we could find that there was no reasonable possibility that the prior convictions, even though *185 admitted in error, might have contributed to appellant’s conviction, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85, 86-87 , we could declare a belief that the error in admitting them was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman v. State of California, supra, at 24, and further proceedings-would not be necessary. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Coit v. State
neutral
1 sentence1969In Coit v. State, 7 Md. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.