15 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. Cingular Wirelessgreen2 sentences2025Rather, in Scott, the Supreme Court decided that a class action waiver in a cellular service subscriber contract was substantially unconscionable violating public policy because it effectively exculpated Cingular Wireless from potential liability, given that the claims were individually small and “practically, attorneys are generally unwilling to take on individual arbitrations to recover trivial amounts of money.” 160 Wn.2d at 847, 854-57 . 2025As the Scott court recognized, “[t]his is, of course, precisely why class actions were created in the first place.” 160 Wn.2d at 856 . | 3 | 3 |
Billups v. Bankfirstgreen2 sentences2007See also, e.g., Billups v. Bankfirst, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1265 , 1276 n.6 (M.D. 2007Id. at 1275 ; see also Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting on similar grounds the argument that the arbitration clause was unconscionable because without a class procedure the plaintiff would be unable to maintain her legal representation); Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374 (stating in response to the argument the TILA’s goal of encouraging private actions conflicted with an arbitration agreement precluding class actions that because attorney fees are recoverable under the TILA, “arbitration [will not] necessarily choke off the supply of lawyers”); Jenki | 2 | 2 |
Adkins v. Labor Ready, Incorporatedgreen2 sentences2007See generally, e.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir.2002); Schultz v. AT & T Wireless *1014 Servs., Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 685, 690 (N.D.W.Va.2005); O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F.Supp.2d 512, 520 (M.D.La.2003); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 201 (Tex.App.2003). 2007See generally, e.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002); Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 (N.D. | 2 | 2 |
Lynne A. Carnegie, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Household International, Inc.green2 sentences2007See Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 2007See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). | 2 | 2 |
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.green2 sentences2007See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 , 105 S. Ct. 3346 , 87 L. 2007See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 , 105 S. Ct. 3346 , 87 L. | 2 | 2 |
Schultz v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc.green2 sentences2007See generally, e.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir.2002); Schultz v. AT & T Wireless *1014 Servs., Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 685, 690 (N.D.W.Va.2005); O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F.Supp.2d 512, 520 (M.D.La.2003); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 201 (Tex.App.2003). 2007See generally, e.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002); Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 (N.D. | 2 | 2 |
Discover Bank v. Superior Courtred2 sentences2007App. 41, 49 , 17 P.3d 1266 (2001); see generally Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162 . ¶12 We turn to whether this class action waiver is unconscionable because it undermines Washington’s CPA to the extent that it is “injurious to the public.” See King, 125 Wn.2d at 511 . 2007As our sister court said, “ ‘[a] company which wrongfully extracts a dollar from each of millions of customers will reap a handsome profit; the class action is often the only effective way to halt and redress such exploitation.’ ” Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 156 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381, 387 , 556 P.2d 755 , 134 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1976) (Tobriner, J., concurring)). ¶18 Of course, on its face, the class action waiver does not exculpate Cingular from anything; it merely channels dispute resolution into individual arbitration proceedings or small claims court. | 1 | 2 |
Luna v. Household Finance Corp. IIIgreen2 sentences2007Cf. Luna, 236 F.Supp.2d at 1177-79 (finding under Washington law that class action waiver in an arbitration rider was substantively unconscionable). ¶ 21 Like the arbitration clause found unconscionable in Zuver , this class action waiver effectively prevents one party to the contract, the consumer, from pursuing valid claims, effectively exculpating the drafter from potential liability for small claims, no matter how widespread. 2007The court said that all of these aspects of the agreement, “taken together, grossly favor[ed] Household.” Id. at 1182-83 . ¶55 Thus, mere one-sidedness of the class action waiver in the sense that the defendant was unlikely to seek to bring a class suit against its customers did not, in and of itself, render the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable. | 1 | 2 |
King v. Rivelandgreen2 sentences2007Co., 117 Wash.App. 438, 447-48 , 72 P.3d 220 (2003); Stein v. Geonerco, Inc., 105 Wash.App. 41, 49 , 17 P.3d 1266 (2001). ¶ 12 We turn to whether this class action waiver is unconscionable because it undermines Washington's CPA to the extent that it is "injurious to the public." See King, 125 Wash.2d at 511 , 886 P.2d 160 . 2007App. 41, 49 , 17 P.3d 1266 (2001); see generally Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162 . ¶12 We turn to whether this class action waiver is unconscionable because it undermines Washington’s CPA to the extent that it is “injurious to the public.” See King, 125 Wn.2d at 511 . | 1 | 2 |
Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2007Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, 153 Wash.2d 293 , 301 n. 2, 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citing cases). ¶ 48 In accord with the importance of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms when possible, the majority should, like other courts, determine whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable on a case-by-case basis, considering all the surrounding circumstances. 2007Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, 153 Wn.2d 293 , 301 n.2, 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citing cases). ¶48 In accord with the importance of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms when possible, the majority should, like other courts, determine whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable on a case-by-case basis, considering all the surrounding circumstances. | 1 | 2 |
Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2007Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, 153 Wash.2d 293 , 301 n. 2, 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citing cases). ¶ 48 In accord with the importance of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms when possible, the majority should, like other courts, determine whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable on a case-by-case basis, considering all the surrounding circumstances. 2007Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, 153 Wn.2d 293 , 301 n.2, 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citing cases). ¶48 In accord with the importance of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms when possible, the majority should, like other courts, determine whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable on a case-by-case basis, considering all the surrounding circumstances. | 1 | 2 |
Stein v. Geonerco, Inc.green2 sentences2007App. 41, 49 , 17 P.3d 1266 (2001); see generally Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162 . ¶12 We turn to whether this class action waiver is unconscionable because it undermines Washington’s CPA to the extent that it is “injurious to the public.” See King, 125 Wn.2d at 511 . 2007App. 41 , 17 P.3d 1266 (2001). ¶52 Finally, the majority suggests that the class action waiver unilaterally limits the remedies of only one side. | 1 | 2 |
McKee v. AT&T Corp.green1 sentence2026Cf. McKee, 164 Wn.2d at 397 (invalidating a class action waiver because the individual claims were extremely small, “under $2 per month”). | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Cingular Wirelessgreen2 sentences2008See Scott, 160 Wash.2d at 858 , 161 P.3d 1000 . 2008Id. | 1 | 1 |
| Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delawaregreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'QUIN v. Verizon Wirelessgreen | 1 | 1 |
Dix v. ICT Group, Inc.green1 sentence2007The Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, unquestionably embodies the legislature’s statement of strong public policy favoring private actions to enforce the act in addition to actions brought by the attorney general. “[C]lass suits are an important tool for carrying out the dual enforcement scheme of the CPA.” Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 837, ¶24 , 161 P.3d 1016 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
| Adler v. Fred Lind Manorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Terry Johnson v. West Suburban Bank Tele-Cash Inc. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware Tele-Cash Inc. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delawaregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stein v. Geonerco, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend
green
2 sentences2018Comcast Corp. v. Behrend , 569 U.S. 27 , 33, 133 S.Ct. 1426 , 185 L.Ed. 2d 515 (2013). 2018Comcast Corp. v. Behrend , 569 U.S. 27 , 33, 133 S.Ct. 1426 , 185 L.Ed. 2d 515 (2013). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Lowden v. T-MOBILE USA, INC.
green
2 sentences2008For example, Judge Gould, writing for the Ninth Circuit, recently applied Scott to invalidate a class action waiver in Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2008). 2008For example, Judge Gould, writing for the Ninth Circuit, recently applied Scott to invalidate a class action waiver in Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir.2008). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
green
2 sentences2007In rejecting a claim that the bar on class proceedings in an arbitration agreement had the effect of immunizing the company from low-value claims, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it "must take into account that both federal and [the relevant state] policy favor arbitration as a method of dispute resolution" and concluded that "the fact that certain litigation devices may not be available in an arbitration is part and parcel of arbitration's ability to offer `simplicity, informality, and expedition.'" Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 159 , 174 (5th Cir.2004) ( 2007In rejecting a claim that the bar on class proceedings in an arbitration agreement had the effect of immunizing the company from low-value claims, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it “must take into account that both federal and [the relevant state] policy favor arbitration as a method of dispute resolution” and concluded that “the fact that certain litigation devices may not be available in an arbitration is part and parcel of arbitration’s ability to offer ‘simplicity, informality, and expedition.’ ” Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wire less, LLC, 379 F.3d 159 , 174 (5th Cir. 2004) | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Discover Bank v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2007Id. [2] In Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.2006), the First Circuit held that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement was not enforceable because it meant that individual plaintiffs would be unable to vindicate statutory rights, contravening the holdings in United States Supreme Court decisions. 2007Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 4th 886 , 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (2005), petition for review and depublication request denied, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 4098 (Mar. 29,2006). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2007As our sister court said, “ ‘[a] company which wrongfully extracts a dollar from each of millions of customers will reap a handsome profit; the class action is often the only effective way to halt and redress such exploitation.’ ” Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 156 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381, 387 , 556 P.2d 755 , 134 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1976) (Tobriner, J., concurring)). ¶18 Of course, on its face, the class action waiver does not exculpate Cingular from anything; it merely channels dispute resolution into individual arbitration proceedings or small claims court. 2007As our sister court said, “ ‘[a] company which wrongfully extracts a dollar from each of millions of customers will reap a handsome profit; the class action is often the only effective way to halt and redress such exploitation.’ ” Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 156 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381, 387 , 556 P.2d 755 , 134 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1976) (Tobriner, J., concurring)). ¶18 Of course, on its face, the class action waiver does not exculpate Cingular from anything; it merely channels dispute resolution into individual arbitration proceedings or small claims court. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC
green
2 sentences2007E.g., Discover Bank, 36 Cal.4th at 165-66 , 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 76 , 113 P.3d 1100 ; Kinkel, 223 Ill.2d at 19 , 306 Ill.Dec. 157 , 857 N.E.2d 250 . *1009 ¶ 26 By its terms, the class action waiver is not severable from the arbitration clause. 2007E.g., Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 165-66 ; Kinkel, 223 Ill. 2d at 19 . ¶26 By its terms, the class action waiver is not severable from the arbitration clause. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Insurance
green
2 sentences2007E.g., Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash.2d at 784-85 , 719 P.2d 531 . [1] The California court noted in Discover Bank that the plaintiff had not relied on the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act; rather, the plaintiff brought the action under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, Del.Code Ann. title 6, §§ 2511-2527, and Delaware contract law. 2007E.g., Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn.2d 778 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC
green
2 sentences2007In rejecting a claim that the bar on class proceedings in an arbitration agreement had the effect of immunizing the company from low-value claims, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it "must take into account that both federal and [the relevant state] policy favor arbitration as a method of dispute resolution" and concluded that "the fact that certain litigation devices may not be available in an arbitration is part and parcel of arbitration's ability to offer `simplicity, informality, and expedition.'" Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 159 , 174 (5th Cir.2004) ( 2007In rejecting a claim that the bar on class proceedings in an arbitration agreement had the effect of immunizing the company from low-value claims, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it “must take into account that both federal and [the relevant state] policy favor arbitration as a method of dispute resolution” and concluded that “the fact that certain litigation devices may not be available in an arbitration is part and parcel of arbitration’s ability to offer ‘simplicity, informality, and expedition.’ ” Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wire less, LLC, 379 F.3d 159 , 174 (5th Cir. 2004) | 2 | 2007–2007 |
cluster 794138
green
2 sentences2007In Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006), the First Circuit held that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement was not enforceable because it meant that individual plaintiffs would be unable to vindicate statutory rights, contravening the holdings in United States Supreme Court decisions. 2007In these circumstances, the class action bar precluded the plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights, and thus, the court held, the “[p]laintiffs cannot be compelled to arbitrate their antitrust claims, both state and federal, if that bar remains in place.” Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Oda v. State
green
2 sentences2007But “[n]otwithstanding the rule of liberal interpretation, . . . the class action rule does not contemplate automatic affirmance whenever a trial court certifies a class.” Oda, 111 Wn. 2007But "[n]otwithstanding the rule of liberal interpretation, . . . the class action rule does not contemplate automatic affirmance whenever a trial court certifies a class." Oda, 111 Wash. App. at 92 , 44 P.3d 8 . "[A]ctual, [and] not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains . . . indispensable." [3] Gen. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
DeFunis v. Odegaard
green
2 sentences2002“Class actions are specialized types of suits, and as a general rule must be brought and maintained in strict conformity with the requirements of CR 23.” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 84 Wn.2d 617, 622 , 529 P.2d 438 (1974). 2002“Class actions are specialized types of suits, and as a general rule must be brought and maintained in strict conformity with the requirements of CR 23.” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 84 Wn.2d 617, 622 , 529 P.2d 438 (1974). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Anderson v. STATE, DSHS
green
1 sentence2025App. 452, 453-54 , 63 P.3d 134 (2003). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Anderson v. Department of Social & Health Services
green
1 sentence2025Anderson v. Department of Social & Health Services considered a class action claim for compensation under the MWA for time that state employees spent commuting on an employer-provided ferry to work at the Special Commitment Center (SCC), a secure confinement facility located on McNeil Island. 115 Wn. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wash. State Nurses Ass'n v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc.
green
1 sentence2024We also observed that “it [was] undisputed that the nurses could pursue a class action claim against Yakima [HMA].” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lacey Nursing Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2021DOR moved to dismiss the class action refund claims, arguing that a claim for a refund of a REET that has already been paid falls within the exclusive scope of RCW 82.32.180. 5 DOR asserted that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lacey Nursing Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 128 Wn.2d 40 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995), a class action claim for an excise tax refund under RCW 82.32.180 cannot proceed. 2021DOR moved to dismiss the class action refund claims, arguing that a claim for a refund of a REET that has already been paid falls within the exclusive scope of RCW 82.32.180. 5 DOR asserted that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lacey Nursing Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 128 Wn.2d 40 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995), a class action claim for an excise tax refund under RCW 82.32.180 cannot proceed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Oda v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Dix v. ICT Group, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Tsadilas v. Providian National Bank green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Gras v. Associates First Capital Corp. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Heaphy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.